



Meta-Review: Interventions for Sustainable Natural Resource Management in Lesotho, 1970-2020

Final report



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Interventions for Sustainable
Natural Resource Management
in Lesotho, 1970-2020**

Final report
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ReNOKA (“we are a river”) is a national programme and citizen movement for the restoration of land and water in Lesotho and the Orange-Senqu River Basin. Support for ReNOKA is provided through a partnership between the Government of Lesotho, the European Union and the German Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ). The EU and BMZ contributions are implemented through a technical assistance project “Support to Integrated Catchment Management in Lesotho” by the Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ) GmbH.

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Opinions expressed in this report are those of the authors and not necessarily of the contracting agency. The authors take full responsibility for the contents and opinions expressed in this study.

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List of acronyms

ABC	All Basotho Convention
AD	Alliance of Democrats
ADF	African Development Foundation
AMCP	The Agricultural Marketing and Credit Project
ARC	Agricultural Research Council
AWPB	Annual Work Plan Budget
BASP	Basic Agricultural Support Project
BB	Butha-Buthe
BNP	Basotho National Party
CARE	Cooperative for Assistance and Relief Everywhere
CCF	Community Conservation Forum
CIDA	Canadian International Agency
CMBSL	Conserving Mountain Biodiversity in Southern Lesotho
CO	Country Office
COP	Conference of Parties
CRS	Catholic Relief Service
CSIF	Country Strategic Investment Framework
CSO	Civil Society Organization
CTA	Chief Technical Advisor
DAO	District Agricultural office/rs
DC	Democratic Congress
DDC	District Development Committee
DLS	Department of Livestock Services
DOC	Document
DoE	Department of Environment
DPCC	District Project Coordination Committee
DPIC	District Project Implementation Committee
DRRM	Department of Range Resources Management
DWA	Department of Water Affairs
FAO	Food and Agricultural Organization
FISC	Farm Improvement with Soil Conservation
FMC	Financial Management Committees
GA	Grazing Association
GEF	Global Environment Facility
GEO	Global Environment Objective
GIS	Global Information System
GIS-WIS	Geographic Information System
GIZ	Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit GmbH
GoL	Government of Lesotho
GTZ	Deutsche Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit
HIV/AIDS	Human Immunodeficiency Virus/Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome
ICM	Integrated Catchment Management
ICR	Implementation Completion and Results Report
ICRA	International Cultivar Registration Authority
IDA	International Development Agency
IFAD	International Fund for Agricultural Development
IGA	Income Generating Activity
ILUP	Institute of Land Use Planning
IRAL	Innovative Rural Action Learning
IWRM	Integrated Water Resource Management
KM	Knowledge Management

LADB	Lesotho Agricultural Development Bank
LAPIS	Lesotho Agricultural and Institutional Support
LASA	Lesotho Agricultural Sector Analysis
LASAP	Lesotho Adaptation of Small-Scale Agricultural Production
LCD	Lesotho Congress for Democracy
LCU	Labour Construction Unit
LDC	Least Developed Countries
LHDA	Lesotho Highlands Development Authority
LHWP	Lesotho Highlands Water Project
LISP	Local Initiative Support Project
LNWMGA	Lesotho National Wool and Mohair Growers Association
LRAP	Livelihoods Recovery Through Agriculture Programme
LTDC	Lesotho Tourism Development Cooperation
LULUCF	Land Use and Land Use Change and Forestry
LUPD	Land use Planning Department
LWRDP	Land and Water Resources Development Project
M&E	Monitoring and Evaluation
MACM	Ministry of Agriculture Cooperatives and Marketing
MAFS	Ministry of Agriculture and Food Security
MCA	Millennium Compact Account
MDTCDP	Maloti-Drakensberg Transfrontier Conservation and Development Project
METT	Management Effectiveness Tracking Tool
MFDP	Ministry of Finance and Development Planning
MFLR	Ministry of Forestry and Land Reclamation
MFRSC	Ministry of Forestry, Range and Soil Conservation
MFS	Machobane Farming System
MFT	Mafeteng
MICARD	Ministry of Interior Chieftainship Affairs and Rural Development
MoA	Ministry of Agriculture
MoAFS	Ministry of Agriculture and Food Security
MoI	Ministry of Interior
MoLG	Ministry of Local Government
MOLGC	Ministry of Local Government and Chieftainship
MoU	Memorandum of Understanding
MOW	Ministry of Water
MRA	Managed Resource Area(s)
MRC	Managed Resource Committee
MTE	Mid-Term Evaluation
MTEC	Ministry of Tourism, Environment and Culture
MTEF	Medium-Term Expenditure Framework
MTICM	Ministry of Trade and Industry, Cooperatives and Marketing
MTICM	Ministry of Trade Industry, Cooperatives and Marketing
MTR	Mid-term Review
MU	Management Unit
NAP	National Action Plan
NBFI	Non-Bank Financial Intermediation
NEPAD	New Partnership for Africa Development
NES	National Environment Secretariat
NGO	Non-Governmental Organization
NPM	National Medicine Policy
NRM	Natural Resource Management
NSDP	National Strategic Development Plan
OFID	OPEC Fund for International Development
ORASECOM	Orange-Senqu River Commission
PA	Protected Area

PAD	Project Appraisal Document
PCC	Project Coordination Committee
PCU	Project Coordination Unit
PDO	Project Development Objective
PELUM	Participatory Ecological Land Use Management
PFO	Principal Field Officer
PICSA	The Participatory Integrated Climate Services for Agriculture Approach
PIMS	Project Information Management System
PIP	Project Implementation Plan
PIU	Project Implementation Unit
PM	Project Manager
PMU	Project Management Unit
PPA	Project Performance Assessment
PS	Principal Secretary or Permanent Secretary
PSC	Project Steering Committee
PSP	Priority Support Programme
PTC	Production Through Conservation
RC	Resident Coordinator
RCL	Reformed Congress of Lesotho
REAL	Restoring Ecosystems and Livelihoods project
REDD	Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation
ReNOKA	We are a River
RMA	Range Management Area
RSA	Republic of South Africa
RTA	Regional Technical Adviser (UNDP)
RUFIP	Rural Financial Intermediation Programme
SACU	Southern African Customs Union
SADC	Southern African Development Community
SADC ELMS	Southern African Development Community Environment Land Management Sector
SADP	Smallholder Agriculture Development Project
SADPMA	Sustainable Agricultural Development Program for the Mountain Areas
SANReMP	Sustainable Agricultural and Natural Resource Management
SAP	Sustainable Action Programme
SGP	Small Grants Programme
SIDA	Swedish International Development Agency
SIDS	Small Island Developing States
SLM	Sustainable Land Management
SLM/W	Sustainable Land Management/Water
SNP	Sehlabathebe National Park
SOWACO	Soil and Water Conservation
SSIDP	Small Scale Irrigation Development Project
SWC	Soil and Water Conservation
SWCLU	Oil and Water Conservation and Land Utilisation Programme
TA	Technical Adviser
TE	Terminal Evaluation
ToC	Theory of Change
UNCCD	United Nations Convention to Combat Desertification
UNCDF	UN Capital Development Fund
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
WAMP/WAMPP	Wool and Mohair Promotion Project
WWF	Worldwide Fund for Nature

Executive summary

This report presents the results of a study done for the national programme for Integrated Catchment Management (ICM), the aim of which is to rehabilitate degraded watersheds across Lesotho and to put in place prevention measures that will halt further degradation of catchment areas in the country. This programme, or movement, has been named ReNOKA. The movement's overall objective is to effectively implement ICM in Lesotho by developing a framework that supports strengthening institutions and coordination among relevant stakeholders.

This study aims to aggregate findings from a series of project documents and reviews, and provide an overview and analysis of the interventions for sustainable natural resource management in Lesotho that were carried out by the Government of Lesotho (GoL) and its international partners between 1970 and 2020. The aim is to present some common lessons learned that can inform ongoing and future interventions to build on an existing body of knowledge for the management of interventions.

Chapter 1 introduces the study and presents, among other issues, the context within which the past projects were implemented. Key factors that affected interventions over the study period include, among others, the use of five-year development plans in the earlier part of the period, the effects of political instability, authoritarian rule and the 1986 military takeover, and the ensuing instability of democratically elected governments to the present day. The study found that despite authoritarian rule and a military coup, there was an increase in the number of externally supported projects in the first three decades under review.

Chapter 2 presents the data collection methods used by the study and describes how data was analysed. As the information required for the study was to be found in project documents (reports, evaluations, reviews, etc.) from various initiatives, the team requested that letters be written to entities known to hold the required documents for the study to allow the team access to such information. This was augmented by internet searches, the use of the team's network of contacts, a review of records from Prof. Ambrose's library, and the use of documents available in the team's library. Appendix 1 of this report provides a list of projects identified as relevant for this study. It lists project information that includes the commencement date, project name and official identification number, the relevant

funding and implementing agencies, duration, and the documents located and used to learn about the project. Appendix 2 presents a list of all the documents found and reviewed.

Project information is presented by decade, and for each of these, a full description of the context is provided – as this underpins project implementation. In addition to context, the study provides details of the most critical findings related to projects for a given decade.

In Chapter 2, the report details the review process undertaken and the results. The documents in Appendix 2 were used to gather information on the character of three phases of the project, namely the (i) initiation/planning and design phase, (ii) implementation phase, and (iii) completion phase, as reported by terminal evaluations or post-project evaluations. The team concentrated on gathering lessons learned from all these documents, as well as recommendations made.

Chapter 3 provides an overview of past interventions. In the first instance, projects are considered in terms of their mode of funding, where consideration is given to whether single or multiple donors funded them. This analysis shows that where several donors are supporting a project, there are complexities resulting from different reporting requirements and the differing agendas of donors. These complicate the work of the Project Implementation Unit (PIU) and result in poor performance. In addition, the analysis shows that in cases where several entities are involved in implementation, problems tend to arise, especially in terms of coordination and high staff turnover. The study also indicates that problems in the PIU are those that significantly affect overall project performance.

Chapter 4 of the report presents a summary of project assessments undertaken. The estimates are based on reviewing a set of projects identified by the team, and for which there were extant documents covering the three phases. The team reviewed projects based on their objectives, lessons learned, and recommendations. The chapter presents the full context of each project over the five-decade period.

Appendix 3 is a table that presents examples of factors that impact project performance and examines which entity (implementing agency, donor, or both) has contributed to the observed situation. The appendix does not cover all projects, but is used

to demonstrate the kind of analysis that ongoing and future initiatives should undertake to understand the inner workings of a project.

Appendix 4, on the other hand, presents lessons, recommendations and remarks on projects that have been reviewed. The information provided is then summarised in the main report, where the lessons learned and the recommendations are categorised by project phase. This is done to provide insights into which part of the project phase seems to generate most lessons and advisory guidance. The most important aspect is the trend that is provided by the analysis; more lessons are to be found in a project's design phase than in any other. The fact that there does not seem to be a decrease in the number of lessons as time goes on is an indication that learning for the purpose of improving project designs does not happen. On the other hand, there is more information available on implementation than design in terms of recommendations in the early decades (1970-1989) and the later decades (2009-2020), compared to the decades between. This implies that there was learning and adoption of recommendations in the mid-decade, which was later reversed.

Chapter 5 presents lessons learned from the externally and locally funded independent initiatives. The most glaring lesson is the lack of recognition of efforts of non-state initiatives, especially local ones. Several studies have evidenced that many local initiatives have shown great promise, but donor and GoL funded projects neither support nor embrace their practices, despite their successes. The most obvious one is the Machobane Farming System, which has proved to be most appropriate for Lesotho, given that it is the most climate-smart system. The other sign is the permaculture work of Bethel Business Development Centre in Phamong Mohale's Hoek. Applying the permaculture principle has contributed to developing a very productive enclave. The centre also has developed a learning system that allows learners with low academic credentials to learn skills to enable them to be self-employed.

Chapter 6 summarises recommendations that we make for the attention of ongoing and future projects. We counsel that the recommendations from earlier projects be used to inform ongoing and future projects, as they contain relevant information. They should be categorised into four groups pertaining to the design, implementation, and post-project review, and those related to the overall context, policy, or institutional framework. This will serve two purposes. Firstly, they will provide an insight into which category has the highest number of recommendations. A casual look at the recommendations from the 24 projects over five decades shows that the largest group relates to project design, followed by those related to the implementation; the least are those associated with the post-project era and those related to the context. Appropriate categorisation will allow for the effective application of lessons learned and associated recommendations.

In Chapter 7, we conclude that there is a large volume of information on lessons learned and recommendations made, but that these are not adequately utilised due to a lack of systemic analysis which could be used to inform ongoing or future projects. We suggest that these be analysed using the method proposed by this study to inform all phases of projects. We also conclude that monitoring and evaluation should be started when other project activities commence to ensure that project experiences are recorded and can contribute to lessons learned. We also recommend some standardisation in terms of evaluations to ensure that results are comparable.

Finally, we conclude that a vital issue for Lesotho's natural resources and ICM is establishing a permanent authority to develop a long-term programme that donors and other entities can support, as opposed to piecemeal, short-term projects. This will help avoid the situation where a five-year project is initiated and makes an impact, which dissipates at the end of its term. This will also prevent the problem of constant policy changes as new projects are started, and donors call for changes that they feel will suit the project they are funding.

CHAPTER 1

Introduction

This report functions as a meta-review of interventions for sustainable natural resource management in Lesotho from 1970–2020, including transboundary projects such as the Lesotho Highlands Water Project (LHWP), the Maloti Drakensberg Transfrontier Project (MDTP), and the Orange-Senqu River Basin Commission (ORASECOM). The assignment is undertaken in response to a Request for Proposals issued by the Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ). GIZ has been commissioned by the European Union and German Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development to support the GoL in the implementation of ICM.¹ The aim of ICM, as articulated by ReNOKA, is to support and empower Lesotho to implement and maintain sustainable measures that will restore and protect the source of the Orange-Senqu River Basin.

ReNOKA represents a network of individuals, communities and professionals that are made stronger by working together, are fluid and growing, and dedicated to the restoration of water, land, and the long-term prosperity of all communities in Lesotho. The goal of ReNOKA is to use the tools of ICM to facilitate stronger economic growth and climate resilience for Lesotho. ReNOKA's vision is that livelihoods and economic development for present and future generations will be improved through the conservation of biodiversity, land, and water resources in the catchment areas of the rivers in Lesotho. This will benefit the country, the Orange-Senqu River Basin, and the entire southern African region.

The terms of reference describe the objectives of the meta-review as being “to provide an overview and analysis of the main interventions on sustainable natural resource management in Lesotho carried out by the Government of Lesotho and its international partners between 1970 and 2020.” The information resulting from this review is meant to support the aims and objectives of ReNOKA in line with climate change adaptation principles.

The specific questions that are addressed here can be summarised as follows:

- What are the sources of success or failure in the projects implemented during the time under review?
- What are the lessons that can be provided to improve performance of the ReNOKA programme?
- What are the identified constraints that must be avoided to enable the sustainability of interventions introduced by the programme?
- How can we ensure the provision of documentation to enable sharing of the knowledge and experiences of successful interventions at community level?
- What have the major barriers and constraints been in upscaling the successful practices identified?

The interventions undertaken during the period 1970–2020 were guided by national policies, international and regional agreements and/or conventions to which Lesotho is a signatory. In the first decade (1970–1979), projects were guided by those policies and practices inherited from the pre- and post-independence period. Chief among these were the Lesotho five-year development plans guided by legislation existing at the time (policies, strategies, plans and activities). The period opened with a political emergency that did not affect governance structures, but rather the effectiveness of the projects in reaching many of the communities. The second decade (1980–1989) commenced with the socio-political conditions of authoritarian, one-party rulership, which was interrupted in 1986 by military rule; this persisted for the rest of the decade. However, this period saw an increase in donor funding for new projects with an emphasis on participatory, bottom-up approaches, and the introduction of community-based natural resource strategies, especially in range resource management. The third decade (1990–1999) ended with a transition from military to democratic rule following multi-party elections.

¹ Integrated Catchment Management is a process where the socio-economic and ecological needs of a river basin are managed for the sustainability of future generations using multiple approaches. Available at: <https://ReNOKA.org/purpose/#>.

The rest of the study represents results of this assignment as follows:

- Chapter 2 presents the data/information collected for this study, its description and presentation
- Chapter 3 presents the overview of the past projects in terms of duration and model of funding, grouped into the categories 'Lesotho' and 'Transboundary'
- Chapter 4 summarises the assessment in terms of context and relevance to ReNOKA
- Chapter 5 presents lessons learned grouped together based on the results of the current review, as well as experience from international assessments and those gathered from descriptions in academic works
- Chapter 6 presents recommendations
- Chapter 7 presents conclusions

CHAPTER 2

Data/information used for the review (access, type, and format)

2.1 Description of data collected

Using various approaches, including informal communication with the staff of relevant institutions,² use of reference materials (books, articles, and previous assessments), the internet and private archives with biographic publications, we managed to obtain information of the projects carried out during the period under study. This information has been summarised in tabular form to enable ease of analysis and presentation. Two primary tables were developed to enable a summary of projects and the documents which formed the source of information about them from design to completion.

The projects are described using the following variables:

1. Year of commencement of the project
2. Name of the project and official identification number
3. Funding agency or donor
4. Implementing agency
5. Duration of the project
6. Number of documents located and used to learn about the project, categorised as follows:
 - a. Official project documents – Project Document Report, Mid- and Terminal Evaluation Reports
 - b. Journal articles, books and academic theses on the specific project or group of projects
 - c. Independent evaluations of the project/s

2.2 Presentation of the collected data

The collected data is presented in two tables; ‘Meta-review tables of projects by decade’ (Appendix 1) and ‘List of references for projects reviewed’ each project (Appendix 2).

Appendix 1 is described in terms of the variables with the summary of the objectives of each project arranged chronologically. This enables us to discuss each project with reference to the environment during which they were implemented. Three major enabling environments can be identified for the five decades under review: single-party authoritarian rule, 1970–1986; military rule, 1986–1993; and, multi-party parliamentary rule, 1993–present.

The data for each decade is presented in tabular form. The information on projects where detailed reviews could not be carried out are marked **purple**, and are excluded from the decadal presentation. Projects where sufficient documents were obtained to allow for a description of their activities, their objectives, as well as their periods of implementation, are marked **yellow**. Projects that are marked **green** are those for which we have been able to obtain what we refer to as a full set of documents (design level documents, mid-term appraisals/evaluations and/or terminal/final evaluations).

² Formal requests made to some institutions provided us with some documentation, but the majority failed to provide us with the official list of the documents they generated during this period. LHDA was written to using introduction letter from ICM Coordination Unit, but we were only able to get two documents about two projects (ICM-SMEC Evaluation report, Volume III of their strategic document).

Table 2.2.1 Number of projects by the completeness of documents by decade

Decade	Purple	Yellow	Green	Total
1970 – 1979	1	4	4	9
1980 – 1989	0	6	4	10
1990 – 1999	2	3	5	10
2000 – 2009	1	5	5	11
2010 – 2020	3	6	7	16
Totals	8	22	25	56

2.3 Past projects and their context

In this subsection we present information of past projects from 1970-2020. The project design and planning will always be based on the context of the time of its conceptual development. The context usually has several aggregate components that influence the thinking and the setting of goals and objectives for a project. The context is temporally specific, and evolves with time and the introduction of new ways of thinking. Here, we present projects arranged by decade in terms of the number of project documents located, model of funding and model of implementation. We also briefly describe the relevant context under which the projects were conceived. In looking at the context for project development with specific focus on ReNOKA, we have broadly focused on socio-economic and environmental context, political climate, climatic conditions, land degradation, unforeseen disasters, fiscal realities, and the policy landscape.

2.3.1 1970-1979 implemented projects

The projects undertaken during this decade were implemented using the concept of development, with emphasis on improvement of livelihoods. The main thrust of each was to improve income, productivity and employment. They were designed to improve cultivation of natural resources and their production based primarily on local needs and job creation. The goal was to sustain production with very little concern for the environment. They were dominated by area-based projects with very little participation by the community factoring into their design. The basic assumptions for natural resource management have been summarised as follows:

1. *“Large-scale capital-intensive soil and water conservation approaches are highly desirable in Lesotho because of the severity of soil erosion (land degradation).*
2. *Mechanical structures are not maintained beyond project life. In the past this was attributed to ignorance, but our findings are that it is the attitudes of resource users towards the structures because of the way they were introduced to them and their ownership.*
3. *Water and land resource conservation efforts are not maintained because adequate legal structures and bodies for regulations do not exist. If conservation regulations could be enforced, villagers would eventually realise the long-term benefits accruing to them because of conservation efforts.*
4. *Rural Basotho do not have a long-term concept of time, and they tend to address present subsistence needs, rather than future problems or potential long-term benefits. This is a major impediment to government sponsored conservation works, and one that makes regulations so necessary.”³*

Four specific problems areas developed: farmer participation; continuity of projects (specifically the ability to learn from past mistakes, and cooperation between various bodies working in Natural Resource Management (NRM); regulations concerning NRM; and biological as opposed to mechanical conservation treatments. Table 2.3.1 below summarises the meta-data for the projects and programmes undertaken during this period. The detailed context is provided in Chapter 5.

3 Chakela, Q. K & Cantor, J. 1987. History of Soil Conservation and Soil Conservation Policy in Lesotho. Appearing in: Report No. 8 of Co-ordination Unit, SADCC Soil and Water Conservation and Land Utilization Programme. March 1987. Maseru.

Table 2.3.1 1970-1979 projects by number of documents located per project, model of funding, and model of implementation

Colour	Number	Model of funding		Model of implementation	
		Bilateral	Multi-lateral	Single	Multiple
Purple	1		1	1	
Yellow	4	2	2	3	1
Green	4		4	3	1
Total	9	2	7	7	2

2.3.1.2 Context of 1970-1979 projects

The 1970s was a time when many Basotho men were employed in mines in South Africa. Mine remittances were a principal source of family income. Women and youth dominated the labour market in Lesotho. Politically, the country was under authoritarian rule following the declaration of a state of emergency by Prime Minister Leabua Jonathan of the Basotho National Party (BNP). Economically, Lesotho was dependent on South Africa, and up to this point, its development programmes had been supported by the apartheid regime. The authoritarian regime in Lesotho introduced a practice whereby employment in all spheres of life was based on a party line;⁴ BNP card carrying Basotho were the only ones who were supposed to be prioritised for available opportunities, be it for employment, state grants for education, or participation in development projects.

Despite being a non-democratic state, Lesotho saw growing support from other countries in the form of projects in many sectors. The support by other nations was based on Lesotho's status as a frontline

state – a member of a coalition of African countries committed to ending apartheid in South Africa – and as one of the least developed countries in the world. Awareness of land degradation continued to dominate the development scene, and women made up the largest proportion of workers in many soil and water conservation projects. It is noteworthy that Lesotho, like other countries, was impacted by the 1973-1975 global recession.

The projects undertaken during this period were using the concept of development, with emphasis on the improvement of livelihoods as the main objective (improve income, productivity, and employment). They were designed to improve management of natural resources and their production, based mainly on local needs and job creation. The goal was to sustain production with very little concern for the environment. They were dominated by area-based projects with very little participation by the community factoring into their design. The policy environment at the time was dominated by politically motivated changes in civil service recruitments which were meant to entrench the ruling party.⁵

4 Mothibe T. H, 2017. Political leadership Challenge in Lesotho - a Cause of Political instability? Appearing in: Thabane, M. (Ed), 2017. Towards an Anatomy of Persistent Political Instability in Lesotho, 1966-2016. pp. 55-57.

5 Van de Geer, R. and Wallis, 1984. Government and Development in Lesotho. NUL. pp. 50-51.

2.3.2 1980-1989 implemented projects

Table 2.3.2 1980-1989 projects by number of documents located per project, model of funding, and model of implementation

Colour	Number	Model of funding		Model of Implementation	
		Bilateral	Multi-lateral	Single	Multiple
Purple	1	0	1	1	
Yellow	6	2	4	3	3
Green	4	3	1	3	1
Total	11	5	6	7	4

The major driving principles for the period 1980-1989 were formed in response to conceptual changes in projects, and were influenced mainly by the Structural Adjustment Program,⁶ the Brundtland Commission,⁷ and the Rio Convention.⁸ It is during this period that participatory methods were used to engage the local communities. There was also an adjustment of the legal framework to include environmental concerns in development projects and other development efforts. The number of projects and extent of international support increased, and NGOs were recognised as valid partners for natural resource management. The approach of resource management started to include considerations of impacts on the climate.

2.3.2.2 Context of 1980-1989 projects

During this period, employment in the South African mining industry started to decline, and Basotho started to be retrenched in large numbers. This prompted the Lesotho government and its cooperating partners to focus on projects that could potentially employ many of the retrenched Basotho. The increasing retrenchment of Basotho miners saw a fall in household income and pushed families to focus more on the land to substitute their meagre incomes. In 1982, Lesotho felt the impact of the global recession that slowed economic development.

The 1986 military coup that deposed Prime Minister Leabua Jonathan was a turning point in the management and outlook of the country. The military ran a parsimonious, tightfisted government which saw the large deficit being turned around due to stringent austerity measures being imposed. The military ruled through orders issued by the Military Council; orders were not open to debate, and were enforced as soon as they were made. A significant event during this period was the signing of the Lesotho Highlands Water Treaty, which was signed shortly after the military took over. This was seen as a major event that would turn the fortunes of the country around due to the large cash injection that was envisaged, as well as offering significant employment opportunities.

The increased awareness of climate change saw greater attention being paid to aspects such as desertification, and several initiatives were started which addressed desertification.

The political landscape of Lesotho was changed significantly by the military when it facilitated the start of a return to democratic elections and allowed the return of exiled politicians.

The policy landscape for this period is contained in the Fourth Five-Year Development Plan.⁹

6 The purpose of Lesotho's April 1988 to March 1991 Structural Adjustment Program was to reduce government intervention, encourage private sector initiatives and promote exports to pay for imports and allow the government to service its debts. This was a programme funded by the International Monetary Fund.

7 The Brundtland Commission, also known as the World Commission on Environment and Development (WCED), disbanded in 1987. In the United Nations, it is also called the UN Special Commission on the Environment. The aim of the Brundtland Commission was to help direct the nations of the world towards the goal of sustainable development. The commission is also known as the World Commission on Environment and Development (WCED). It operated from 1984 to 1987. The commission published its results in the Brundtland report in 1987. Thereafter, sustainable development became an important concept in the vocabulary of politicians, practitioners, and planners.

8 Rio Convention relates to the following three conventions, which were agreed at the Earth Summit held in Rio de Janeiro in June 1992: The Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD); the United Nations Convention to Combat Desertification (UNCCD), and United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC).

9 Ministry of Planning, Economic and Manpower Development, 1987. Kingdom of Lesotho Fourth Five-Year Development Plan (1987-90/91).

2.3.3 1990-1999 implemented projects

Table 2.3.3 1990-1999 projects by number of documents located per project, model of funding, and model of implementation

Colour	Number	Model of funding		Model of implementation	
		Bilateral	Multi-lateral	Single	Multiple
Purple	2	2		2	
Yellow	3		3	2	1
Green	5	1	4	2	3
Total	10	3	7	6	4

Democratic decentralisation was one of the factors that influenced donor funding during 1990-1999. The early part of the period was marked by extensive drought, seeing donor funding going into emergency relief efforts. The return of large numbers of miners from South Africa was also a factor in donor funding. Some projects were spurred by regional efforts for greater economic integration and required improved institutional capacity. At development level, the efforts to change civil servant approaches away from a top-down to a bottom-up orientation were being piloted. This was influenced mainly by the Southern African Development Community's (SADC) programme strategies for popular participation,¹⁰ which spearheaded this approach within the region.¹¹ The 1998 civil unrest impacted the economy negatively.^{12 13 14 15}

2.3.3.2 Context of 1990-1999 projects

This decade was dominated by the political shift back to democracy, which saw the return of democratic elections in 1993, and the relinquishing of power by the military. It was a time that was also affected by several political disturbances, such as the temporary takeover of the government by the King, as well as the major civil unrest in 1998 which necessitated the intervention of SADC. The start of efforts to end military rule and return to democracy attracted donor funding, and many projects were initiated. HIV/AIDS, which garnered much attention

during the period 1980-1989, became a factor in the development arena. Greater efforts began to be directed at addressing what was then becoming a pandemic threatening productive activities as people became sick and died.

The global recession of 1991 affected the Lesotho economy, but this was tempered by the large aid purse that the country was receiving.

The early part of the period was marked by extensive drought, and some donor funding had to be diverted to emergency relief efforts. The increase in the number of Basotho miners who were retrenched from South African mines continued to be a great concern, and projects such as the Labour Construction Unit were upscaled to absorb the large numbers of miners returning from South Africa. The retrenchment of Basotho miners was also related to events in South Africa; the apartheid regime was replaced by a popular, inclusive and democratically elected government, and efforts were made to replace foreign nationals with South Africans in certain industries.

It is in this decade that the Lesotho Highlands Water Project (LHWP) kicked into action; construction activities commenced, and massive efforts were undertaken to address environmental issues through the Lesotho Highlands Development Authority (LHDA), the operational arm of the LHWP. Several natural resource management projects that were

10 SADC, 1987. Soil and Water Conservation and Land Utilization Programme: Phase II Programme of Work. Maseru.C

11 SADC 1987. Peoples Participation in Soil and Water Conservation. Report from SADC Seminar March 2-6, 1987, Maputo. Report No. 8, SADC SWCLUP. Maseru.

12 Consortium for International Development, Frederiksen, Kamine & Associates, Lindsay/Dekalb International, 1992. End of Project Report, USAID Project No 632-0221.

13 World Bank Country Strategy (CAS 1996), as reported in Maloti-Drakensberg Transfrontier Conservation and Development Project Evaluation. ICR Review 2011. Report No. ICRR 13444.

14 IFAD, 1997. Soil and Water Conservation and Agroforestry Programme (SWaCAP) Focused evaluation.

15 World Bank, 1995. Implementation Completion Report: Lesotho Land Management and Conservation Project (Credit 1897-LSO).

conceived towards the end of the previous decade were implemented. Reported here is the Integrated Catchment Management (ICM) Project in Phase I Areas of the LHWP, which was conceived in this decade. While the LHWP was expected to have a huge impact on the economy of Lesotho, a 2000 poverty mapping exercise conducted by Sechaba Consultants showed that the project did not leave a significant impact on the economy.¹⁶

Established in 1992, SADC committed itself to regional integration and poverty eradication within

southern Africa through economic development and ensuring peace and security. Some projects were spurred by regional efforts for greater economic integration and required improved institutional capacity. At the development level, efforts to change the civil service orientation away from top-down to bottom-up were being piloted. The 1998 civil unrest impacted the economy negatively.

Development efforts in this decade were driven by five-year development plans without a long-term vision of where Lesotho aspired to be in the future.

2.3.4 2000-2009 implemented projects

Table 2.3.4 2000-2009 projects by number of documents located per project, model of funding, and model of implementation

Colour	Number	Model of funding		Model of implementation	
		Bilateral	Multi-lateral	Single	Multiple
Purple	5		5	1	4
Yellow	4		4	3	1
Green	7	1	6	4	3
Total	16	1	15	8	8

This decade saw increased focus on sustainable land management with the Conference of Parties (COP)¹⁷ Framework providing a basis for pursuing successful natural resource management. This occurred as Lesotho's policy landscape was invigorated by the Poverty Reduction Strategic Plan, the National Environmental Action Plan, the National Action Plan, and buttressed by the Food Security Policy and UN Convention to combat desertification and mitigate the effect of drought.¹⁸ At the same time, developing countries were increasingly unable to meet their financial obligations. This was also a decade when the fight against HIV/AIDS reached its height and addressing its linkages with poverty and food insecurity took centre stage given its impact on the

availability of labour for production. The 2008 global financial crisis impacted Lesotho negatively and affected the availability of development aid.^{19 20 21 22}

2.3.4.2 Context of 2000-2009 projects

At the start of the decade, Lesotho was emerging from the 1998 civil strife that had seen the economy decimated by the destruction of many businesses, especially in the capital, Maseru. It was also a time of great political uncertainty, with a SADC stabilisation mission deployed to the country. The close of the decade was marked by a global recession that again impacted economies and reduced international aid.

In what was expected to be a significant milestone in the development of the country, in 2004 Lesotho

¹⁶ Poverty and Livelihoods in Lesotho, 2000. Sechaba Consultants.

¹⁷ The Conference of Parties, known as COP, is the decision-making body responsible for monitoring and reviewing the implementation of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change. It brings together the 197 nations and territories – called Parties – that have signed on to the Framework Convention. The COP has met annually since 1995.

¹⁸ United Nations Convention to Combat Desertification in Those Countries Experiencing Serious Drought and/or Desertification, particularly in Africa (UNCCD)

¹⁹ World Bank, 2010. Implementation Completion and Results Report (TF-23723). Report No. ICR0001177. Maloti-Drakensberg Transfrontier Conservation and Development Project.

²⁰ UNDP/GEF, 2007. Project Identification Form (PIF). Capacity Building and Knowledge Management for SLM. Project PIMS.3044.

²¹ Dr. Motebang Pomela and Mrs. Stephanie Hodge, 2007. UNDP/GEF. Midterm Evaluation Report. Capacity Building and Knowledge Management for SLM. Project PIMS.3044.

²² FAO. Dejene, A, Midgley, S, Marake, M, Ramasamy, S, 2011. Strengthening Capacity for Climate Change Adaptation in Agriculture: Experience and Lessons from Lesotho.

adopted Vision 2020.²³ Starting from 1970, Lesotho had based its development strategies on the employment of Five-Year Development Plans, and Annual Plans and Budgets. In 1997, this trend was replaced with Three-Year Rolling Plans. The development of Vision 2020 was based on the realisation that the plans were short-term, and did not articulate a vision of where Lesotho sought to be in the future. The Vision 2020 document identified seven pillars of development; these are: democracy; unity; peace; education and training;

economic growth; management of the environment; and, advancement in technology. Going forward, all development efforts were to be aligned with Vision 2020.²⁴ This included the Lesotho National Poverty Reduction Strategy, which included the following priority areas: employment creation and income generation; improving agriculture and food security; and developing infrastructure, deepening democracy, governance, safety and security; improving quality of and access to health and social welfare services; and, improving quality of and access to education.²⁵

2.3.5 2010–2020 implemented projects

Table 2.3.5 2010–2020 projects by number of documents located per project, model of funding, and model of implementation

Colour	Number	Model of funding		Model of implementation	
		Bilateral	Multi-lateral	Single	Multiple
Purple	3	1		1	
Yellow	5	2	2	4	
Green	7	3	4	5	3
Total	15	6	6	10	3

2.3.5.1 Context of 2010–2020 projects

Over this period, Lesotho experienced political instability that resulted in three changes of government. The 2015/16 El Niño-induced drought impacted the country and called for some resources to be diverted to emergency response. Inequality and unemployment grew,²⁶ with the latter mostly affecting the youth. Global climate change impacts became pervasive. HIV/AIDS in Lesotho continued to impact families and continued to be a primary influencing factor in some projects.^{27 28 29}

The start of the decade saw political instability that ended the sole rule of the Lesotho Congress for Democracy (LCD) and ushered in the All Basotho Convention (ABC) led three-party coalition government in 2012. In 2014, there was a fallout between the two main coalition partners, ABC and LCD. This resulted in a vote of no confidence in the government which the opposition parties won, leading to the collapse of the ABC-led government. Elections were held in 2015, which led to the return of the Democratic Congress (DC) led movement

23 Developed in 2000 for a period of 20 years, Vision 2020 presented a broad perspective framework of how Basotho, through their representatives, would like to see their country by the year 2020. This represented a fundamental shift from the way Lesotho approached development planning in the past. Starting from 1970, Lesotho based its development on Five-Year Development Plans, Annual Plans and Budgets. In 1997 it changed to Three-Year Rolling Plans. While these plans were useful in so far as they went, they were not long enough to see where the nation would be in fifteen or twenty years. Such a perspective was deemed necessary because development of natural resources such as water, mining, forestry, etc., require more than a five-year lead time to realise full benefits. The second consideration was that the measurement of progress on poverty reduction and employment generation that required a perspective that is longer than three-year plans. Finally, the Vision provided a beacon towards which national energies and resources could be mobilised. It was also meant to facilitate ownership of the development agenda on a sustained basis.

24 His Majesty's message, and the foreword in the NSDP II, makes reference to Vision 2020. Available at: <https://www.gov.ls/wp-content/uploads/2021/06/National-Strategic-Development-Plan-II-2018-19-2022-23.pdf>

25 Santho, S., 2017. Can Lesotho Survive? The Political Economy of a Fragile State. Appearing in: Thabane, M. (Ed) Towards an Anatomy of a Persistent Political Instability in Lesotho, 1966–2016. NUL, OSISA.

26 Measured by a Gini coefficient of 0.66 in 2012.

27 IFAD, 2021. Smallholder Agricultural Development Project. Project completion Report. Main Report and Appendices. Project No.1100001530. Report No. 5847-LS.

28 Maloti Drakensberg Transfrontier Conservation and Development Area. Action for Phase IV of MDTP (2018–2023).

29 IFAD, 2013. Lesotho Adaptation of Small-Scale Agricultural Production (LASAP). Main Report and Appendices. Draft Design Report.

comprising a coalition of seven parties; this coalition was also short-lived. The opposition, led by ABC and the newly formed Alliance of Democrats (AD), won a motion of no confidence against the DC-led government. This led to another election in 2017, which saw another ABC-led coalition back in power. Due to internal squabbles within the ABC, there was a further change of government in 2019. As this occurred in Parliament, a reconfiguration of coalition partners, rather than a fresh election, was required. This led to a coalition between ABC and DC, which remains in power at the time of publication of this report.

The start of the decade saw the introduction of the National Strategic Development Plan (NSDP). This was to be the overall guide for Lesotho's development efforts. Two plans (2012/13-2016/17, and 2018/19-2022/23) have been developed and applied. The NSDP has been aligned with global trends, especially to the UN's Millennium Development Goals and the Sustainable Development Goals, as well as to other global initiatives that focus on the effects of climate change.

On the economic front, Lesotho experienced very deep economic pressure during this decade; this was due to a decline in revenue from the Southern African Customs Union (SACU) and an increase in the number of civil servants.

The period 2010-2020, within which the ReNOKA programme operates, is dominated by a dynamic of political wrangling among parties; this has seen the emergence of a disproportionately large number of new parties as older ones fragment. The next national elections will be held in September 2022, which means that government's attention will be firmly on electioneering, and not necessarily on ruling.

The current fiscal position of the Government of Lesotho (GoL) is dire, and it has applied for a rescue package from the International Monetary Fund. While the decline in SACU revenues is one of the main contributors to this situation, there are other factors that have led to this precarious state of affairs. The result is that the government having to attend to 18.9 billion loti in debt;³⁰ the most pressing aspect of which is finding money to pay its private sector vendors for goods and services procured. The poor fiscal position of the GoL exists at a time when the level of aid to the country has declined significantly.

It is important to note that due to financial challenges, most government services are severely curtailed by lack of access to resources. In several cases, electricity has been disconnected to the most important organs of state - such as the judiciary and other key ministries. The result is that the bloated civil service is not productive, as it lacks resources to undertake the necessary work.

The country, the region, and the world are facing unprecedented climate change effects. Lesotho is experiencing higher than normal temperatures and rainfall. It can be expected that this will be followed by severe droughts in the years to follow. The result of this is extensive degradation of the land, significantly reducing crop and animal production, and exacerbating poverty and food insecurity.

The country is facing a high level of youth unemployment. There is a fast-growing number of graduates that are unable to find work. Youth groups have started to lobby for their plight to be addressed; a situation that should cause discomfort to the GoL, as it is conventionally the youth who have been central to civil unrest.

Added to the woes of Lesotho - and the world in general - is the Covid-19 pandemic that has occasioned a massive global economic downturn. Governments, Lesotho included, have had to divert financial and other resources to fight Covid-19. It is not clear whether the world will return to the pre-2020 'old normal'. This being the case, it can only be assumed that the current situation will continue for the foreseeable future, and that it will continue to constrain governments in their ability and capacity to address developmental challenges.

A worrisome situation is the escalating level of insecurity in the country. The murder rate is increasing; this is accompanied by a rise in cases of police brutality (torture and killings). In addition, stock theft has also increased, and many people are murdered during these crimes. Insecurity is taking a significant toll on the fragile rural economy. Lawlessness affects most aspects of life, including development initiatives.

2.4 The review process and results overview

The documents in Appendix 2 were used to gather information on the nature and character of the three phases of each project reviewed:

- Initiation/planning and design phase
- Implementation phase, including mid-term evaluations
- The completion phase, as reported by terminal evaluations or post project evaluations:
 - Lessons learned
 - Recommendations

These will be explored in more detail in Chapter 3 below.

30 Budget Speech to the Parliament of the Kingdom of Lesotho for the 2022/2023 Fiscal Year, "Building a Resilient, Sustainable and Innovative Economy: Fiscal Consolidation Amid Covid -19" by Honourable Thabo Sopheona, MP Minister Of Finance Maseru, Lesotho, 2 March 2022.

CHAPTER 3**Overview of past interventions in Lesotho, including transboundary projects****3.1 Time span and distribution of initiatives**

Most of the projects carried out in the first decade under consideration (1970-1979) varied in duration from one to five years, and were spatially distributed based on the problems they were intended to address. Most soil and water conservation interventions were carried out in the lowlands to address the decline in productivity of cropland, with limited measures implemented on pastures, infrastructure (roads, bridges, offices, etc.); these were implemented in specific areas only. Projects to address rangelands and livestock services dominated the highlands in the form of experimentation with different models of range resource management using Range Management Areas (RMA) and Grazing Associations (GA) as the major units of intervention. Irrigation projects were more scattered, and depended on the availability of suitable areas and bodies of water. Most wetland protection and restoration projects were in the highland areas, while very little was done to properly manage the lowland wetlands (reed-meadows).

3.2 Lesotho-based interventions

The interventions undertaken in Lesotho are interrogated in terms of the mode of funding and the number of implementing agencies involved. This was done as implementation outcomes are related to these factors.

3.2.1 Model of funding

Development projects or programmes can be funded by a single donor, multilateral donors or by the Government of Lesotho (GoL) alone. It should

be noted that when we talk of a single donor, we are referring to a situation where one external donor entity works on a bilateral basis with the GoL. Referring to a single donor may be a misnomer, because in almost all cases the GoL provides co-funding, either monetarily or in kind. In the case of multilateral donors, we find several external donor entities contributing to the funding of a single project. In our analysis, we have considered the Lesotho Highlands Water Authority (LHDA) projects as being funded by the GoL.

The reasoning behind our analysis of projects in terms of the number of donors is that we have observed that in cases where there are several donors involved, there are complexities in reporting and coordination that impacts on project performance.

A look at Appendix 1 shows that 27 projects were funded by a single donor, while 15 were funded by multiple donors. Two of the projects reviewed were funded by LHDA, and we categorise these as GoL-funded.

3.2.2 Number of implementing agencies

In a similar manner to the matter of funding, we also consider the number of agencies involved in the implementation of projects. Again, we have found that the greater the number of implementing agencies involved, the higher the chances are that projects will experience challenges resulting from a lack of cooperation among the agencies. A look at Appendix 1 shows that in 27 cases,³¹ the projects were implemented by a single agency, while in 14 cases,³² multiple agencies were involved. While in the case of donors, the main factor negatively impacting project performance is reporting requirements, in the case of agencies, it is lack of and/or poor coordination among them.

31 This includes Phuthiatsana Integrated Rural Development Projects, which was run by an Authority.

32 Include among these are the SADC ELMS Environment and Land Management Sector project and the ORASECOM Protection of Orange-Senqu River Water Sources Project.

3.3 Transboundary

Transboundary projects are those that are owned and implemented by several sovereign states. Below we describe projects headed by the Orange-Senqu River Commission (ORASECOM),³³ the Maloti-Drakensberg Transfrontier Conservation and Development Project (MDTCDP),³⁴ and the Lesotho Highlands Water Project (LHWP).³⁵ Our view is that these transboundary projects hold a wealth of lessons that are relevant to ReNOKA.

3.3.1 ORASECOM

While there are several ORASECOM projects that have been implemented in Lesotho, we have specifically reviewed the Khubelu Sponges Pilot Project (2013–2015). The pilot project's objectives were to pilot the improvement of range management in the Khubelu Catchment, to rehabilitate degraded catchments, and to monitor and collect lessons for replication in other catchments.

3.3.2 Maloti-Drakensberg Transfrontier Conservation and Development Project

We have included a project from the MDTCDP due to extensive work that the project has undertaken in its project area through several initiatives. We have been able to access information of the MDTCDP (2018–2023). The information obtained from project documents has added much to our collection of lessons learned.

3.3.3 Lesotho Highlands Water Project (LHWP)

In the case of LHWP, we have reviewed two LHDA managed projects, namely the Integrated Catchment Management Project in Phase I areas of the LHWP. (2004–2010), contract 1044, and the Ministry of Agriculture and Food Security (MAFS)/LHDA Agricultural Projects (2000–2008). These two projects deal with natural resource management, and they are therefore relevant to the ReNOKA learning process.

33 ORASECOM manages the riparian resources of Botswana, Namibia, Lesotho and South Africa.

34 The Maloti-Drakensberg project is a bilateral initiative between Lesotho and South Africa.

35 LHWP is a bilateral water transfer scheme between Lesotho and South Africa.

CHAPTER 4

Summary of assessments

This chapter presents summaries of assessments of project-based reviews made from available project documents, independent and scholarly project reviews, and other aspects that have relevance for development generally, and ReNOKA specifically. The information used in this chapter largely comes from data presented in Appendices 1 and 2, referenced in Chapter 2. It is data from these appendices that is used to describe and analyse past interventions.

4.1 Project specific assessments

The first part of the analysis was to break down the period into decades; for each decade, a review of identified projects was undertaken. For each project identified, the documents located were used to assess the project to learn how it was designed, implemented, and evaluated. For this we used three primary documents: the project document/s; the mid-term review; and, the terminal evaluation. A simulated questionnaire was used to structure

the assessment to enable the description of each project in terms of four variables: documents used for the review; objectives of the project; status of the project during its three phases (initiation/planning and design phase, implementation phase, and completion phase, as reported by terminal evaluations or post-project evaluations); and, for each phase, an indication of the critical factors identified which hindered or enabled the project to achieve its objectives.

Table 4.1 provides an overview of the information gathered in the review of individual projects. It provides the life cycle of the project as extracted using the documents containing the relevant information from project inception to terminal evaluation.

For those projects where the documents used provided the lessons learned from the project, these lessons were extracted and summarised into a table as shown in Table 4.2. This grouping by decade provides a picture of the temporal trend, allowing one to see if there has been any learning over time.

Table 4.1 An illustration of the use of the method applied in this study template to summarise different phases of the project life cycle (planning and design phase, implementation phase, completion and lessons learned)

Project name	Smallholder Agriculture Development Project (SADP) 2011-2020	
Documents used for review	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Implementation Completion Report Review 2. Project financial statements for the year ended 31 March 2017 3. Implementation completion and results report 	
Objectives	Planning and design	Implementation phase
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Increasing agricultural market opportunities • Increasing market-oriented smallholder production project management • To assist in natural disasters 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The project has been jointly designed and implemented with the GoL) and the beneficiaries of the project • The project is in line with the International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD) country strategy and GoL national development plans 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The project started as planned, there were no delays • The Marketing Information System has been and is complete but is non-functional • The livestock training with an approximate value of 3,381,000 loti remains unutilised, with approximately only a year left to the project • Lack of responsive bids under Social Capital Mentoring Consultancy and Technology Packages leading to re-advertisement hinders the project to implement these activities

Table 4.2 Sample presentation of lessons learned from specific assessments (See Appendix 4 for details)

Project name	Woodlot Programme (1972-1985)³⁶
Lessons	Recommendations
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Training Basotho foresters at diploma level in South Africa was expensive and there was political risk as Ciskei in South Africa became an independent homeland 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Develop the one-year forestry certificate course at the Lesotho Agricultural College into a three-year certificate course. • The Woodlot project should be developed into a Forestry Division of the Ministry of Agriculture.
Project name	Senqu River Agricultural Extension Project Lesotho (1974-1977)³⁷
Lessons	Recommendations
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Despite good management, disappointing results were obtained due to a faulty project design and shortfalls in performance inherent in an ambitious pilot project • Improvement in agriculture will largely depend on infrastructure improvement 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Undertake full project revision to cover the remaining period. The revision document should reflect different emphasis on the objectives and should include a modified work plan and increased inputs. • Livestock activities to continue as is, but to include the initiation of a pilot group ranch and a brown Swiss breeding herd. • A crop specialist to be immediately recruited to intensify the search for improved crop activities and to produce suitable data for better farming system. • Plans to be developed for a surface irrigation scheme for the second phase of the project. • Work should commence on the development of two unconsolidated conservation schemes of around 500 acres each. • The project should liaise closely with all other area development schemes in the country and should consult the management of these schemes when identifying the objectives and scope of a second phase project. • Immediately employ a physical planner, a sociologist, and a volunteer with a background in economics/ planning. • Invest in new roads as a high priority.

36 C. G. Wenner, 1982. Soil Conservation in Lesotho. Draft Discussion Document. 15th March 1982. SIDA Consultancy Report. pp. 70.

37 UNDP, 1975. The Senqu River Agricultural Extension Project. Report of the Evaluation Mission. LES/72/003.

4.2 Past projects and assessment

In this section we are presenting the results of our assessment of projects carried out between 1970 and 1979. Tables 4.2.1 to 4.2.5 below summarise these assessments. These are derived from Appendix 1, which contains the full details for each project, including objectives, performance, and assessment.

The rating of each project was based on the information extracted from the documents using the template illustrated in table 4.1 above. In this study, the rating of the project performance is the degree to which it achieved its objectives as stated in the project document/s.

4.2.1 Projects carried out during 1970-1979

Assessments of projects³⁸

For this decade, we located 11 projects, but were only able to assess four; these four projects had a sufficient amount of documents to allow us to apply our template to review them. The assessed projects are presented in Table 4.2.1. In the table, we have

included the project number, project name and our assessment based on the three phases. The rating is on a scale of 1-10 and measures the: initiation/planning and design phase; implementation phase; and, the completion phase, as reported by terminal evaluations or post-project evaluations.

Table 4.2.1 Assessments of 1970-1979 projects

Project number	2		
Project name	Pilot Agricultural Scheme in Leribe Area (1970 -1975) Assessment		
Rating			
I	II	III	Mean
4	6	3	4
Reasons:			
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> The project was undertaken without consultation with the people. The heavy machinery used meant that the conservation structure would not be maintained, especially by ordinary people. The project managed to initiate and achieve some tasks (repairs, creation of fishponds, establish tree nursery, establish meteorological station, building of stores). The termination was done to make way for the Phuthiatsana Integrated Rural Development Project, which was supposed to use lessons learned from this project. 			
Project number	5		
Project name	Khomokhoana Rural Development Project (1975 – 1977)		
I	II	III	Mean
5	6	4	5
Reasons:			
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> The project was poorly planned, with inadequate consultation and assessment of people's needs. The shortage of GoL counterpart staff resulted in project activities needing to be scaled down. The terminal evaluation reported that each of the separate project activities were performed satisfactorily, but they had not been integrated to become an overall rural development programme. 			

³⁸ The rating is based on the Appendix 6: Template: Method used in this study, presented in the Research Proposal and Research Process. It is a summary of the "Interview of the Project", to understand its three phases: before, during and after. What is presented here is the summary of the scores as reported by the three team members on a 1-10 scale.

Project number	8		
Project name	Thaba Bosiu Rural Development Project (1973- 1977)		
Rating			
I	II	III	Mean
5	7	4	5
Reasons:			
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The project was defined as an integrated farming system, but this was not well defined, and it was not clear how this was intended to lead to improvement of agricultural productivity. • The project expected the people to perform the maintenance with their own resources. • Insufficient market training and support to cash-crops introduced by the project. • Most funds were used for office infrastructure improvement. 			
Project number	9		
Project name	Basic Agricultural Services Project (1978- 1987).		
Rating			
I	II	III	Mean
3	4	3	3
Reasons:			
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Poor design and an unreasonable assumption that the government would support the project. The GoL instead gave primary attention to a food self-sufficiency programme. • The highly mechanised system was not sustainable. • The failure of government to provide counterpart funding affected the success of the project. • There was a breakdown in extension services. • Too many donors being involved also made management a problem. 			

The assessment of the four projects rates between 3 and 5 according to the authors of this report. This indicates a moderate achievement of the stipulated objectives. The political and economic conditions under which these projects were implemented, and intended to mitigate, continued:

- Economic dependence on South Africa increased, resulting in a further decline in available labour for projects and programmes in Lesotho
- The condition of rural (infrastructure) services did not improve
- The continued lack of policies and enabling legislation was not addressed

- Low levels of skills in both planning, administration, and implementation of projects (especially at extension service level) continued

How this will assist future projects

The above assessment indicates that future projects should be well designed and not be based on unreasonable assumptions. An example of an unreasonable assumption is that community members have the obligation to maintain conservation projects initiated and implemented on the basis that they are for their benefit. It is also important that future projects should ensure that project outputs and outcomes are properly defined, realistic and not overly optimistic.

Future projects should properly assess staff requirements, and ensure that they are not going to place undue pressure on the existing GoL staff compliment, potentially compromising other ongoing work. Future projects should be aware that the GoL tends to overcommit on promises of making counterpart staff available.

The use of machinery for construction of conservation structures was found to have been inappropriate and unsuitable, as people would not undertake the necessary maintenance as they perceived the work to require machinery they do not have access to.³⁹ Future projects must assess the need for machinery

and, where possible, avoid the use of machinery that leaves a significant footprint on the land, affecting people's fields.

4.2.2 Projects carried out during 1980-1989

Assessments of projects

For this decade, we located ten projects, but were only able to assess four; these four projects had a sufficient amount of documents to allow us to apply our template to review them.

Table 4.2.2 Assessments of 1980-1989 projects

Item	11		
Project name	Agriculture Marketing and Credit Project (1980-1988)		
Rating			
I	II	III	Mean
2	3	3	3
Reasons:	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Design of the project not aligned properly to government policy. • Assumptions based on the inadequate evidence from the Basic Agricultural Services Project (BASP) justified the need for a credit facility for agricultural inputs).⁴⁰ • Supply driven credit services did not work as designed.⁴¹ • Poor monitoring and evaluation (recordkeeping). 		
Item	12		
Project name	Land Conservation and Range Development Project (1981-89). 1985-1992)		
I	II	III	Mean
6	-	5	6
Reasons:	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The design and planning were good, and this seems to be where past lessons were learned and applied in design and execution. • The practices developed in this project are still producing the data that helps improve landscape restoration. • Development of efficient teams at both local offices and headquarters, with good communication procedures with the local land users. 		

³⁹ For example, see BASP evaluation in Appendix 1, project 18.

⁴⁰ This project was designed as complementary to BASP, which aimed to provide small-scale farmers with farm support services and infrastructure essential to the increase of production of food. The appraisal team adopted the same BASP economic justifications in appraising the project. Available at: <https://www.ifad.org/en/web/ioe/w/agricultural-marketing-and-credit-project-1991-e>.

⁴¹ Project evaluation noted that "The provision of loans is not a sufficient condition for the development of agricultural production and the improvement of farm family life". <https://www.ifad.org/en/web/ioe/w/agricultural-marketing-and-credit-project-1991-e>.

Item	12		
Project name	Land Conservation and Range Development Project (1981-89). 1985-1992)		
I	II	III	Mean
6	-	5	6
Reasons:			
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The design and planning were good, and this seems to be where past lessons were learned and applied in design and execution. • The practices developed in this project are still producing the data that helps improve landscape restoration. • Development of efficient teams at both local offices and headquarters, with good communication procedures with the local land users. 			
Item	13		
Project name	Farm Improvement with Soil Conservation (FISC) Project in Maphutseng, Mohale's Hoek District (1985-1990)		
Rating			
I	II	III	Mean
3	6	4	4
Reasons:			
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The project was not able to achieve its objectives because of its complex nature, and the fact that there was a severe drought that called for some of the resources to be reallocated to emergency relief. • The agricultural issues often came far down in the Village Development Council's priority list. 			
Item	14		
Project name	Lesotho Agricultural Production and Institutional Support (LAPIS) Program (1985-1992)		
Rating			
I	II	III	Mean
7	5	6	6
Reasons:			
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The project met most of its institutional development objectives. It was able to coordinate other projects funded by USAID. The downside was the large contingent of external experts which meant that a significant amount of institutional memory was lost. • The project was dogged by a large propensity for change in most Ministry of Agriculture departments. • Shortcomings in design led to some constraints not being addressed. • Despite slow progress of decentralisation, the programme managed to reach local land users better than most. 			

The decade was guided by two Five-Year Development Plans, namely 1981/82-1984/85 and 1986/87-1990/91.⁴² The latter,⁴³ unlike the previous plans, was developed with the involvement of a “comprehensive process of consultations by the Central Planning Office with all the ministries and parastatals, and even with private organisations”. Relevant to this review are: ‘Section One’ on the situation of natural resources, and the Land Tenure System; ‘Section Two’ on the performance of the Third Five-Year Development Plan; and, ‘Section Three’, which outlines the objectives, strategies, policies and priorities to be adopted. The transition to military rule also took place during this decade.

Agricultural production continued to decline, with a minor recovery attributed to the Food Self-Sufficiency Programme. The range resource management component of agricultural production saw the introduction of an enabling environment in the form of the Range Management and Grazing Control Regulation. Forestry Division programmes were articulated, and the Conservation Division adopted watershed management approaches; these were meant to provide the necessary integrative focus required for comprehensive land use planning and the systematic improvement of productive land within a catchment area.

It was during this decade that the fruits of the United Nations Convention to Combat Desertification (UNCCD) were realised in Lesotho. This enabled a useful discussion and learning seminar on the concepts and approaches to soil and water. It is the decade in which land resource management transformed into a holistic approach, where conservation of resources was linked conceptually to production. The central theme is best described as follows:

“Dedicated and efficient application of the conventional approach to soil conservation in Lesotho over the past 60 years has not led to raised yields or to disappearance of the land degradation. These unsatisfactory results are attributed to failure to take sufficient account of rural people’s needs and viewpoints thus failing effectively to integrate conservation with production.

Re-assessment of existing knowledge about erosion and land degradation, and about the farmer’s decision making, provides an altered

viewpoint on how improved production with conservation may be achieved, and produces a set of agro-ecological, socio-economic and organisational criteria for good land husbandry..... in the past and present project and programmes where some or all of the criteria are satisfied, successful results have been achieved; where they have not, objectives of improved conservation and increased production have not been sustained.

A wealth of literature exists about Lesotho’s agriculture and soil conservation. However, little attention has been paid to analysing the information and using the available insights in project design...it is concluded that if the as-yet-untapped resources of (a) rural people’s enthusiasms and (b) the self-recuperating capacities of soils and range vegetation can be invoked, sustainable and conservation-effective agricultural development can be achieved in the future if average land husbandry skills can be induced to rise faster than the rate of increase in human population.”⁴⁴

The relatively high scores of the projects in this decade may be due to this enthusiasm.

How this will assist future projects

The relatively high ratings of the projects above are attributed to good design and planning, and they applied lessons learned from previous projects. The designs of these projects were also not complex, making for easy implementation. Future projects should therefore ensure good planning and design and apply the lessons from previous projects. Designs of future projects should also not be complex, to allow for easy implementation and monitoring.

It should also be noted that project implementation was accompanied by good monitoring & evaluation (M&E). Future projects should ensure that M&E starts at project inception, and does not become an afterthought activity.

4.2.3 Projects carried out during 1990-1999

Assessments of projects

For this decade, we located 11 projects, but were only able to assess four; these four projects had a sufficient amount of documents to allow us to apply our template to review them.

42 Ministry of Planning, Economic and Manpower Development, 1987. Kingdom of Lesotho Fourth Five-Year Development Plan (1986/87-90/91).

43 Kingdom of Lesotho, 1987. Fourth Five-Year Development Plan (1986/87-1990/91). Volume 1. Ministry of Planning, Economic and Manpower Development. Maseru. pp. 4.

44 Shaxton, T. F. and Guma, T. (1990) Land Husbandry Lesotho: Development of a Programme for Sustainable Productive Land Use. Ministry of Agriculture, Cooperatives and Marketing/Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nation. Maseru, August 1990. (AG::TCP/LES/6755+8954 Field Document 8. pp. 7.

Table 4.2.3 Assessments of 1990-1999 projects

Item	24		
Project name	Community Natural Resources Management Project (1992-1995)		
Rating			
I	II	III	Mean
5	4	3	3
Reasons:			
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> The major problem was the fact that most of the GoL counterpart staff had not been involved in the design of the project and had no knowledge of the concepts referenced. The design also precluded collaboration between the various entities involved. The Range Management Area (RMA) component must have a concise goal, including a set of objectives, and strategy; and then solicit resources to accomplish that goal. These elements were missing at the start, but were developed. 			
Item	25		
Project name	Production Through Conservation (1989-1996)		
Rating			
I	II	III	Mean
8	8	7	8
Reasons:			
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Good design that was focused on the role of the communities; this was the biggest contributor to the success of the project. Upscaling of local communities through participatory approaches. Included learning and research components which strengthen relations with academia. This project was found to represent a significant breakthrough in approaches to achieving conservation-effective rural development in Lesotho. 			
Item	27		
Project name	Rural Finance and Enterprise Support Programme (1993-2002)		
Rating			
I	II	III	Mean
6	-	4	5
Reasons:			
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> The design of the project and the concept of increasing access to finance was a good strategy. The work with the Central Bank as the mandated entity to supervise the sector was a good move and helped address constraints at the central level. Enlisting the input of other NGOs was positive. 			

Item	29		
Project name	Conserving Mountain Biodiversity in Southern Lesotho (1995)		
Rating			
	I	II	III
	2	3	2
	Mean		
	6		
Reasons:	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The project failed due to poor design and execution. • The lack of clarity of the PIU as the project steering committee meant that the project was akin to a rudderless ship. Some very controversial activities, such as fencing Letša la Letsie, were a waste of resources. • The fact that the project had a very ambitious programme which did not match the amount of resources available was a problem. 		

The projects carried out during this decade were locally guided by the Fifth and Sixth National Development Plans,⁴⁵ which continued through military to democratic rule. The primary aims of the agricultural sector were stated as being “to increase and diversify agriculture through improvement in land use and land allocation systems and to combat soil erosion through effective range management practices”.⁴⁶ The Food Self-Sufficiency Programme⁴⁷ was deemed unsustainable and was abandoned, as it failed to assist households with increasing their productive capacity.

It is during this decade that a clear approach was developed to address the situation of Lesotho’s environment and land through the development of an Environment Unit. The unit developed the 1989 National Environment Action Plan to provide a framework for the integration of environmental considerations into planning and decision-making processes for social and economic development, and for the implementation of Agenda 21.⁴⁸ This was considered a starting point for development programmes, where project designs would need to take cognisance of, and be aligned with, the legal framework for good environmental management, and that they are aligned with the conventions to which Lesotho is a signatory.

The projects carried out during this decade have a score range of 3 to 8, but the biodiversity

programmes have not shown the same degree of improved performance.

How this will assist future projects

Lessons learned from these projects show that future projects should ensure that GoL counterpart staff get involved from inception, and come to fully understand the project design and ideology. Also, in cases where multiple implementing entities are involved, the design must ensure that strategies are in place to facilitate and ensure collaboration.

Future projects must ensure that expressed goals and objectives are concise and supported by good strategies. In addition, future projects should include learning and research during the life of the project, as this will contribute to success.

Future projects should be aware that good designs which focus on the effective involvement of communities increase chances for project success.

4.2.4 Projects carried out during 2000-2009

Assessments of projects

For this decade, we located 11 projects, but were only able to assess five; these five projects had a sufficient amount of documents to allow us to apply our template to review them.

45 Kingdom of Lesotho Second Five Year Development Plan Vol 1. 1975/76-1979/80. Maseru 1997.

46 Kingdom of Lesotho Sixth National Development Plan 1996/97-1998/99. Ministry of Economic Planning. Maseru 1997

47 Food Self-Sufficiency Programme (FSSP) which was formulated in 1980 and got implemented in 1981.

48 <https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/outcomedocuments/agenda21>.

Table 4.2.4 Assessments of 2000-2009 projects

Item	34		
Project name	LHDA Contract 1044: Integrated Catchment Management Project in Phase I Areas of the Lesotho Highlands Water Project (2004-2010)		
Rating			
I	II	III	Mean
8	-	7	7
Reasons:			
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> The project was able to achieve most of its objectives. This was because it was run by a hired consultant who performed their duties diligently and methodically. A factor that has prevented the achievement of a full score (10) is that LHDA failed to continue the project through to full implementation in the LHWP area following the end of the pilot phase. 			
Item	35		
Project name	Sustainable Agriculture and Natural Resource Management Programme (2005-2011)		
Rating			
I	II	III	Mean
5	-	4	4
Reasons:			
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> The project's average performance was due to the underperformance of the lead entity, and the fact that GoL counterpart staff were not committed to the project, as it was seen as a stand-alone entity. The project focused more on access to food, rather than food security itself. Weak on natural resource protection and rehabilitation. Risked enhancing dependence due to its incentive-based approach. 			
Item	38		
Project name	Lesotho Wetlands Restoration and Conservation Project (2008-2013)		
Rating			
I	II	III	Mean
6	7	4	6
Reasons:			
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Although the project was well designed, some key aspects - such as baseline socio-economic studies - were not conducted. Other issues which reduced performance included lack of staff at the national level. Lack of funds for operational work and weak district-level coordination. Weak coordination among stakeholders, especially implementing agencies. 			

Item	39		
Project name	The Rural Finance Intermediation Program (2008-2015)		
Rating			
I	II	III	Mean
7	7	6	6
Reasons:			
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The project was able to achieve most of its objectives, and this is largely attributed to working with private sector entities, and the fact that the project addressed very important people's need for access to financial services. • Several unresolved issues constrained the performance, e.g., poor M&E implementation that led to a lack of data on the number of group loans provided, missed contract renewals, etc. • Weakness of state-owned banks constrained the performance. 			
Item	41		
Project name	Capacity Building and Knowledge Management for Sustainable Land Management (2009-2016)		
Rating			
I	II	III	Mean
7	6	6	6
Reasons:			
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The project was able to achieve most of its objectives, and this is largely attributed to work with private sector entities, and the fact that the project addressed very important people's need for access to financial services. • Failure to implement the developed strategic investment framework and develop a knowledge management strategy. 			

Contextually, this decade's natural resource conditions are described adequately as follows:

"In spite of enormous efforts for several decades of the Government of Lesotho, with international support, there has not yet been a significant change for the better in the land use by the rural populations. However, currently there are instruments in place that should enable implementation of natural resource conservation and protection of the environment more effectively."⁴⁹

The projects assessed for this decade show better performance than the previous decades, and they address most of the environmental issues relevant to national policies and aspects of international

conventions which promote best practice in natural resource management. They are part of the implementation of Lesotho's Vision 2020, which states:

"By the year 2020, Lesotho shall be a stable democracy, a united and prosperous nation at peace with itself and its neighbours. It has a healthy and well-developed human resource base. Its economy will be strong, its environment well managed and its technology well established."⁵⁰

Annex 1 of Vision 2020 addresses critical success factors, the following of which have relevance to the subject of this review as creating the basis for an enabling environment for natural resource management:

49 Government of Lesotho Ministry of Development Planning. 2014. National Strategic Development Plan 2012/13-2016/17. Maseru.

50 Government of Lesotho Ministry of Development Planning. 2014. National Strategic Development Plan 2012/13-2016/17. pp. xviii. Maseru.

- **Stable democracy** (local governance, political stability, development management, programme management, policy management, institutional leadership)
- **Well managed environment** (environmental management, land management and desertification, conservation and biodiversity, conservation of mountain ecosystems and climate change)
- **Well established technology** (improved management capacity, research and development, education and awareness).

How this will assist future projects

Future projects have to be designed to ensure they are led by entities that have a high level of accountability and responsibility, as was the case of with consultants contracted by LHDA to manage its ICM project. Poor performance of most projects is due to the casual attitudes of PIU staff, and lack of accountability. Contracted entities such as consultants tend to manage projects better, as their performance is linked to their remuneration. There is ample evidence that project success is largely a function of good management by the lead agency. In addition, projects should, where possible, involve

NGOs and other private sector entities. Again, this is because these entities can be held to account by public sector entities.

Future projects should ensure that linkages between the various components/aspects of natural resource management projects are strong and effective. For example, there should be a clear link between soil conservation and crop production, and staff should understand how these components relate to and support each other.

Future projects must ensure that baseline studies are conducted to guarantee the existence of data to gauge project performance. Baseline socio-economic studies are essential, as in most cases, projects aim to improve livelihoods at whatever level the project operates at.

4.3 Current projects and assessments (2010-2020)

Assessments of projects

For this decade, we located 11 projects, but were only able to assess seven; these seven projects had a sufficient amount of documents to allow us to apply our template to review them.

Table 4.3.1 Assessments of 2010-2020 projects

Item	43			
Project name	Lesotho Adaptation of Small-Scale Agricultural Production (LASAP) (2011-2015)⁵¹			
Rating				
	I	II	III	Mean
	8	-	7	7
Reasons:	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Inadequate institutional capacity for climate change initiatives. • Shortage of human resources and technical capacity. • Lack of coordination among government institutions on varying roles related to climate change adaptation. • Climate change information was not made sector-relevant. • Insufficient financial resources to implement adaptation activities. • Lack of awareness both at the institutional and local levels of climate change and its impact on livelihoods. • Adaptation not integrated into other development initiatives. 			

⁵¹ The midterm evaluation reports states: "The rating remains unchanged since the last mission (on SADP) because although the significant efforts made by the PMU to address environmental issues are commendable, negative environmental impacts are not fully resolved. All sub-projects have gone through the screening and identification of environmental risks and impacts. Due to a lack of technical and financial resources, it has been difficult for the beneficiary groups to implement/incorporate ESMPs (e.g. construction of septic tanks for piggeries)". IFAD 2020. Lesotho Adaptation of Small-Scale Agricultural Production (LASAP) Mid-Term-Review / Supervision report.

Item	47		
Project name	Smallholder Agriculture Development Project (2012-2018)		
I	II	III	Mean
5	-	4	4
Reasons:			
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> This project was considered a success due to a streamlined design, and clearly outlined matching grants procedures. It is noteworthy that the project had a positive impact on household incomes. 			
Item	48		
Project name	Khubelu SPONGES Pilot Project (2013-2015)		
Rating			
I	II	III	Mean
6	7	4	6
Reasons:			
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> The project achieved its objective as a pilot for rangeland rehabilitation. The demonstration of successful rangeland rehabilitation was a key contributor to the success. The physical rehabilitation efforts had limited impact, and are not practical for use in remote areas. The use of concrete structures was not efficient and had negative impacts; the utilisation of local materials was more practical for the environment. Enforcement of regulations was weak, and this led to continued trespassing by livestock into the rehabilitated areas. 			
Item	50		
Project name	Wool and Mohair Promotion Project (2014-Present)		
Rating			
I	II	III	Mean
7	7	6	6
Reasons:			
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Although the project is having a high-level of success, its full potential has been impacted by the high turnover of GoL counterpart staff, especially in the PIU. 			

Item	52		
Project name	Strengthening Capacity for Climate Change Adaptation through Support to Integrated Watershed Management Programme in Lesotho (2015-2019)		
Rating			
I	II	III	Mean
7	6	6	6
Reasons:			
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> The design of the project was robust, and it was able to achieve most of its objectives and outputs satisfactorily. It contributed to the eradication of poverty. Due to good management, it was able to survive political instability across three government administrations. 			
Item	53		
Project name	Reducing vulnerability from climate change in the Foothills, Lowlands, and the Lower Senqu River Basin (2015-2020)		
Rating			
I	II	III	Mean
7	6	6	6
Reasons:			
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> The project was badly designed and had too many listed outcomes and activities. Its targets were too ambitious and could not be achieved. It was also dogged by delays and inappropriate fund allocations. 			
Project number	56		
Project name	UNDP-GEF 'Support to the Orange-Senqu River Strategic Action Programme Implementation (2017-2023)		
Rating			
I	II	III	Mean
7	6	6	6
Reasons:			
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> The project was well designed. It has developed an operational strategic plan. Functional M&E system. 			

The most recent decade has seen major changes in governance, the accession to international agreements, and the development of the National Strategic Development Plans;⁵² these developments have provided major guidance for natural resource-related issues. Relevant to this review is what is presented by “Strategic Goal V of the NSDP: Reverse environmental degradation and adapt to climate change”. The means to achieve this are stated as:

- (i) *Reverse land degradation and protect water sources through integrated land and water resource management;*
- (ii) *Improve national resilience to climate change;*
- (iii) *Promote biodiversity conservation;*
- (iv) *Increase clean energy production capacity and environment friendly production methods and explore opportunities for carbon trading;*
- (v) *Improve land use and physical planning as well as increasing densification and ringfencing towns to avoid human encroachment on agricultural land and other fragile ecosystems;*
- (vi) *Improve the delivery of environmental services, including waste and sanitation and environmental health promotion; and*
- (vii) *Improve coordination, enforcement of laws, information and data for environmental planning and increase public knowledge and protection of the environment.*⁵³

In our assessment of the projects during this decade, our scores take cognisance of the abovementioned strategic goal, including those aspects of Strategic Goal II, relevant to natural resource management.

How this will assist future projects

Future projects should have streamlined designs with fewer and more clearly articulated objectives and outcomes. There is a need for projects to avoid complex designs with too many outcomes, that prove hard to monitor effectively.

Future projects should aim to evidence their concepts in order to gain the confidence of those involved in the implementation of the project, as well as the beneficiaries. It is also important for any evidence to be drawn from areas similar to those the project aims to upscale. For example, in the case of the Wetland Rehabilitation Pilot Project, the concrete structures used in the pilot could only be replicated in areas where vehicular access was possible, yet the majority of the catchments are not accessible by vehicles.

In cases where future projects are to be managed by GoL appointed PIU members, targets should not be too ambitious, as it is known that their management will be affected by high staff turnover.




Figure 4.4 Temporal distribution of the performance score of the reviewed projects

⁵² Lesotho Government, Ministry of Development Planning 2014. National Strategic Development 2012/13-2016/17. Maseru.

⁵³ Government of Lesotho, 2014. National Strategic Development Plan 2012/2017. pp. xii.

4.4 Independent assessments and reports

Among the documents that we accessed for this review are studies by consultants, academics, and critics. The information contained in their evaluations provides another way of looking at natural resource management projects. It is through those independent reports and assessments that we managed to obtain lessons learned by independently funded individuals and institutions. It would be beneficial to ReNOKA if some of these could be included as lessons learned for the purposes of this report.

4.5 What is relevant to ReNOKA?

It is the hope of the authors that the information we have collected in this study will provide ReNOKA with knowledge about problems encountered by past natural resource management projects. The value of this work to ReNOKA is to highlight what many evaluators and observers of past projects have advised on what can be done to avoid the pitfalls that negatively impacted past projects. It is our understanding that for ReNOKA to be able to achieve its objectives, it must have the information contained herein. This will enable the movement to

take careful steps in planning and assessing where problems are likely to occur, and adjusting their project designs accordingly. Revisiting past projects will ensure that the potential for future problems is minimised. With ReNOKA's complex operational structure, this information will enable the movement to avoid incorrect or false assumptions.

It has been shown through this review that project performance is dependent on the context which exists at a given point in time. This means that what is considered a failure or success may not necessarily be replicable in a different context. The impression we have from this study is that ReNOKA must be flexible in order to be able to address circumstances likely to affect the project performance.

In our study, it has become clear that circumstances that affect projects are located at different stages in the project life. Therefore, it is necessary for ReNOKA to review all stages of the project to ensure identification of potential pitfalls.

Knowledge management is key in informing project performance. ReNOKA, by asking us to undertake this study, has initiated a knowledge management system whereby we have managed to locate relevant documents, and are able to advise on how they can be located for further reference.

CHAPTER 5

Lessons learned

This chapter presents lessons learned from the review of 20 projects for which we had access to a full set of documents. The documents reviewed included the appraisal reports, project implementation and midterm reports, and terminal evaluation reports. It presents the lessons learned, the recommendations made by the evaluation teams, as well as our observations of the projects. Also included here are lessons learned from projects undertaken by independently funded individuals and institutions around the country that have not benefited from extensive external support, but who used their own resources to achieve remarkable results. Finally, the chapter presents lessons learned from the scholarly works of individuals who have either reviewed externally funded projects, or who have studied and written about ReNOKA-related subjects.

5.1 Lessons learned from reviewed externally funded projects

We identified a total of 56 projects (see Appendix 1) which were implemented during the study period for which we could find some document/s to review. In 11 cases, although the projects were identified, they were insufficiently described. In 29 cases, documents were located but were insufficient for a full review of the project. It was only in 20 cases that a full set of documents (including an appraisal or identification report, implementation reports, and mid-term and final evaluation reports) allowed for a comprehensive review and assessment of the project. The lessons learned are presented in Appendix 4.

5.2 Lessons learned from independently funded individuals and institutions

A key failure in natural resource management has been poor attention being paid to, and failure to utilise, individuals and institutions that have demonstrated

success in natural resource management and agricultural improvement initiatives; the failures were generated by projects that are sponsored by the GoL and its cooperating partners in Lesotho. There are several success stories in the sector which, in some cases by design, have been largely ignored. In some cases, efforts have been made to frustrate their efforts. Critchley and Mosenene⁵⁴ note that the initiatives have come from farmers themselves based on their firsthand experience, and that project advice and inputs have been peripheral to their success. The farmers have taken ideas from different sources and have used trial and error and experimentation to achieve success.

These include, but are not limited to, the following:

- **Machobane Farming System** - Teke Mathata from Berea adopted the Machobane Farming System, making it more intensive, and rehabilitated dongas near his property by using hand dug earth bunds.
- **Mosoeu Mosoeu** in Mafeteng extensively improved his crop production through experience and experimentation.
- **Ramoliehi and Napo Sengagng'e's** soil and water conservation and afforestation initiative near Holy Cross in Mohale's Hoek. An eroded and barren field has been restored and made very productive.
- **Musi's Wetland Rehabilitation and Afforestation Initiative** in Malealea Mafeteng.
- **Marake's Fisheries, Fruits and Vegetable Initiative** in Masitise Quthing.
- **Growing Nations Initiatives in Maputseng and Bethel Business Community Development Centre's**⁵⁵ permaculture-focused soil and water conservation effort that has transformed the campus into an oasis in the middle of a very degraded and dry southern Lesotho landscape.

54 Critchley, W. and Mosenene, L., 1994. Individuals with initiative: Network Farmers in Lesotho. Chapter 5 of Successful natural resource management in southern Africa.

55 Ivan Yabolnitsky. 2020. Permaculture, Education and Enterprise for the Sustainable Development Goals in Lesotho. Bethel Business and Community Development Centre, Lesotho. Journal of Humanities, Arts and Social Science, 2020, 4(2). pp. 165-186.

5.3 Lessons learned based on international reviews on performance of NRM projects

In this section, we present lessons learned based on assessments and studies carried out by international donor organisations and international scientific bodies. The first example we have is from a 1988 publication by the Soil and Water Conservation Society and World Association of Water Conservation.⁵⁶ The first lesson relates to 'The Eppalock Catchment Project: A soil conservation success story'.⁵⁷ It was carried out in the 1960s in Australia, and it is included here as an example of what proper planning, involving beneficiaries and the project implementation length has on the results of the interventions. The second example is from D.W. Sanders' case studies in the same volume,⁵⁸ which describes lessons from the performance of Khomokhoana project in Lesotho.

Based on the Eppalock study, the following reasons are cited as bases for success:

- **The time frame** - A period longer than ten years; in this case, the project operated for 27 years.
- **Farmer involvement** - Farmers were fully involved in both planning and implementation, and every effort was made to meet the individual capabilities of different farmers.
- **The approach to cost-sharing** - The work was divided into production and non-production elements, coupled with simple systems of subsidies and services.
- **Assured funding** - The availability of a realistic sum annually for ten years to enable implementation of long-term plans.
- **Technology** - Introduction of new technology without taking into account local context.
- **Project organisation, administration, and staffing:**
 - a. Simple, straightforward system of command and communications established
 - b. Staff responsibilities clearly defined, ensuring workload does not exceed capacity
 - c. General specialised technical staff within appropriate fields
 - d. Low staff movements during the life of the project

Based on the Lesotho case study, the following are stated as requirements for success:

- Adoption of conservation practices appears to depend at least as much on socio-economic factors as on the physical effectiveness of the practices.
- Farmers and other land users need to be involved from the start in planning conservation schemes - the involvement must be genuine, explain what is possible, include consultations, and facilitate the negotiation of agreements.
- Farmers will only adopt and continue to use conservation methods if they can see some direct benefit in doing so.
- Land tenure systems have a bearing on which conservation practices land users will accept (case of stubble grazing after harvest in Lesotho, where once harvest is over the cropland is made communal grazing area; this often leads to damage of conservation structures and the cost of repairs are the responsibility of the field owner alone).
- The soil conservation practices and techniques advocated for must be practical and appropriate to local conditions.
- Implementing soil conservation programmes can be expensive in time and labour (therefore a combination of incentives, subsidies, and disincentives is required).
- Experience indicates that conservation can only be achieved if governments are committed to seeing through long-term programmes.

The Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO) study carried out by Hudson in 1991 has formed the model for the method used in this study:

"There have, of course, been some very good and effective conservation projects and programmes in a number of countries but, nevertheless, despite substantial efforts and the expenditure of large sums of money over the last half century, the results have frequently been disappointing.

With this problem in mind, this study was undertaken to try to identify the reasons for success and failure in soil conservation projects. Armed with the results of this study, it should now be possible to avoid repeating many of the mistakes of the past and developing new projects which have a far greater chance of success."⁵⁹

56 Moldenhauer, W. C. & Hudson, N. W. (Eds), 1988. Conservation Farming on Steep Lands. Soil and Water Conservation Society World Association of Water Conservation. Ankeny, Iowa. (pp. 228-241 for Eppalock & 59-62 for Khomokhoana).

57 D.W. Sanders, 1988. The Eppalock catchment project: a Soil conservation success story. Appearing in: W. C. Moldenhauer, and N. W. Hudson (Eds). Conservation Farming on Steep lands. Soil and Water Conservation Society World Association of Soil and Water Conservation. Ankeny, Iowa. pp. 228-232.

58 Sanders, D. W. 1988. Food and Agriculture Organization activities in soil conservation.

59 Hudson, N. W., 1991. A study of the reasons for success or failure of soil projects - FAO. Soils bulletin 64.

The method used in the study interrogates the projects to identify where in the life of the project issues of success or failure arose, and the factors

contributing to this described in terms of donor and host governments. Table 5.1 is a summary of the study's finding.

Table 5.1 Summary of factors that should be considered to ensure improved project performance⁶⁰

Project component affected	Donor factors	Host government factors
BEFORE IMPLEMENTATION		
Design	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Over-optimism, including over-estimating the effect of new practices Over-estimating the rate of adoption of new practices Over-estimation of the ability of the host country to provide backup facilities Under-estimation of the time required to mobilise staff and materials for the project Frequently, a quite unrealistic estimate of the economic benefits 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Over-estimating their capacity to provide counterpart staff and the funds for the recurrent costs arising from the project A tendency to under-estimate the problems of coordination among different ministries or departments A tendency to over-estimate the strength of the national research base and its ability to contribute to the project The absence of a long-term policy for the development of natural resources and the political stability necessary to ensure continuity of political support
Technology	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Be appropriate and tested locally Offer short-term, on-site benefits Require affordable inputs, especially labour Not include lost benefits, e.g. giving up land Not include any increased risk Be in tune with existing social factors, e.g. the perceived separate roles of men and women in agriculture 	
DURING IMPLEMENTATION		
Management	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Projects or programmes which set up a separate Project Management Unit (PMU) are in rapid decline because these were frequently associated with multi-sector or multi-component projects (e.g. integrated rural development projects) Monitoring is a common weakness 	
AFTER THE PROJECT		
Monitoring	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Increased and improved monitoring is required, because it is only through the careful evaluation and study of past projects that the lessons and experiences can be applied in the design of future projects Development of jargon, which is characterised by buzz words like sustainability, continuity, and replicability, without adequate explanation or clarity 	

60 Hudson, N. W., 1991. A study of the reasons for success or failure of soil projects - FAO. Soils bulletin 64.

CHAPTER 6

Discussions and recommendations

6.1 Summary and recommendations for performance

The study has examined and extracted a large volume of recommendations from project documents that include appraisal reports, project reports, mid-term evaluation reports, terminal reports, and reports of independent entities not related to the project in any way. The central question then is how should future projects use this huge collection of recommendations to inform their activities going forward?

We submit that the recommendations from earlier projects should be applied wisely, and should be categorised into four groups:

- Design
- Implementation,
- Post-project evaluation
- Overall context (be that policy or institutional frameworks)

This will serve two purposes. First, they will provide an insight into which category has the highest

number of recommendations. A casual look at the recommendations from the 20 projects for the five decades under review shows that the largest group relates to design, followed by those that relate to implementation, and the least are those that relate to the post-project era and those that relate to the context.

The distribution shows that across all decades, the recommendations that have been made are mostly concentrated on the implementation phase of the projects, followed by the design and completion phases. Recommendations relating to context/policy are more prevalent in the 1970s and 2000s. The fact that there is an increase in recommendations in the later part of the period under review suggests that there is more learning that is related to implementation issues. As in the case of lessons learned, we recommend that future projects (especially ReNOKA) should use a similar approach of critically reviewing recommendations made for past projects, and use this four-group categorisation as a tool to enable understanding of where project issues tend to occur in order to be able to design projects which mitigate against poor performance.




Figure 6.1 The temporal distribution of the recommendations extracted from the projects assessed



6.2 Lessons learned and summary of related recommendations

The lessons learned during this study are summarised in Appendix 4.

As in the case of recommendations, we have examined and extracted a large volume of lessons learned from the project documents we had access to. Although the lessons learned relate to different phases of projects, these are not categorised in a way which allows the reader to know which phase they relate to. We recommend that these lessons be categorised in a similar manner as done for the recommendations above. In Figure 6.2 below, we have categorised lessons from the projects for which we had documents, to demonstrate how this should be done. In the case of lessons, we have used the three phases of the project (initiation/planning and design phase, implementation phase, and completion phase). Unlike for recommendations, we have not included the context or policy environment related lessons.

The distribution shows that in all the decades, the most lessons that have been learned are related to the design phase, followed by implementation and completion phases. The most surprising observation is the upward trend; if there was any learning from the projects, one would have expected a decrease in the numbers of lessons for design and implementation, meaning that lessons are being used to design and implement projects which would lead to better outcomes.

It is therefore our recommendation for future projects, especially ReNOKA, to use information on lessons that we have collected in Appendix 4 of this report, and use this type categorisation as a tool to enable learning from the past projects. The lessons learned provided by reports and evaluations do not indicate where lessons apply in the development project life cycle. This lack of specificity must be addressed if the lessons are to be applied to guide future projects.




Figure 6.2 The temporal distribution of the lessons learned extracted from the projects assessed

6.3 Overall recommendations to ReNOKA based on performance indicators and extracted lessons learned

“What we now seek is a positive approach where care and improvement of the land resource comes first, and control of erosion follows as a result of good land husbandry.”⁶¹

ReNOKA has taken the initiative to investigate the performance of the past projects to inform its implementation efficiency. We recommend that the ReNOKA movement should use the information we have provided as a starting point and establish a ‘Lessons Learned Depository’ to keep the movement informed. Staff should be capacitated on how best the information can be applied.

The following issues are critical in dealing with natural resource management for increasing the chances of a project’s effectiveness in achieving their objectives:

- Explanation of natural resource degradation has two sets of specificity to address:
 - a. the physical system
 - b. social/economic systems, which must be brought together and analytically integrated
- Interconnected relationships between government departments, and other governing bodies. It is critical to make explicit what they are and what they do. It has been observed that “many commentaries without a clear and analytical statement, bewail the lack of political will, expertise or rational planning, without offering any explanation as to why these qualities frequently do not exist to carry out effective natural resource management projects.”⁶²

We hope that the information we have collected in this study will provide ReNOKA with knowledge about the problems encountered by past natural resource management projects. The value of this work to ReNOKA is to bring to light what many evaluators and observers of past projects have provided as advice on what can be done to avoid project failures. It is our understanding that, in order for ReNOKA to be able to achieve its objectives, it must access the information contained in this report. This will enable the movement to take careful steps in designing, planning and assessing where problems are likely to occur. The revisiting of those areas through effective M&E will ensure that problems that arise are minimised. With its very complex operational structure, this information will enable ReNOKA

to avoid incorrect or false assumptions, as other projects failed to do in the past.

It has been shown through this review that project performance is dependent on the context that prevails at the point in time when the project is implemented. This means that what may be considered as a failure or success of a project may not necessarily be replicable in a different context. The impression we have from this study is that ReNOKA has to be flexible to be able to address unexpected circumstances that are likely to affect the project performance.

In our study, it has become clear that circumstances that affect projects are located at different stages in the life of the project. Therefore, it is necessary for ReNOKA to review all stages of the project to ensure early identification of potential pitfalls.

Knowledge management is key in informing project performance. ReNOKA, by requesting us to do this work, has initiated a knowledge management stage whereby we have managed to locate relevant documents, and advise on how they can be used for further reference.

Key to our message to ReNOKA is the need to review its projects plans with a view to identifying possible factors that are likely to lead to under-performance. In section 4.5, we have addressed issues of performance and have noted the three areas of significance in a project’s life cycle. Below we summarise the areas of the project cycle that should be considered in the review.

61 Hudson, N., 1992. Land Husbandry. Batsford. London. pp. 9.

62 Blaikie, 1985. The Political Economy of Soil Erosion in Developing Countries. Longman London and New York.

1. At design

- a. Avoid complexity
- b. Ensure that assumptions are realistic, and that targets are not too ambitious
- c. Understand the context (laws, institutional issues, status of decentralisation and relevant contextual factors, including the lived realities of the Basotho)
- d. Have an exit strategy and ensure post-project funding
- e. Ensure that the project length is adequate to attain and sustain objectives
- f. Ensure innovation is built into the project plan, and that appropriate and affordable technology is provided
- g. Ensure that agreements/commitments with the GoL are legal and binding
- h. If needed, factor in time for staff recruitment
- i. Have a clear statement of who will ensure the project's sustainability, and why it will be sustainable; consider what factors will ensure its sustainability

2. Implementation

- a. Ensure availability of project staff and reduce turnover of GoL counterpart staff
- b. Ensure availability and full tenure of foreign expert staff
- c. Ensure or build capacity and skill sets of local staff and of local institutions (Chiefs, Councils, etc.)

- d. Ensure community participation from the planning stage
- e. Build in flexibility and ensure continuous review and revision
- f. Use local experts and NGOs
- g. Ensure learning and research, and record experiences

3. Post project

- a. Timely commencement of M&E, and regular application; use a simple M&E framework
- b. Ensure continuous review and recording as part of M&E
- c. Use a standardised evaluation framework

The appendices to the study will enable the implementation of the structure provided above. The relevant appendices are the following:

- Appendix 1, which contains objectives and performance of each project reviewed
- Appendix 4, which lists lessons learned, and recommendations extracted from past projects
- Appendix 4a, which lists the projects for which there is documentation for further scrutiny

We recommend that in carrying out the process of reviewing the documents, the template borrowed from Hudson,⁶³ which we used in this study, is the appropriate tool. The template is attached hereto as Appendix 6.

CHAPTER 7

Conclusions

At the start of the study, the team's vision was to identify as many reports relating to past projects as possible. We sought to extract every conceivable lesson possible and report on what information they provide detailing the performance of projects. When accessing certain information the team felt would be useful became a problem, it became clear that what was required was to have a small number of project reports that would provide a good understanding of the complete life cycle of a project. The team then decided to find projects with appraisal or design documents, mid-term evaluations, terminal reports, and external or end-of-project evaluations. In addition, the team felt that it was necessary to review the context within which the projects were designed and implemented, as this influenced the origins of projects and their performance during implementation. These conclusions are therefore based on what we have found, based on the four project phases noted above.

In terms of design, many lessons point towards poor design when project performance is lacking. Failure is guaranteed when the design is flawed, unless there is learning based on good monitoring and flexibility. The information from the projects we reviewed showed that about 61% of lessons learned were related to project design. We highlight some of the issues that contribute to poor performance emanating from the design and planning phases of the projects:

- The tendency to underplay the coordination problems of the various ministries involved in project implementation
- Baseless assumptions that are not backed up by robust data; this is often attributed to the lack of availability of data from baseline studies and other credible sources
- Setting of overly ambitious/optimistic targets, particularly relating to the rates of adoption and the rate at which progress will be made
- Overly complex designs make implementation and monitoring problematic

- Underestimation of the time it will take for the project to commence, even working efficiently and effectively
- Short project period/duration does not allow the momentum of project achievements to be sustained
- The assumption is that the government will provide skilled counterpart staff
- Projects are designed by external experts who import ideas from other places and contexts, assuming they will be easily replicable in Lesotho. Similarly, it has to be understood that even within Lesotho, successful initiatives may not work in another part of the country without adaptation. Cultural norms and other unique context-related issues may negatively impact the performance of initiatives.

While innovation is difficult to adequately provide for, the project design must allow a reasonable level of flexibility to address problems that the project faces. It should also allow for research and learning. Project design should also include extensive details of processes and procedures for implementation, because project staff are usually not part of the design team. The key to success is to have clear, concise, and limited objectives. Finally, project design must be careful of the level of technology it introduces and how it is introduced. The role of new technologies should be to solve apparent problems for the beneficiaries.

At the project implementation stage, the local and international staff's deployment seems to be one of the main issues that impact project performance. In addition, it is not possible to always find a local team with the requisite skill levels. It is also necessary that the Project Implementation Unit (PIU) develop a system where staff have a clear delegation of responsibility, and are accountable for their actions, to allow them to make decisions timeously without going back to the PIU for authorisation. Finally, M&E should be made part and parcel of implementation, and start simultaneously at the stage of project commencement.

There is a need to develop project evaluation frameworks that have a minimum set of standards that all stakeholders should use to ensure uniformity in evaluations, which allows for comparability. In carrying out this assignment, the team was confronted with the daunting problem of comparing the results of assessments. The major donors and cooperating partners each have different criteria.

A vital issue for Lesotho's natural resources and Integrated Catchment Management is establishing a permanent authority to develop a long-term programme that donors and other entities can support, instead of piecemeal, short-term projects. This will help avoid the situation of a five-year project being initiated, and then making an impact that dissipates at the end of its term. This will also prevent a problem where policy constantly changes as new projects are started, and donors call for changes that they feel will suit the project they are funding.

Finally, the context within which projects are designed and implemented is critical for recording and understanding their influence on success. In Lesotho, the most influential aspects over the review period have been political instability, a decline of the country's fiscal position, and unpredictable weather conditions. It is important to note that in some cases, project motives have little to do with development; they may be initiated to further the objective of the GoL and donors. For example, in the early part of the

review period, donors supported Lesotho because of its proximity to South Africa. They were not concerned that Lesotho was an autocratic dictatorship.

ReNOKA should ensure that the planning is integrated, it is inclusive, participatory, and takes into account the needs and the capabilities of the communities within the catchments that they operate in. In that planning, the main purpose should be identification of potential benefits to the community which are not environmentally degrading or do not demand resources (manpower, financial, etc.) that are beyond the capacity of the communities. It should take into account the biophysical and climatic conditions of the area.

The governance is the most critical pillar of a "sustainable" livelihoods support programme. It is not sufficient to have a legal framework in place when the institutional structures are not coordinated and integrated.

The following quotation forms a suitable end message for this assignment:

"The thesis further concluded that the biggest contribution to the lack of sustainability of rural development projects in Lesotho came from the decision makers, the planners and the community members themselves, all of whom in their different ways were often reluctant to adjust to the sacrifices demanded by the new ways of livelihood introduced by the projects".⁶⁴

64 Mashinini, I. V., 2000. Sustainable Rural Development In Lesotho. PhD Thesis submitted to Faculty Science, Department of Geography at the University of the Orange Free State, South Africa.

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Appendix 1: Meta-review tables of projects by decade

The information on projects where detailed reviews could not be carried out are marked **purple**, and are excluded from the decadal presentation. Projects where sufficient documents were obtained to allow for a description of their activities, their objectives, as well as their periods of implementation, are marked **yellow**. Projects that are marked **green** are those for which we have been able to obtain what we refer to as a full set of documents (design level documents, midterm appraisals/evaluations and/or terminal/final evaluations).

Table 1: 1970-1979 Natural resource management implemented projects

Item	Year	Project name	Funding agency/donor/sponsor	Implementing agency
1		Phuthiatsana Upper Catchment Irrigation (1971 -1977) ⁶⁵		Ministry of Agriculture Conservation and Forestry Division
2	1970	Development of a Pilot Agricultural Scheme in Leribe Area. (1970 - 1975) ⁶⁶	FAO/UNDP	Ministry of Agriculture
3	1972	Woodlot Programme (1972-1985) ^{67 68 69}	UK/Anglo American Corporation/ De Beers Consolidated Mines/GoL	Ministry of Agriculture
4	1974	Senqu River Agricultural Extension Project Lesotho (1974-1977) ⁷⁰	UNDP	Ministry of Agriculture

65 The only information is a soil survey with no report dates. Have project location map.

66 C. G. Wenner, 1982. Soil Conservation in Lesotho. Draft Discussion Document. 15th March 1982. SIDA Consultancy Report. p.65.

67 C. G. Wenner, 1982. Soil Conservation in Lesotho. Draft Discussion Document. 15th March 1982. SIDA Consultancy Report.

68 Maile, N. 200. The Forest Revenue System and Government Expenditure on Forestry in Lesotho. A paper prepared for FAO work-programme component on financing sustainable forest management. Working Paper: FSFM/WP/03.

69 May, E. D. 1992. Social Forestry in Lesotho Records of Past Initiatives and Achievement. Miscellaneous Extracts from Bibliographic Sources in Lesotho.

70 UNDP. 1975. The Senqu River Agricultural Extension Project. Report of the Evaluation Mission. LES/72/003.

Objectives	Performance
<p>a. Demonstrate the potential for significantly increased yields through the systematic application of good husbandry, improved planting material, fertilisers, and the integration of proven livestock enterprises within viable mixed farming systems.</p> <p>b. Provide a model for the implementation of similar projects in Lesotho with a view to increased food production and import substitution on a national scale. Ensure the maintenance and expansion of production-oriented projects through the establishment of a well-trained cadre of Lesotho agricultural staff.</p> <p>c. To assist the government of Lesotho in establishing a Pilot Agricultural Scheme in the Leribe lowlands in order to demonstrate the efficacy of an integrated approach in increasing and intensifying crop production.</p>	<p>The dominant work done was maintenance of terraces using machinery which was judged a questionable task for an agricultural project. Other work included construction of diversion banks, small fish dams, and roads; gully control; establishment of a small nursery; planting of trees; and establishment of meteorological station.</p> <p>It was determined that a strategy for an integrated approach be introduced, with modifications where necessary, as a basic feature of the agricultural and rural development plans.</p>
<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Establishment of a forest service and marketing facilities. 2. Establishment of woodlots throughout the country for the provision of fuel and poles to farmers. 3. Provision of trees for soil and water conservation purposes. 4. Training of Basotho nationals to assume responsibility for the operation of a forest. 	<p>The programme was a success because its objectives were limited and experts with experience initiated research as to the appropriate species, fertilising, nursery and planting techniques. The constraints it faced included special climatic and topographic conditions of Lesotho, damage to trees by livestock even in fenced areas, availability of communal land for woodlots due to lack of interest or even resistance by people, and lack of trained staff because those trained took other jobs.</p>
<p>Assist GoL in increasing the agricultural production above the subsistence level, create employment and competitive earning. These were to be achieved by:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Identifying constraints to rural development. • Determining and demonstrating the economic feasibility of overcoming these constraints. • Strengthening the government services to carry out the needed development activities. 	<p>Despite good management, disappointing results were obtained due to faulty project design and shortfalls inherent to the ambitious type of area development scheme cum pre-investment project. Other factors were drought, the late arrival of key equipment, and the poor functioning of the Project Coordinating Committee. Although conservation works were found to be sound, they covered a tiny part of the project. The evaluation recommended a complete redesign of the project.</p>

Item	Year	Project name	Funding agency/donor/sponsor	Implementing agency
5	1975	Khomokhoana Rural Development Project (1975 – 1977) ^{71 72}	FAO	Ministry of Agriculture
6	1975	Land and Water Resources Development Project LWRDP (1975-1983) ⁷³	USAID	Ministry of Agriculture
7	1975	Thaba Tseka Mountain Development Project (1975-1978) ⁷⁵	CIDA	Ministry Agriculture/Ministry of Works
8	1976	Thaba Bosiu Rural Development Project (1973- 1977) ⁷⁶	USAID/IDA/UNCDF/UNDP	Soil Conservation Division of the Ministry of Agriculture and Roads Division of the Ministry of Works.

71 C. G. Wenner, 1982. Soil Conservation in Lesotho. Draft Discussion Document. 15th March 1982. SIDA Consultancy Report. p.67.

72 Michael. D. Stapleton.1977. Khomokhoana Rural Development Project. Terminal Report. FAO. TF/LES 9 (SWE).

73 Documentation housed in SWC library – MFRC.

74 Nobe, K. C. and Seckler, D. W. 1979. An Economic and Policy Analysis of Soil-Water Problems and Conservation Programs in the Kingdom of Lesotho. LASA Research Report No. 3. Ministry of Agriculture, Kingdom of Lesotho and Department of Economics Colorado State University.

75 LASA Report No. 3 (p.123) describes Phase I of the project.

76 James B. Davis, James J. Acres and William A. Daley. An Evaluation of the Thaba Bosiu Rural Development Project in Lesotho. 1975.

Objectives	Performance
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> a. To support the government policy of increasing agricultural production. b. To improve the soils of the Khomokhoana and adjacent areas. c. To demonstrate the socio-economic advantages deriving from a sound, integrated approach designed to sustain intensified agricultural output. d. To train a Lesotho cadre in all those disciplines applied by the project so that national personnel may be expected to assume responsibility for this project and independently be able in the future to apply such knowledge in similar efforts in other parts of the nation. e. To bring about a significant improvement in the standard and quality of living enjoyed by the farming community thereby facilitating a more effective contribution to the economic wellbeing of the country. 	<p>The project failed already in planning. The scale and impact of the project were found not to be satisfactory. The evaluation mission was not satisfied with the approach.</p> <p>The conservation measures were done with Food Aid labour and it was clear that these will not continue when WFP stops the Food Aid programme. Although the Lerotholi Law that decrees that people should be responsible for repairs and maintenance of structures it was found the labour available (old women and young children) was not physically capable of doing the work.</p> <p>Failures were recorded for a number of components. Factors that contributed included lack of involvement of people, lack of drivers, bad roads, high mortality of planted trees, delayed deployment of counterpart staff, etc.</p>
<p>As inferred from the sub-elements, identified as “project input-output linkages. These are:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Skill transfer 2. Adoption of technology 3. Institutional development 4. GoL-rural population linkages 	<p>The following shortcomings were identified in the LASA assessment of the project:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Government plans to incorporate all donor projects with a soil and water conservation component into MoA, with Conservation Division having a major coordination role. The absence of economic expertise was viewed as a constraint. 2. Project failed to provide for a research component among the objectives. 3. Project efforts directed to increasing short-term agricultural productivity focused primarily on protection of existing cropland from erosion. 4. High level of achievement was noted in the area of natural resources programme integration. 5. The project, unlike area-based projects, had a long-term goal involved to upgrade the delivery capacity of the major conservation agency, if noted deficiencies are removed⁷⁴
<p>An integrated project to raise the standard of living of the people.</p>	<p>At the time of evaluation by both Wenner and the LASA team, the project was highly rated based on what it had achieved under tough working conditions. ICM-related activities, especially range management and increasing both short and long-term productivity, were done in limited areas. For crop production, trials were conducted for crop varieties and demonstration plots were established at the village level. Little work was done on range improvement apart from the establishment of range trial plots and overseeding trials where responses were disappointing but revegetation in fenced plots was dramatic.</p>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> 1. To provide a more assured subsistence for farm households and to increase the income derived from crop and livestock production. 2. To control erosion and transform land use patterns to permit the introduction of a permanent system of integrated farming combining rotational cropping with improved livestock production. 3. To provide data for the preparation of similar rural development projects in other areas. 	<p>The project was too ambitious and some of its components had to be severely reduced. Although it has a number of components, it is remembered as a soil conservation project. Reasons for major changes included lack of trained personnel, equipment was delivered late or was the wrong type, and slow progress working with communities. Instead of pushing its original plans, it changed its strategy to be able to give priority to community cooperation.</p>

Item	Year	Project name	Funding agency/donor/sponsor	Implementing agency
9	1978	Basic Agricultural Services Project (1978- 1987) ⁷⁷	Britain, Ireland & West Germany	Ministry of Agriculture

Table 1(a) The distribution of funders and implementing agency composition

Colour 1970-1979	Number	Model of funding		Model of implementation	
		Bilateral	Multi-lateral	Single	Multiple
	1		1	1	
	4	2	2	3	1
	4		4	3	1
Total	9	2	7	7	2

77 C. G. Wenner, 1982. Soil Conservation in Lesotho. Draft Discussion Document. 15th March 1982. SIDA Consultancy Report. p. 69-70.

78 World Bank 1987. Project Completion Report on Lesotho Basic Agricultural Services Program Project (Credit 795-LSO).

Objectives	Performance
<p>The Basic Agricultural Services Programme (BASP) is aimed at increasing output of five major crops (maize, sorghum, beans, peas and wheat) in six development blocks, covering 75 percent of Lesotho's arable land and encompassing about 66 percent of the country's population, through the provision of agricultural inputs, training, credit, extension, stores, roads, and marketing facilities. The proposed IDA credit would assist specifically the improvement of the institutional capabilities of the Ministry of Agriculture (MoA) by:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> Establishing a Basic Agricultural Services Programme Division and strengthening the administrative, accounting and crops divisions Establishing a Central Credit Management Unit within MoA Establishing a planning and evaluation division Supporting a training component within MoA's Extension and Information Division, in order to enable MoA to coordinate and supervise BASP. 	<p>The project was judged as good and that it needed more machinery and implements to be hired by farmers. Recommendations worked out for fertilising usual crops such as potatoes, which gave excellent results, but the results for beans and wheat were questionable.</p> <p>This positive view is negated by the findings of World Bank project completion report,⁷⁸ which states that:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> The project was unsuccessful in increasing crop production, arresting declining productivity and increasing intensity of cultivation through use of appropriate inputs, extension, credit and technical assistance. The failures of Thaba Bosiu was repeated within the BASP because of poor husbandry. The credit mainly funded technical experts who coordinated the project implementation. Most of the stores built failed to provide services and were abandoned. Some funders withdrew their support when the government decided to give prime attention to a competing programme (food self-sufficiency) under a highly mechanic system of farming because they found the mechanised system was highly uneconomic and constituted a large drain on the countries limited resources. The evaluation team listed 8 lessons emanating from the project.

Table 2: 1980-1989 projects

Item	Year	Project name	Sponsor/funder	Implementing agency
10	1980	Agriculture Marketing and Credit Project (1980-1988) ^{79 80 81}	IFAD	MACM
11	1981	Land Conservation and Range Development Project (1981-1992) ^{82 83}	USAID	MACM MICARD
12	1982	Phuthiatsana Integrated Rural Development Project ⁸⁵	ADF	Phuthiatsana Irrigation Authority MOW
13	1985	Farm Improvement with Soil Conservation (FISC) Project in Maphutseng, Mophale's Hoek District (1985-1990) ^{86 87}	SIDA	MACM

79 IFAD 1980: Project ID 1100000055 [Lesotho agricultural Marketing and Credit.pdf].

80 IFAD 1991. Agricultural Marketing and Credit Project.

81 The project evaluation document could not be located.

82 Land conservation and range development project, Lesotho technical proposal submitted to the United States Agency for International Development, in response to RFP no. 632-0215, April 1981.

83 Strategies and Tenure in African Livestock Development by Brent M. Swallow (wsc-0008.pdf).

84 Chakela, Q. K. & Cantor, J. 1987. History of Soil Conservation and Soil Conservation Policy in Lesotho. IN: SADCC-SWCLUP. History of Soil Conservation in the SADCC Region. Report No. 8. See A.

85 African Development Bank Group. Phuthiatsana Integrated Rural Development Project. Project Performance Evaluation Report. Operations Evaluation Department. 1991.

86 Marake, M. V. and Shone, G. 1998. The Production through Conservation (PTC) Programme 1981-1996.

87 T.F Shaxson & D M Sehloho 1993. Draft report of the informal evaluation mission, The PTC 11 Programme Mafeteng, Mophale's Hoek, Quthing.

Objectives	Performance
<p>The Agricultural Marketing and Credit Project (AMCP) was designed as complementary to the Basic Agricultural Services Programme (BASP) meant to:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Provide small farmers with farm support services and infrastructure essential to the increase of production of food. • Provide small-scale farmers with crucial farm support services not provided by the BASP project assistance in the areas of input distribution, marketing services and agricultural credit. • Provide a credit facility to assist women who headed farming households to obtain help in the form of labour and draught animals during the crucial period when the land is being prepared for crops. 	<p>The project provided working capital, along with management and technical assistance, to Coop Lesotho Ltd to meet farmers' needs for efficient distribution of inputs such as fertilisers and seeds. It also provided a programme of seasonal, short-term, medium-term and long-term credit administered by the Lesotho Agricultural Development Bank (LADB), including management and technical assistance funds for monitoring and evaluation of activities, and institutional and technical studies covering the development of the cooperative sector and the feasibility of establishing a seed multiplication unit.</p>
<p>The Land Management and Conservation Project will be part of a long-term programme for land management and erosion control to enhance agricultural productivity, to be carried out through the newly elected village, ward, and district councils. To this end, the project will strengthen:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> a. MICARD through technical assistance, training, and logistical support to enable them to assist the councils. b. MCM's Institute of Land Use Planning (ILUP) to enable it to put together working groups in the districts to help local communities to prepare and implement land management plans. Also financed will be land management sub-projects (such as pasture improvement, conservation works, tree planting) approved by the district councils. Finally, the project will provide assistance in the further development of a land policy for the Kingdom. 	<p>Relatively successful due to considerable work done within the range component. Inadequate integration of the two components. Fair progress in the design of farm plans even though farmer participation was extremely limited. The plans tend to be idealised statement of what the farm should look like to western trained and educated staff. The actual capabilities of farmers, given their incomes and social setting among other factors, are not adequately considered e.g. blanket recommendations for fertiliser. Considerable attempts at extension conservation education have been made. However, the tendency appears to advocate things which farmers cannot afford, or do not want to implement. In all, the project has not assumed the necessary amount of dialogue with farmers for viable farm planning. Considerable training of nationals, as well as soil surveying and interpretation has been conducted.⁸⁴</p>
<p>To increase crop production, particularly of rainfed maize, through the use of crop production chemicals and improved varieties of seed, supplemented by extension, credit and farm machinery services.</p>	<p>The irrigation component does not perform particularly well, there being no rainfall records at the irrigation sites, no records of water pumped and no system of irrigation costs or water charges. Project building, clinics and classrooms operate well and are soundly maintained by the concerned authorities. One road was well built by the MOW and has been adopted by the MOW for upkeep purposes. The boreholes are satisfactory and a sound system of repair and maintenance is in operation.</p>
<p>To assist farming communities in the district (Mohale's Hoek) to improve agricultural production by conserving and managing their land resources sustainably.</p>	<p>The PTC was generally considered a success as a pilot programme. It was noted that it represented a significant breakthrough in approaches to achieving conservation-effective rural development in Lesotho.</p> <p>Positive programme aspects included: the programme approach, multi-sectoral planning, participatory planning, process orientation, client demand, multi-sectoral integration, and objectives and materials.</p> <p>Among the problems identified were: lack of a unified extension approach, poor follow up, low morale and motivation of staff, fear for transparency and accountability, apparent fear of redundancy, half-baked decentralisation policy, apparent loss of power, fear of transfers to remote locations, the fear of losing our kingdoms, poor career prospects under DAO control and negative competition among projects. A key issue noted was lack of support by headquarters in Maseru.</p>

Item	Year	Project name	Sponsor/funder	Implementing agency
14	1985	Lesotho Agricultural Production and Institutional Support (LAPIS) programme (1985-1992) ⁸⁸	USAID	MACM
15	1986	Matelile Rural Development Project (orientation phase) (1986-1990) ⁸⁹	GTZ	MACM
16	1978	Labour Construction Unit (LCU) (1978 -1985) ⁹⁰	SIDA	Ministry of Works
17	1987	Land Management and Conservation Project (1987-1992) ^{91 92}	World Bank/SIDA	MICARD MACM
18	1988	Soil and Water Conservation and Agroforestry Programme	IFAD	MACM

88 AMERICAN AG INTERNATIONAL: Consortium for International Development Fredrerisen, Kamine & Associates Lindsay/Dekalb International. 1992. Lesotho Agricultural Production and Institutional Support Project. LAPIS END-OF-REPORT. USAID Project No. 632-0221.

89 Saltze, W., Schweizer, G., Mey, U. and Jesswein, Dr. 1993. Project Progress Review Final Report (BN 85.2515.6.01.100): Matelile Rural Development Project. Lesotho 06.93.

90 G. Edmonds, K. Goppers, M. Soderback. 1985. Men or Machines. An evaluation of Labour Intensive Works in Lesotho. A SIDA Evaluation Report.

91 World Bank, 1995. Implementation Completion Report: Lesotho Land Management and Conservation Project (Credit1897-LSO).

92 Dee, Philippa; Diop, Ndiame; 2012. Lesotho - Land Management and Conservation Project. The World Bank ISBN: 0-8213-2578-7. "Lesotho - Land Management and Conservation Project"@eng.

Objectives	Performance
<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Farming households are involved in intensive horticulture, cash crops, and livestock production activities, which have measurably contributed to increased employment and income. 2. A coordination structure is operating within the MACM to facilitate support to smallholder production projects. 3. The MACM research division is capable of addressing the constraints to smallholder agriculture, testing and developing improved packages, and assisting in the dissemination of these packages to small farmers. 4. Training institutions are capable of training MoA extension and technical staff, farmers, the public and private personnel involved in smallholder agriculture including input supply and marketing operations. 	<p>The project achieved extensive institutional development but maintenance by GoL was poor. Propensity for change in most MoA departments was noted and also financial and budgeting capabilities were not strong. GoL financial support for the project was low.</p> <p>Donor efforts played a large role in defining general direction for change.</p> <p>At the time of evaluation, attainment of purpose of macro-level improvement and employment was not evident.</p> <p>Most project supported programmes were new.</p> <p>The project term, while long, was brief relative to the mandate.</p>
<p>The overall goal was to “reduce the dependency of the farming population on off-farm income” with the purpose to increase the target groups’ participation and production on a sustainable basis.</p>	<p>The review of the orientation phase reports above average success in the implementation of all the objectives of the four components, in terms of planning and implementation. The orientation phase provided good baseline information for the implementation phase.</p>
<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. To promote and propagate the use of efficient labour-intensive methods in the government of Lesotho. 2. To create as much gainful employment as possible in the country, especially for returning migrant workers. 	<p>Several projects were carried out to satisfactory technical standards but the broad objective in relation to large-scale employment promotion was not achieved. This was due to the fact that GoL did not provide sufficient funds.</p> <p>80% of LCU operations remained in road construction and maintenance despite the fact that several studies showed that other types of projects, e.g. soil conservation could yield higher employment effects.</p> <p>Training-related objectives were not realised, management positions were not filled in eight years, recommendations to remedy shortcomings by evaluation teams were not heeded, and employment was done on a political basis.</p>
<p>The project is viewed in a long-term perspective. It would:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> a. Assist in the further development of a land policy for the Kingdom, and in the implementation of land tenure laws by providing for land registration and surveys. b. Strengthen MICARD’s ability to assist councils in administration and development planning through technical assistance, training and logistical support. c. Strengthen MoA’s ability through its ILUP to field resource management working groups in each district which would assist local communities in preparing and implementing land resource management projects. d. Finance approved and management projects such as pasture improvement, civil and conservation work, and tree planting. 	<p>The project performed unsatisfactorily. Targets of the number of resources management plans were reduced from 47 to 25. The project performance was affected by delays in start-up and poor communication between the two ministries. The project had to be restructured to provide drought relief and this is what led to the reduction of the number of plans from 25 to 8.</p> <p>Training results were not easily visible due to turnover of VDC members as a result of two elections and continuous training was not catered for on the project.</p>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Improving small-scale farmers’ productivity and income. • Promoting soil and water conservation by farmers as a routine feature of agricultural activities. • Establishing agroforestry research capability to develop ecologically sound agricultural production systems. • Creating effective agricultural extension services. • Monitoring and coordinating conservation policies, programmes, and projects. 	<p>This project aimed to integrate soil conservation and agricultural production and to make conservation programmes more effective by rooting them in what rural people can do for themselves, using simple methods and limited resources. Under the project, farmers carried out the conservation works themselves under the supervision of technicians, and farmers were paid not in food aid, but in the form of agricultural inputs such as seed and fertilisers. Women were the principal target of the programme.</p> <p>The programme assisted farmers in building and repairing erosion control structures such as terraces and waterways, and water harvesting structures for supplementary irrigation. The programme promoted controlled livestock grazing, simple biological methods of soil conservation, and traditional sharing arrangements so that women and landless people could have access to land.</p> <p>Project funds were used to test and promote the Machobane farming system. The results were noteworthy: Yields from fields cultivated under the system were triple those of monocrop plots. Between 1991 and 1997, the number of farmers adopting the system soared from 22 to 2,000.</p>

Item	Year	Project name	Sponsor/funder	Implementing agency
19	1989	Soil and Water Conservation and Land Utilisation (SWCLU) Programme	SADC	MACM

Table 2(b) The distribution of funders and Implementing Agency composition

Colour 1980-1989	Number	Model of funding		Model of implementation	
		Bilateral	Multi-lateral	Single	Multiple
			1	1	
	6	2	4	3	3
	4	3	1	3	1
Total	10	5	6	7	4

Objectives	Performance
<p>The programme aimed to help the governments of countries:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • To improve their performance in relation to the sustainable management of natural resources, particularly soil and water. • To identify actual or potential conflicts of interest that may arise out of environmental degradation and to reconcile such conflicts. • To develop policies and promote practices for the sustainable and productive management of natural resources based upon partnerships between government and communities of farmers and other land users. • To support institutions in member countries in their efforts to increase their competence in relation to sustainable resources management and to integrate the various disciplines and contributions of such institutions. <p>To motivate development from grassroots through the following:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Peoples' participation • Addressing the economics of sustainable resources management • Good land husbandry • Integrated land use planning • Environmental awareness creation among youth 	<p>The performance of the programme in relation to natural resource management is best described by its 1986 Report No. 5 following a workshop on land degradation and desertification control in the SADCC region. The aim of the workshop was to discuss the threat of environmental degradation and to share experiences in land degradation/environmental control programmes. Among the issues covered are a summary of options and constraints for each natural resource covered. For this study the relevant themes are presented here with the identified constraints:</p> <p>Water resources management:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • trained manpower • implementation of technical solutions • legislation • land tenure system <p>Training, education and more efficient extension service:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • low output from training institutions • training not relevant • lack of teachers • poor management of extension service • lack of incentives to improve farm management • Improving pastures, growing fodder crops and stall feeding: • know how • cultural, traditional • implementing technical solutions <p>Controlling grazing, destocking by legislation:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • land tenure systems • know how • implementing enforcement. • Change land use, forced resettlements, grazing legislation <p>Cultural, traditional land tenure system;</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Find new land • New legislation enforcement

Table 3 1990-1999 projects

Item	Year	Project name	Sponsor/funder	Implementing agency
20	1990	SOWACO Project ⁹³	FAO	Ministry of Agriculture
21	1990	Matelile Rural Development Project (Implementation phases I and II) (1990 -1996)	GIZ	Ministry of Agriculture
22	1992	Community Natural Resources Management Project (1992-1995) ⁹⁴	USAID	Ministry of Agriculture, Cooperatives and Marketing
23	1993	Production Through Conservation ⁹⁵	SIDA	Ministry of Agriculture through Lesotho Agricultural College
24	1993	Local Initiative Support Project (LISP)	IFAD	Ministry of Agriculture
25	1993	Rural Finance and Enterprise Support Programme (1993-2002) Project ID: 110000468 ^{96 97}	IFAD/Regional	
26	1993	Mafeteng Development Project	GTZ	

93 Hall, D. 1990. A Comprehensive Approach to Village-Based Conservation Development. A Case Study from 21 Villages in Mohale's Hoek District, Lesotho. Results of a Survey for the SOWACO Project.

94 McCormick, S. & Auman, J. 1995. Community Natural Resources Management Project. (Contract No. 632-6228) [CNRM.pdf].USAID/Lesotho. 1991: Community Natural Resources Management Project Paper 632-0228 [PDABB852.pdf] Country Program Strategic Plan.

95 Marake, M. V, with contributions from Shone, G. J. Carlsson. Y. Khatwa and M. Segerros. 1998. The Production through Conservation (PTC) Programme. 1981-1996. A Historical Document.

96 Only summary available online. The President's Report- Rural Finance and Enterprise Support, could not be located.

97 IFAD 1993: Rural Finance and Enterprise Support Project (Rural Finance and Enterprise Support Project.pdf).

Objectives	Performance
	<p>The project managed to raise awareness of soil erosion and most attributed it to man-made activities. Villagers appreciated Project activities because of incentives it offered although many villagers thought inducements should not be offered for development work. It was concluded that the time period of the project was too short and hence its efforts would not be sustainable that incentives were unsustainable, and that the project should work with both groups and individuals.</p>
<p>To establish effective community grazing associations which will manage rangelands at sustainable carrying capacities for livestock.</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Developed a prototype for a range of management areas. • Improved staff capacity. • Initiation of privatisation.
<p>a. To help farming communities to acquire the technical and managerial skills required to manage their communal resources and production endeavours sustainably. b. To help the District Agricultural Officers (DAOs) to develop a partnership with communities and their members in order to increase sustainable production. c. To help the DAOs to develop ways and means of giving optimum support to the farming communities.</p>	<p>The project was successful because its approach emphasised all kinds of production through better land husbandry, and the achievement of the objectives of soil and water conservation. The programme was based on a village development planning procedure where all villagers could participate. The process called for integration with all MoA departments at district and headquarters levels. Other Ministries were also invited. The resultant Unified Extension service proved to provide a solid basis for service delivery.</p>
<p>The primary objective of LISP was to raise rural incomes by increasing and diversifying agricultural production and by initiating a range of income-generating activities, both on and off-farm. To achieve these objectives a participatory approach would be used. This would entail developing grassroots, service-orientated groups at the local level and developing linkages between the rural population and national organisation, thereby reducing to a minimum future needs for government support.</p>	<p>Management was weakened by a decline in the regularity of meetings. Although civil work was completed on time, there was limited adoption of recommended packages as farmers found them both capital and labour intensive. At MTE, soil conservation measures had not been implemented to a significant level. Farmers were not interested in soil conservation. Small irrigation schemes took a long time due to problems identifying sites. The credit scheme was delayed by failure to assess the capacity of LADB. At MTE, the loan recovery rate was 72% overall. Income generation activities saw a huge attrition rate for non-farm enterprises due to drought. Project delayed to include beneficiaries in the PCC and never included the NGO (plenty) as planned.</p>
<p>Increasing household incomes and food security, and improving the standard of living of rural poor people.</p>	<p>Designed to be national in scope, the project targeted poor households that were without food security either because they were landless or had little land and/or no off-farm incomes. Crop yields in the area are low, although they are higher than elsewhere in the country. The potential for large-scale irrigation is limited, but existing sources of water (mainly streams) can be used to irrigate small plots. About half of the households have some livestock, although distribution is uneven</p> <p>The reported achievements are:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Reoriented financial institutions, such as the Central Bank, the Lesotho Agricultural Development Bank, three commercial banks and other financial institutions, to serve the interests of poor rural people better and on a sustainable basis. • Provided training and technical support to members of rural households to enable them to engage in both on-farm and off-farm small-scale rural enterprises. • Improved poor people's access to rural financial services by promoting savings and credit groups and linking them with formal financial institutions, particularly targeting people whose requirements are too small to be serviced by formal institutions. • Improved markets and marketing facilities for rural communities.

Item	Year	Project name	Sponsor/funder	Implementing agency
27	1995	Conserving Mountain Biodiversity in Southern Lesotho, 1995 (CMBSL) LES/97/G31/B/1G/99 ⁹⁸	UNDP/GEF	DoE/NES
28	1997	Environment and Land Management Sector, SADC ELMS (Phase II of SWCLUP)	Multi-lateral	SADC ELMS Lesotho
29	1998	Maloti-Drakensberg Conservation and Development Project ¹⁰⁰	Multi-lateral	South Africa/Lesotho

Table 3(a) The distribution of funders and implementing agency composition

Colour 1990-1999	Number	Model of funding		Model of implementation	
		Bilateral	Multi-lateral	Single	Multiple
	2	2		2	
	3		3	2	1
	5	1	4	2	3
Total	10	3	7	6	4

98 Oliver Chapeyama and Taelo Letšela. 2006. Conserving Mountain Biodiversity in Southern Lesotho (Cmbst). Final Evaluation (Project Number LES/97/G31/B/1G/99).

99 Seggeros, M. et al. 1996. Let the farmer speak: Innovative Rural Action Learning areas. IN: Centre for Development Cooperation Services, 1996. Successful natural resource management in Southern Africa. pp 94-95.

100 Maloti-Drakensberg Transfrontier Conservation Area. Action Plan for Phase IV of the Maloti-Drakensberg Transfrontier Programme. 2018-2023.

Objectives	Performance
<p>The overall project goal was to ensure the conservation and sustainable utilisation of unique alpine and montane landscapes in Lesotho. Intermediate objectives were:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> a. A planned and rational network of Protected Areas is in place which adequately covers the extent of Lesotho’s biodiversity. b. Improved resource management systems reduce the rate of biodiversity loss outside formal Protected Areas. 	<p>The project was largely a failure due to a series of factors. The project was designed and implemented without the benefit of preliminary baseline economic, social and biodiversity surveys so progress with implementation was therefore difficult to measure as there were no benchmarks. It failed to recruit adequately qualified project management personnel to manage it, none of the senior project management staff recruited to be CTAs or NPMs were qualified in fields directly related to biodiversity conservation. The project was also characterised by lack of clarity regarding responsibility for management of the initiative by staff at both PIU and NES.</p> <p>Lack of clarity of mandate resulted in competition for control and ended up with a high staff turn-over at the project as NPMs relieved of their duties by GoL principals. This high staff turn-over affected project delivery and continuity.</p> <p>The only positive area was that the project created awareness among the beneficiaries.</p>
<p>The sector coordination programme aims to help the governments of member countries:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • To improve their performance in relation to the sustainable management of natural resources, particularly soil and water. • To identify actual or potential conflict of interest that may arise out of environmental degradation and to reconcile such conflicts. • To develop policies and promote practices for the sustainable and productive management of natural resources based upon partnerships between government and communities of farmers and other land users. • To support institutions in member countries in their efforts to increase their competence in relation to sustainable resources management and to integrate the various disciplines and contributions of such institutions. • Attempt to motivate development from grassroots through: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - people’s participation - addressing the economics of sustainable resources management - good land husbandry - integrated land use planning - environmental management⁹⁹ 	
<p>The overall goal for MDTP phase IV is to ensure further entrenchment and improvement of the cooperative and collaborative framework established in the earlier phases of MDTP. This will ensure that biodiversity and cultural heritage priorities are secured and pressures minimised, whilst tourism benefits are maximised to benefit livelihoods in the process.</p>	



Table 4 2000-2009 projects

Item	Year	Project name	Sponsor/funder	Implementing agency
30	2000	Sustainable Agricultural Development Programme for the Mountain Areas (SADPMA) (2000-2005) ¹⁰¹	IFAD	MAFS
31	2000	MAFS/LHDA Agricultural Projects Coordination Unit. Contract 21615 ^{102 103}	LHDA	LHDA/MAFS
32	2004	LHDA Contract 1044 Integrated Catchment Management Project in Phase I areas of the Lesotho Highlands Water Project (2004-2010) ¹⁰⁵	World Bank/GoL	LHDA
33	2005	Sustainable Agriculture and Natural Resource Management Programme (2005-2011) ¹⁰⁶	IFAD	MoA
34	2005	CARE's Livelihoods Recovery Through Agriculture Programme (LRAP) (2002-2006) ¹⁰⁷	CARE	MAFS Local NGOs
35	2005	Crop Production: Small-Scale Irrigation Development Project (SSIDP) ¹⁰⁸	IFAD	MAFS

101 IFAD 1998. Report and Recommendations of the President. ED 98/64/R.19/Ref 1 Sept. 1998.

102 Calvin Mafisa. 2008. MAFS/LHDA Agricultural Projects Coordination Unit. LHDA Agricultural Projects Completion Report.

103 LHDA Agricultural Projects Exit Strategy. Prepared by the Projects Coordination Unit 22nd July 2003.

104 These objectives relate only to two (Animal Husbandry and Range Management, and Mountain Horticulture and Field Crops) of the five components of the project.

105 SMEC 2010: LHDA Contract 1044: Integrated Catchment management in Phase I Areas of the Lesotho Highlands **Water Project**. Final Report.

106 Evaluation Report No. 3379-LS 2014. By the Independent Office of Evaluation (IOE). 6-16 March 2013.

107 Mahao, M. & Lerotholi, P. J. (?). What is the livelihoods Recovery through Agriculture Programme?

108 NEPAD/FAO 2005. Support to NEPAD-CAADP Implementation TCTC/ LES/209(I). AE901E00.pdf.

Objectives	Performance
<p>The main objective is to improve the household food security and nutritional status of the rural poor in the three mountain districts of Mokhotlong, Qacha's Nek and Thaba Tseka, promote the systematic participation of beneficiaries in programme planning and implementation, and strengthen the institutional capacity of the district administrations.</p>	<p>Risk identified at inception was that about 50% of the established posts for MoA in the three mountain districts were vacant. While the planned scale of activities can be carried out effectively with existing staff levels, further staff losses could critically jeopardise the pace of programme implementation. In order to minimise this risk, the programme will provide for essential staff housing, office facilities, transport and allowances, with a view to attracting and retaining skilled and motivated personnel.</p>
<ol style="list-style-type: none"> a. Replace compensation grain with locally produced grain by 2005. b. Establish a minimum of 4 hectares of commercial high value cash crops production in Muela, 4 hectares of leave and communal vegetable production in Katse local catchment and 10 x 0.25 hectares food plots in Mohale by 2003. c. Assist target communities to establish 5 hectares of orchards in Katse, Muela and Mohale local catchment areas. d. Provide technical advice and capacity building support to target communities to develop, operate and manage three fully functional Range Management Areas (RMAs) in Katse and two in Mohale.¹⁰⁴ 	<p>The projects under the two components were moderately successful and their objectives were achieved. The approach of joint implementation of the project was useful and avoided the silo mentality of past projects. But lack of clearly defined roles between PCU and operations branches contributed significantly to under achievement in some projects. The under performance was seemingly due to the fact that agricultural projects were not a priority for some managers and this was evident from resources allocation. The handover of resources at the end of the project was messy. Production functions were handed over to farmers and extension services were handed to ministries. Vehicles and other assets were not handed over.</p>
<p>To establish, empower and train an effective catchment management authority(ies) in the LHWP catchment area(s) to manage the existing and all future developments.</p> <p>To prepare a resource inventory for LHWP catchments, providing among others, a land capability analysis and an annotated map of current land-use.</p> <p>To implement approved plans as pilot projects in the Muela, Konstabile-Sepinare, Setibi-Mamohau, Makopela_Mpeako and Koporale-Ts'iu sub-catchment areas.</p>	<p>Although most of the objectives of the project were achieved, the impact could only be inferred from the activities as a much longer period was needed. The project is considered generally successful, yet LHDA decided not to commit to implement the programme in other LHWP areas and develop a fully-fledged ICM programme. This despite the fact that this was a pilot that was supposed to initiate a long-term process. The project faced a number of challenges including historical and ongoing experiences and issues between LHDA and the communities/chiefs, dependency syndrome created by previous projects, insufficient understanding of Contract 1044 and the nature of the ICM programme, and lack of funds for demonstration activities.</p>
<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Promote the effective delivery of core support services responsive to the needs and priorities of poor rural households. 2. Promote agricultural diversification and intensification with due attention to sustainable natural resource use and management. 3. Strengthen institutional capacity of the decentralised district administrations as the focal points for programming, implementation, monitoring and evaluation. 4. Empower local communities through the participatory community-action planning process. 	<p>Based on the assessments of the three core programme performance criteria (relevance, effectiveness and efficiency), the programme has yielded mixed results, skewed more on the negative side.</p> <p>Poor implementation performance by central and district-level institutions appears to have been caused, among others, by lack of ownership, with SANReMP being viewed as a separate, donor-funded programme that was not well-integrated in government operations. Overall rating for SANReMP performance by this PPA is moderately satisfactory (4).</p>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Designed as a response to the food and livelihoods insecurity in the southern African region. • Short term impacts on food security while building longer term capacity to withstand shocks and stresses. • To address impacts of HIV and Aids on rural livelihoods. 	
<p>To improve overall agricultural land productivity through harnessing of run-off and use of rainwater in the for irrigation and through holistic soil moisture management by trained and capable farmers supported by equally empowered extension staff.</p>	

Item	Year	Project name	Sponsor/funder	Implementing agency
36	2008	Lesotho Wetlands Restoration and Conservation Project (2008–2013) ¹⁰⁹	MCA	DWA
37	2008	The Rural Finance Intermediation Programme (2008–2015) ¹¹⁰	IFAD	MFDP/CBL/MTICM
38	2008	Protection of Orange-Senqu River Water Sources 'SPONGES' Project ¹¹¹	ORASECOM	ORASECOM
39	2009	Capacity Building and Knowledge Management for Sustainable Land Management (2009–2016)	UNDP/GEF	MFRSC
40	2009	Priority Support Programme, Lesotho (2006–2009) ¹¹²	DFID	MAFS

Table 4(a) The distribution of funders and implementing agency composition

Colour 2000–2009	Number	Model of funding		Model of implementation	
		Bilateral	Multi-lateral	Single	Multiple
	1		1	1	
	5	2	4	3	3
	5	3	1	3	1
Total	11	5	6	7	4

109 Mott MacDonald in Association with Green's Integrated Services. 2013. Strategic Performance Assessment of the Lesotho Wetlands Restoration and Conservation Project. Final Report. Millennium Challenge Account Lesotho Contract No. WS-F-045-12.

110 IFAD President's Report. Proposed loan and grant to the Kingdom of Lesotho for the Rural Financial Intermediation Programme. Approval. 2007.

111 Orange-Senqu River Basin/ORASECOM Transboundary Diagnostic Analysis.

112 S.D. Turner. 2009. Promoting food security in Lesotho: issues and options.

Objectives	Performance
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Restoration demonstrating effective rehabilitation technologies; Comparison of two different range management practices 	<p>The project met most of its objectives and collected a wealth of information and data but its impact was limited in that it did not end up influencing national wetland strategy. The project did not have the resources necessary to address institutional issues. As a result, it was not able to influence national leadership regarding wetlands and there was not clear political support.</p> <p>Biophysical restoration measures have limited scope and are not scalable due to logistical complexities and their footprint. The project failed to assist in the development of a national wetlands conservation strategy.</p>
<p>To enhance access of the rural poor to efficient financial services on a sustainable basis. This could be measured in terms of poor rural households accessing financial services, the number of new deposit accounts and loans granted, the product range offered by the participating financial institutions, the profitability of the financial services, and the impact on reduced transaction costs. To achieve this, the programme would also support the development of an enabling policy and institutional framework to facilitate the efficient and sustainable provision of rural financial services and promote competition.</p>	<p>The project met most of its objectives, especially the establishment of the Post Bank. The project was over ambitious and it underestimated the complexities of establishing an appropriate policy, regulatory and supervisory framework for the sector. NGOs played a pivotal role in the success of some of the components of the project. Project impact assessment was impeded by poor M&E data. The project had a slow start mainly due to inadequate preparedness of the programme coordination unit. Poor financial management and staffing also had a negative impact on deliverables.</p> <p>Sustainability of benefits was assured due to capacity building of the NBFIs and the Lesotho Post Bank.</p>
<p>build capacities for sustainable land management (SLM) in appropriate government and civil society institutions/user groups in Lesotho and SLM mainstreamed into government planning and strategy development.</p>	
<ol style="list-style-type: none"> Ensuring that well informed and appropriate policy is in place. Building appropriate capacity and procedures. Proceeding to enhanced field implementation of extension programmes. 	<p>A beneficiary assessment and a formal scoring of performance against the targets in its logical framework showed that the programme succeeded at all three levels.</p> <p>Most of its effort was devoted to objective iii which included the replication (at government's request) of earlier successful homestead food security approaches. This was done through a range of community-based extension workers and NGOs as well as the field staff of the Ministry of Agriculture and Food Security (MAFS).</p>

Table 5 2010-2020 projects

Item	Year	Project name	Sponsor/funder	Implementing agency
41	2011	Lesotho Adaptation of Small-Scale Agricultural Production (LASAP) (2011-2015) ¹¹³	IFAD/GEF funded	MAFS (For BB, Leribe & MFT)
42	2011	Smallholder Agriculture Development Project I and II (2011-to date) ¹¹⁴	World Bank	Ministry of Agriculture and Food Security
43	2011	Demonstration Project on Community Based Rangeland Management in Lesotho (2011) ¹¹⁵	UNDP/GEF	ORASECOM
44	2012	CRS. Lesotho Food Security Relief and Resilience Project. (2012-2014).		
45	2012	Smallholder Agriculture Development Project (2012-2018) ¹¹⁶	World Bank	MAFS
46	2013	Khubelu SPONGES pilot project (2013-2015) ^{117 118 119 120 121}	GIZ	DWA DRRM SWC Letseng-Diamond
47	2013	Climate Change Adaptation for Sustainable Rural Water Supply in Lowlands Lesotho (2013-2015)	WB/GEF	Water Affairs
48	2014	Wool and Mohair Promotion Project (2014-to date) ^{122 123}	IFAD	Ministry of Agriculture and Food Security/ Ministry of Forestry and Land Reclamation/ Ministry of Trade, Cooperatives and Marketing/ Ministry of Energy, Meteorology and Water Affairs Lesotho National Wool and Mohair Growers Association
49	2014	Biological Resources Monitoring within Phase I of the LHWP Catchments. LHDA Contract 1273	LHDA	AfriDev & partners
50	2015	Strengthening Capacity for Climate Change Adaptation through Support to Integrated Watershed Management Programme in Lesotho (2015-2019)	FAO/GEF	MFRSC

113 Project Document 12-28-2013_ID4453_Projdoc.pdf.

114 World Bank. Appraisal Report for Smallholder Agricultural Development Project. 2011. Report No: 64990-LS.

115 UNDP-GEF. Demonstration Project on Community Based Rangeland Management in Lesotho. Scoping Study. Technical Report 05 Rev 3, 2 June 2011. Orange-Senqu Strategic Action Programme (Atlas Project ID 71598).[TR05_RangeScoping_Lesotho_mor_2Jun11.pdf].

116 World Bank 2019. Smallholder Agricultural Project. Project Appraisal Document. Report No. PAD3320/

117 Orange-Senqu River Basin/ORASECOM Transboundary Diagnostic Analysis.

118 TCC, DHI and PEM Consult. 2008. Feasibility Study of the Protection of Orange-Senqu River Water Sources ('Sponges' Project): Final Report. Report Number ORASECOM 004/2008.

119 Sefali. N. 2014. Khubelu Sponges Midterm Report. Trans-boundary Water Management in SADC Programme Protection of the Orange-Senqu Water Sources (Sponge)- Project Lesotho.

120 Schusser. C. 2015. Lessons Learnt Report. Transboundary Water Management in SADC Programme Protection of the Orange-Senqu Water Sources (Sponge)- Project Lesotho.

121 Chakela. Q and Green. T. 2017. End-of-Pilot Project Report. Transboundary Water Management In SADC Programme Protection of the Orange-Senqu Water Sources (Sponge Project).

122 IFAD. 2014. Wool and Mohair Promotion Project (WAMPP) Final project design report. Main report and appendices. Report No. 3549-LS. Project NO. 1673.

123 IFAD. 2020. Wool and Mohair Promotion Project (WAMPP) Mid-term Review. Main report and appendices. Report No. 5318-LS. Project NO. 200000053.

Objectives	Performance
To increase the resilience of small-scale agriculture to climate change impacts by promoting climate-proofed investments for agriculture-based development, as well as by enhancing the resilience of agricultural productivity under increased climate variability.	
To increase marketed output among project beneficiaries in Lesotho's smallholder agriculture sector.	
To build capacities of local communities, NGO networks and government departments in order to understand and adapt to the likely impacts of climate change in the mountain catchment areas.	
To increase productivity and the marketed output among project beneficiaries in Lesotho's smallholder agriculture sector in Leribe, Botha Bothe, Berea and Mafeteng.	<p>The following were successfully achieved:</p> <p>a) Agricultural market opportunities in the project area increased.</p> <p>(b) Productivity and quality of market-focused crops and livestock from smallholders in the project area increased.</p>
<p>The range management in the Khubelu catchment is improved.</p> <p>Degraded wetlands in the Khubelu catchment are rehabilitated.</p> <p>Monitoring of wetlands in the Khubelu catchment, research and a collection of lessons learned are available for replication in other catchments.</p>	<p>The project was successful in that it demonstrated that communities can adopt sustainable practices that benefit their livelihoods. The capacity building undertaken has led to improvement in acceptance of sustainable livestock farming practices. Both herders and livestock owners participated meaningfully in holistic range management interventions introduced. It demonstrated the benefits of building synergies between private and public sectors. The involvement of Letšeng Diamond Mine is an example that should be extended to other businesses in the highlands.</p>
Better water resource management to improve the livelihoods of the communities of south-western lowlands who are facing challenges caused by climate change.	
<ol style="list-style-type: none"> To enable smallholder livestock producers to generate higher incomes and more sustainable livelihoods. To increase their ability to cope with and recover from natural shocks. 	<p>The MTR's rating of the likelihood of achieving the development objective is 4 out of 5. Component A (climate smart rangeland management) is not moving as expected and is therefore rated as moderately unsatisfactory, mainly justified by the slow implementation of activities under subcomponent A2.</p> <p>The MTR found that project management is moderately unsatisfactory. Internal structures are only partially adhered to, and the PMU suffers from high staff turn-over.</p>
Reduce vulnerability to the adverse impacts of climate change, including variability at local, national and global level. Increase adaptive capacity to respond to the impacts of climate change including variability at local, national and global level. Promote transfer and adoption of adaptation technology in Lowlands (Mafeteng), Senqu River Valley (Quthing) and Mountains (Thaba Tseka).	

Item	Year	Project name	Sponsor/funder	Implementing agency
51	2015	Reducing vulnerability from climate change in the Foothills, Lowlands and the Lower Senqu River Basin (2015-2020)	UNDP/GEF	MFRSC
52	2015	Strengthening National Agricultural Research and Extension in Lesotho (2015-2017)	FAO/ICRA, ARC	Ministry of Agriculture and Food Security
53	2016	Restoring Ecosystems and Livelihoods (REAL) Project	CRS	
54	2017	UNDP-GEF Support to the Orange-Senqu River Strategic Action Programme Implementation (2017-2023) ^{124 125}	UNDP/GEF	Governments of: Botswana Lesotho Namibia South Africa UNDP
55	2020	LHDA Contract 1330: Development of the LHWP Wetlands Conservation Strategy and Monitoring Plan (2020-) ¹²⁶	WB	LHDA
56	2020	Integrated Catchment Management (2020 – 2023) ^{127 128}	EU/GIZ	DWA-ICM

Table 5(a) The distribution of funders and implementing agency composition

Colour 2010-2020	Number	Model of funding		Model of implementation	
		Bilateral	Multi-lateral	Single	Multiple
	3		5	1	4
	5		4	3	1
	7	1	6	4	3
Total	15	1	15	8	8

124 United Nations Development Programme Project Document: Support to the Orange-Senqu River Strategic Action Programme (ID9054_PIMS_5506_ORASECOM_Produc-Revised-2Dec2018.pdf).

125 GEF Project ID: 9054. (FSPCEOEndorsementDocument_PIMS_5506_ORASECOM_Produc-Revised_18Oct2018.doc; Others_PIMS_5506_ORASECOM_GEF6_ER_18Oct2018final copy.doc).

126 Anchor Environmental Consultants (Pty) Ltd in association with Wetland Consulting Services (Pty) Ltd. 2020. Vol III Review of rangeland management, issues and potential solutions. Contract 1330.

127 EU. 2019. Operationalisation of Integrated Catchment Management Framework – Bridging Phase Lesotho. Framework Contract Europeaid/132633/C/SER/Multi Lot 6: Environment. Specific Contract No. 2018/395918.

128 ReNOKA. 2021.The National Programme for Integrated Catchment Management in Lesotho. Operational Plan 2022.

Objectives	Performance
<p>Reduce the vulnerability of the communities and ecosystems in Foothill, Lowlands and Senqu Valley to climate-induced disasters in order to enable Government of Lesotho to strengthen institutional capacity for climate change adaptation.</p>	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • To strengthen capacities for coordinated research and extension. • To develop a national policy for agricultural research and extension, and a strategic plan for its implementation. <p>The design aims:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • To overcome some of the functional capacities and problems of collaboration, coordination and policy. 	<p>One of the achievements the project assessment lists is the following:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 81 key stakeholders acquired skills for effective collaboration, coordination and implementation.
<p>Project Summary: Strengthening joint management capacity for the basin-wide IWRM implementation and demonstrating environmental and socioeconomic benefits of an ecosystem-based approach to water resources management through the implementation of SAP priority actions in the Orange-Senqu River basin.</p>	
<p>The aim of task 5 was to develop a thorough understanding of why rangelands and wetlands are overgrazed in the study area and to recommend a way to rectify this as part of the overall wetland management strategy.</p> <p>The specific objectives are:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. To identify the main drivers of unsustainable grazing practices to compare the problems in the study area with those in other areas. 2. To review local and international experience in interventions to address this issue. 3. To identify what type of interventions might be desirable or feasible in the study area. 4. To further develop the aims and approach of the stakeholder consultation component of task 5. 	<p>The study concludes that:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Establish protected areas in upper catchment areas to protect sensitive ecosystems. 2. Establish grazing area boundaries for each grazing association, encompassing village, winter and summer grazing areas. 3. Assess grazing capacity, issue permits to within this limit to eligible households and buy-out any excess. 4. Avoid taxes, subsidies and payments for ecosystem services at this stage. <p>The study recommends as follows:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Change mind-sets to improve cooperation. 2. Quantify existing use and management in more detail. 3. Expand the protected area system. 4. Reform grazing management. 5. Reduce livestock numbers.
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The population of Lesotho benefits from water availability and quality for all domestic, rural, industrial, or agricultural users. • Sustainable water and land management. • The reduction and reversal of land degradation and soil erosion. • Contributions to advance the resilience to climate change impacts. 	

Appendix 2: List of references for projects reviewed

Project described	Year	Document	Housed/location	Remarks
Basic Agricultural Services Project (BASP)	1978	Appraisal of the Basic Agricultural Services Project. World Bank	Green-Chakela Library	
Basic Agriculture Services Project (BASP)	1987	World Bank 1987. Appraisal of the Basic Agricultural Services Project	Green-Chakela Library	
Basic Agriculture Services Project (BASP)	1987	World Bank 1987. Project Completion Report on Lesotho Basic Agricultural Services Program Project (Credit 795-LSO)	Green-Chakela Library	
Biological resources monitoring within phase 1 of LHWP catchments (LHDA Contract 1273)	2014	State of the Katse Dam Catchment 2014. June Turpie, Nigel Barker, et al.	LHDA Library	
Capacity Building and Knowledge Management for Sustainable Development in Lesotho	2009	UNDP 2009. UNDP Project Document: Government of Lesotho United Nations Development Programme PIMS3044: Capacity Building and Knowledge Management for Sustainable Development in Lesotho.	Green-Chakela Library	
Capacity Building and Knowledge Management for Sustainable Development in Lesotho	2010	UNDP/GoL 2010. Capacity Building and Knowledge Management for Sustainable Land Management in Lesotho: Project Inception Report	Green-Chakela Library	
Capacity Building and Knowledge Management for Sustainable Development in Lesotho	2011	SLM/MFLR 2011: Proceedings of the Workshop on Project Review, M&E, and Socio-Economic Baseline Studies 02-03-2011. Maseru Sun Hotel Maseru.	Green-Chakela & Associates	
Capacity Building and Knowledge Management for Sustainable Development in Lesotho	2014	Q. K. Chakela 2014. Report on the Population of Lesotho SLM Project Monitoring and Evaluation Matrix. MFRSC/UNDP SLM Project. Maseru.	Green-Chakela & Associates	
Capacity Building and Knowledge Management for Sustainable Development in Lesotho	2013	Pomela, M and Hodge, S. 2013. Capacity Building and Knowledge Management for Sustainable Development in Lesotho. Mid-Term Evaluation Report. UNDP-GEF PIMS #3044.	Green-Chakela Library	
Capacity Building and Knowledge Management for Sustainable Development in Lesotho	2015	Troni, J. and Molupe, M. 2015. Terminal Evaluation of the 'Capacity Building and Knowledge Management for Sustainable Land Management in Lesotho' Project.	Green-Chakela Library	
CARE's Livelihoods Recovery through Agriculture Programme (LRAP)	2005	Stephen. D. Turner 2005. Lives and sharing: trends in a Lesotho village 1976-2004. [Maseru]: CARE (July 2005), x + 66pp. illus. (LRAP Discussion Paper 9). Also published Bellville, South Africa: University of the Western Cape School of Government Programme for Land and Agrarian Studies (October 2005), xii + 80pp. illus. map. (Research Report No. 22). ISBN 1-86808-621-6.	Ambrose Archives	
Community Natural Resources Management Project (1991-1999)	1991	USAID 1991. PROJECT AUTHORIZATION. Community Natural Resource Management Project Paper 632-0228.	Green-Chakela Library [PDABB852.PDF]	
Community Natural Resources Management Project	1992	CNRM 1993. First quarter report project year 2, contract number 632-0228.	Department of Range Resources Management	
Community Natural Resources Management Project	1992	CNRM 1992. Second quarterly report, contact No 632-0228.	Department of Range Resources Management	
Community Natural Resources Management Project	1993	CNRM 1993. First quarter report project year 2, contact number 632-0228.	Department of Range Resources Management	

Project described	Year	Document	Housed/location	Remarks
Community Natural Resources Management Project	1993	CNRM 1993. Third quarter report project year 2, contact number 632-0228.	Department of Range Resources Management	
Community Natural Resources Management Project	1993	CNRM 1993. Fourth quarter report project year 2, contact number 632-0228	Department of Range Resources Management	
Community Natural Resources Management Project	1993	CNRM 1993. Quarterly Performance Report, contact number 632-0228	Department of Range Resources Management	
Community Natural Resources Management Project	1994	Conrad.F. Fritsch 1994. Final report, short term technical assistance to the department of livestock services, department of livestock and USAID,	Department of Range Resources Management	
Community Natural Resources Management Project	1994	CNRM 1994. Report on PRA Training consultancy, technical report 9, contract No. 632-0228	Department of Range Resources Management	
Community Natural Resources Management Project	1995	Agency for International Development USA 1995. Midyear report on the third annual work plan. Community Natural Resources Management, contact No. 632-0228	Department of Range Resources Management	
Community Natural Resources Management Project	1995	Candace H.Buzzard 1995. End of tour report, short term training, USAID Contact number 632-0228	Department of Range Resources Management	
Community Natural Resources Management Project	1995	CNRM 1995. Mid-year report on the third annual work plan, contact number 632-0228	Department of Range Resources Management	
Community Natural Resources Management Project	1995	Candace H.Buzzard 1995. CNRM Short Term Training Activity report, Animal Health Sehlabathebe.	Department of Range Resources Management	
Conservation and Land Improvement Project.	2005	Support To Nepal–Caadp Implementation. Conservation and Land Improvement Project.	Green-Chakela Library	
Conserving Mountain Biodiversity in Southern Lesotho	2006	Oliver Chapeyama and Taelo Letšela. 2006. Conserving Mountain Biodiversity in Southern Lesotho (Cmbsl). Final Evaluation (Project Number LES/97/G31/B/1G/99)	Green-Chakela Library	
Crop Production: Small-scale Irrigation Development Project	2005	Support To Nepal–Caadp Implementation. Vol II of V. Bankable investment project profile.	Green-Chakela Library	
Demonstration Project	2011	Scoping Study Technical Report 05. Demonstration Project.	Green-Chakela Library	
Development of a Pilot Agricultural Scheme in the Leribe Area. Lesotho.	1977	Terminal Report of Development of a Pilot Agricultural Scheme in the Leribe Area. Lesotho. Project Findings and Recommendations. FAO/UNDP.	Green-Chakela Library	
Environment and Land Management Sector, ELMS. SADC.	1997	J. Erikson, M. Douglas, J. Cheshe. Sida Evaluation. Environment and Land Management Sector, ELMS. SADC. 1991 – 1995.	Green-Chakela Library	
Environment and Land Management Sector, SADC ELMS (Phase II of SWCLUP)	1996	Segerros, M. et al. 1996. Let the farmer speak: Innovative Rural Action Learning areas. IN: Centre for Development Cooperation Services, 1996. Successful natural resource management in Southern Africa. pp 94-95.	Green-Chakela Library	
Farm Improvement with Soil Conservation		Marake, M. V. and Shone, G. 1998. The Production through Conservation (PTC) Programme 1981-1996.	Green-Chakela Library	
Farm Improvement with Soil Conservation		T.F Shaxson & D M Sehloho 1993. Draft report of the informal evaluation mission, The PTC 11 Programme Mafeteng, Mohales Hoek, Quthing.	Green-Chakela Library	

Project described	Year	Document	Housed/location	Remarks
Integrated Catchment Management in Lesotho	2019	EU. 2019. Operationalisation of Integrated Catchment Management Framework – Bridging Phase Lesotho. Framework Contract Europeaid/132633/C/SER/Multi Lot 6: Environment. Specific Contract No. 2018/395918.	Green-Chakela Library	
Integrated Catchment Management in Lesotho	2021	ReNOKA. The National Programme for Integrated Catchment Management in Lesotho. Operational Plan 2022.	Green-Chakela Library	
Integrated Catchment Management in Phase I Areas of the Lesotho Highland Water Projects	2010	SMEC 2010: LHDA Contract 1044: Final Report.	Green-Chakela & Associates	
Khomokhoana Rural Development Project	1982	C.G. Wenner, 1982. Soil Conservation in Lesotho. Draft Discussion Document. 15th March 1982. SIDA Consultancy Report.	Green-Chakela Library	
Khomokhoana Rural Development Project. Sept. 1974 – June 1977.	1974	Michael Stapleton. 1977. The Ministry of Agriculture, Department of Soil and Water. Conservation Termination Report. FAO TF/LES 9 (SWE).	Green-Chakela Library	
Labour Construction Unit. Lesotho.	1997	D. Stiedl, T. Danelsson, D. Sahle. Sida Evaluation. Labour Construction Unit. Lesotho. 1977 – 1996.	Green-Chakela Library	
Land and Water Resources Development Project LWRDP (1975-1983)	1979	Nobe, K. C. and Seckler, D. W. 1979. An Economic and Policy Analysis of Soil-Water Problems and Conservation Programs in the Kingdom of Lesotho. LASA Research.	Green-Chakela Library	
Land Conservation and Range Development Lesotho	1981	Checchi and Company 1981. A technical proposal regarding Land Conservation and Range Development Lesotho.	Department of Range Resources Management	
Land Conservation and Range Development Project (1981-1989)	1987	L. C. Weaver. 1987. Sehlabathebe Range Management Area: grazing management plan. Maseru: Lesotho Government Ministry of Agriculture Land Conservation and Range Development Project (1987).	Ambrose Archives	
Land Conservation and Range Development Project (1981-1989)	1988	Steven William Lawry. 1988. Private herds and common land: issues in the management of communal grazing land in Lesotho, southern Africa.	Ambrose Archives	
Land Conservation and Range Development Project	1981	Land Conservation and Range Development Project, Lesotho technical proposal submitted to the United States Agency for International Development, in response to RFP no. 632-0215, April 1981.	Green-Chakela Library	
Land Management and Conservation Project	1995	World Bank, 1995. Implementation Completion Report: Lesotho Land Management and Conservation Project (Credit 1897-LSO).	Green-Chakela Library	
LAPIS	1983	Steven W. Lawry. 1983. Agricultural cooperation in Lesotho and implications to LAPIS. Maseru: [Report to] USAID (December 1983), 34 pp	Green-Chakela Library	
LAPIS	1991	Ministry of Agriculture, Cooperatives and Marketing 1991. Quarterly report, USAID project No. 632-0221	Department of Range Resources Management	
LAPIS	1992	Consortium for International Development, Frederiksen, Kamine & Associates, Lindsay/ Dekalb International 1992. End of Project Report, USAID Project No 632-0221	Green-Chakela Library	
LCU	1986	G.Edmonds, K. Copper, M. Soderback. An Evaluation of Labour Intensive Public Works In Lesotho.	Green-Chakela Library	

Project described	Year	Document	Housed/location	Remarks
Lesotho - Land Management and Conservation Project	2012	Dee, Philippa; Diop, Ndiame; 2012. Lesotho - Land Management and Conservation Project. The World Bank ISBN: 0-8213-2578-7. "Lesotho - Land Management and Conservation Project"@eng.	Green-Chakela Library	
Lesotho Agricultural Sector Analysis (LASA) Project	1978	Maureen Mahoney 1978. The Lesotho Agricultural Sector Analysis Project.	Ambrose Archives	
Lesotho Agricultural Sector Analysis (LASA) Project	1979	LASA Research Paper No. 2: Lesotho's agriculture: a review of existing information.	Green-Chakela library	
Lesotho Agricultural Sector Analysis (LASA) Project	1980	Wilken, G.C; Leballo, M.J; Eckert, B.J; Motleleng, M. and Bolls, K.J. LASA Research Report No.5.	Green-Chakela library	
LHDA Contract 1330: Development of the LHWP Wetlands Conservation Strategy and Monitoring Plan	2020	LHDA Contract 1330: Development of the LHWP Wetlands Conservation Strategy and Monitoring Plan:	LHDA	
Liphiring Basic Agricultural Services Programme	1978	Stephen D. Turner 1978. Sesotho farming: the condition and prospects of agriculture in the Lowlands and Foothills of Lesotho. Unpublished PhD thesis in Geography, University of London School of Oriental and African Studies (May 1978), 578pp. maps.		
Mafeteng Development Project	1996	GIZ 1996. Plan of Operation for the Mafeteng development project 1997-1999.	Department of Soil and Water Conservation	
Mafeteng Development Project/Machobane Farming System	1996	Letlamoreng Mosenene 1996. Cropping guideline for the Machobane farming systems.	Green-Chakela Library	
MAFS/LHDA Agricultural Projects Coordination Unit. Contract 21615.	2000	LHDA Agricultural Projects Completion Report. Oct. 2000 – March 2008. Calvin Thulo Mafisa.	Green-Chakela Library	
Maloti Drakensberg Conservation and Development Project	2000	Memorandum of Endorsement/acceptance of the final project document by World Bank CEO.	Green-Chakela Library	
Maloti-Drakensberg Conservation & Development Project	1998	Project BRIEF. Maloti-Drakensberg Conservation & Development Project.	Green-Chakela Library	
Matelile Rural Development Project	1985	German Agency for Technical Cooperation 1985. Project Preparation study for the orientation phase of Matelile rural development project in Mafeteng District Lesotho. Technical Cooperation, Federal Republic of Germany-Kingdom of Lesotho, ReallPN 83.2021-0.	GIZ Archives?	
Matelile Rural Development Project	1991	Thuso Green, David Hall 1991. Identification of socio-economic constraints to project activities and assessment of project impact, 62pp.	Department of Soil and Water Conservation	
Matelile Rural Development Project	1993	John Gay, Thuso Green 1993. Report on range and livestock management in four sub-areas of the Matelile Project area.	Ambrose Archives	
Matelile Rural Development Project	1993	Walter Salzer 1993. Project progress review sector report, Matelile Rural development Project PN 85.2515.6.01.100.	Department of Soil and Water Conservation	
Matelile Rural Development Project	1993	Salzer W, Schweizer G, Mey U, Wesswein 1993. Project progress review final report BN 85.2515.6.01.100.	Department of Soil and Water Conservation	
MOA/LHDA Joint Management Committee	2003	LHDA Agricultural Projects Exit Strategy. Prepared by the Projects Coordination Unit 22nd July 2003.	Green-Chakela Library	

Project described	Year	Document	Housed/location	Remarks
Mphaki Livestock Development Project	1982	GITEC Consult GMBH 1982, Quarterly progress report 4.	Department of Range Resources Management	
Mphaki Project	1985	WS Atkins International 1985. Mphaki Project Report Series vol V Human population survey.	Department of Range Resources Management	
Mphaki Project	1985	WS Atkins International 1985. Mphaki Project Report Series vol i Land use planning study.	Department of Range Resources Management	
Mphaki Project	1986	WS Atkins International 1986. Mphaki Project Report Series vol vii development strategy.	Department of Range Resources Management	
Mphaki Project	1986	WS Atkins International 1986. Mphaki Project Report Series vol vi socio-economic study.	Department of Range Resources Management	
Local Initiatives Support Project (LISP).	1993	Mid-term Evaluation Report of Local Initiatives Support Project (LISP). IFAD Internal Evaluation Unit.	Green-Chakela Library	
Phuthiatsana Integrated Rural Development Project	1982	Phuthiatsana Integrated Rural Development Project. Project Performance Evaluation Report (PPER). Operations Evaluation Department. 1991.	Green-Chakela Library	
Phuthiatsana Integrated Rural Development Project	1991	African Development Bank Group. Phuthiatsana Integrated Rural Development Project. Project Performance Evaluation Report. Operations Evaluation Department. 1991.	Green-Chakela Library	
Phuthiatsana Irrigation Project	-	Montreal Engineering Company. Pre-design study vol 2.	Department of Soil and Water Conservation	
Pilot Agricultural Scheme in the Leribe Area, Lesotho	1975	Development of a Pilot Agricultural Scheme in the Leribe Area, Lesotho. Project Finding and Recommendations. UNDP/FAO. Rome 1975.	Ambrose Archives	
Pilot Agricultural Scheme in the Leribe Area	1982	C.G. Wenner, 1982. Soil Conservation in Lesotho. Draft Discussion Document. 15th March 1982. SIDA Consultancy Report.	Green-Chakela Library	
Policy and strategies -overview	1996	Deborah Johnston. 1996. The state and development: an analysis of agricultural policy in Lesotho 1970-1993. Journal of Southern African Studies (GB), vol. 22, no. 1 (March 1996), pp. 119-137.	Green-Chakela Library	
Priority Support Programme, Lesotho. (DFID Supported).	2009	S.D. Turner. Promoting Food Security in Lesotho. Priority Support Programme, Lesotho. 2006 -2009.	Green-Chakela Library	
Production Through Conservation	1993	T. F. Shaxson & D. M. Sehloho. 1993. Draft report of the informal evaluation mission, The PTC 11 Programme Mafeteng, Mochale's Hoek, Quthing.	Department of Soil and Water Conservation	
Production Through Conservation	1993	Ministry of Agriculture, Department of Conservation, Forestry and Land Use Planning 1993. Annual report.		
Production Through Conservation	1998	M V Marake, Gedion Shone, John-Eric Carlsson, Yadav Khatiwada, Mikael Segerrors. 1998. Historic document, The production through conservation programme.	Green-Chakela Library	
Production Through Conservation Programme	1992	B. Haagsma, D. Hall, G. Poulsen and S. Turner. 1992. Report on the evaluation of the SIDA assisted Production Through Conservation Programme.	Green-Chakela Library	

Project described	Year	Document	Housed/location	Remarks
Production Through Conservation, FISC	-	Centre for Development Cooperation Services, Free University Amsterdam. Evaluation of the SIDA assisted, production through conservation in Lesotho.	Department of Soil and Water Conservation	
Protection of Orange-Senqu River Water Sources 'Sponges' Project	2008	TCC, DHI and PEM Consult. 2008. Feasibility Study of the Protection of Orange-Senqu River Water Sources ('Sponges' Project): Final Report. Report Number ORASECOM 004/2008.	Green-Chakela Library	
Protection of the Orange-Senqu Water Sources 'Sponges' Project	2014	Sefali. N. 2014. Khubelu Sponges Midterm Report. Trans-boundary Water Management in SADC Programme Protection of the Orange-Senqu Water Sources (Sponge) - Project Lesotho.	Green-Chakela Library	
Protection of the Orange-Senqu Water Sources 'Sponges' Project	2015	GOPA, GWC and Wetland Consulting. 2015. Physical Rehabilitation of Phapong Wetland. Final Report. Transboundary Water Management in SADC Programme Protection of the Orange-Senqu Water Sources (Sponge) - Project Lesotho. Report number:08/2015. GIZ Project Number VN81148351/PN:10.2207.8-004.00.	Green-Chakela Library	
Protection of the Orange-Senqu Water Sources 'Sponges' Project	2015	Schusser. C. 2015. Lessons Learnt Report. Transboundary Water Management in SADC Programme Protection of the Orange-Senqu Water Sources (Sponge)- Project Lesotho.	Green-Chakela Library	
Rural Financial Intermediation Programme Project	2017	IFAD. 2017. Approach Paper. Performance Evaluation. Rural Financial Intermediation Programme Project.	Green-Chakela Library	
Semonkong Rural Development Project	1992	Thuso Green. 1992. Report on the evaluation of attitudes of farmers to demonstrations of the 1990/91 season. Semonkong Rural Development Project.	Green-Chakela Library	
Senqu River Agricultural	1977	Tesfa Guma. 1977. Agricultural Problems of Lesotho. [Mohale's Hoek, Lesotho]: (January 1977).	Ambrose Archives	
Senqu River Agricultural Extension project	1978	FAO. 1978. Socio-economic Technical report on attitude of village farmers on farming, Mohales Hoek.	Department of Soil and Water Conservation	
Soil and Water Conservation and Agroforestry Programme	1990	Ministry of Agriculture. 1990. SWaCAP Execution Report No. 2.	Department of Range Resources Management	
Soil and Water Conservation and Land Utilisation (SWCLU) Programme	1989	H. Jonas Akerman. 1989. History of Soil Conservation in Lesotho.	Green-Chakela Library	
Soil and Water Conservation and Land Utilization (SWCLU) Programme	1989	H. Jonas Akerman. History of Soil Conservation in Lesotho.	Green-Chakela Library	
SOWACO PROJECT	1990	David Hall. 1990. A Comprehensive Approach to Village-Based Conservation Development. A case study from 21 villages in Mohale's Hoek District Lesotho. Results of a survey for the SOWACO PROJECT.	Green-Chakela Library	
Strengthening National Agricultural Research and Extension in Lesotho	2019	Strengthening National Agricultural Research and Extension In Lesotho. 2015 – 2017.	Green-Chakela Library	
Sustainable Agricultural Development Programme for Mountain Areas	1998	IFAD. 1998. President's Report and Recommendations for Loan to Lesotho for Sustainable Agricultural Development Programme for Mountain Areas.	Green-Chakela Library	

Project described	Year	Document	Housed/location	Remarks
Sustainable Agriculture and Natural Resource	2013	Evaluation Report No. 3379-LS 2014. By the Independent Office of Evaluation (IOE). 6-16 March 2013.	Green-Chakela Library	
Sustainable Agriculture and Natural Resources Management Programme (SANReMP)	2005	Ministry of Agriculture and Food Security 2005. Project implementation manual. TCP/LES/2905 (I). (NEPAD Ref. 05/18 E). Volume III of V.	Department of Soil and Water Conservation	
Tebetebeng Pilot Project in Berea District, 1953-1960.	1978	Stephen D. Turner. 1978. Sesotho farming: the condition and prospects of agriculture in the Lowlands and Foothills of Lesotho. Unpublished PhD thesis in Geography, University of London School of Oriental and African Studies (May 1978), 578pp. maps.	Ambrose Archives	
Thaba Bosiu Development Project (1973-1977)	1976	The Ministry of Agriculture, Cooperatives and Marketing. 1976. Annual report 3, Thaba Bosiu Development Project 48pp.	Department of Soil and Water Conservation	
Thaba Bosiu Rural Development Project	1973	Appraisal of Thaba Bosiu Rural Development Project. Document of International Bank For Reconstruction And Development.	Green-Chakela Library	
Thaba Bosiu Rural Development Project in Lesotho (1973-1977)	1975	James B. Davis, James J. Acres and William A. Daley. An Evaluation of the Thaba Bosiu Rural Development Project in Lesotho. 1975.	Green-Chakela Library	
Thaba Tseka Project	1978	Thaba Tseka Project First Evaluation Report. Executive Summary. Evaluation Division. Canadian International Development Agency. June 1978.	Ambrose Archives	
Thaba Tseka Project Bee Programme	1977	Maeder, M. D. 1977. Thaba Tseka Project Bee Program.	Ambrose Archives	
Thaba Tseka Rural Development Programme	1979	Woodlot 1979. Thaba-Tseka District Rural Development Program.	Department of Soil and Water Conservation	
Thaba-Bosiu Development Project (1973-1977)	1977	Lorenz F Bredemeier. 1977. Three-Year Research Report, Thaba Bosiu Rural Development Research Unit.	Department of Soil and Water Conservation	
Thaba-Bosiu Rural Development (1973-1977)	1978	Stephen D. Turner. 1978. Sesotho farming: the condition and prospects of agriculture in the Lowlands and Foothills of Lesotho. Unpublished PhD thesis in Geography, University of London School of Oriental and African Studies (May 1978), 578pp. maps.		
Thaba-Phatsoa Scheme (1961-1967)	1978	Stephen D. Turner. 1978. Sesotho farming: the condition and prospects of agriculture in the Lowlands and Foothills of Lesotho. Unpublished PhD thesis in Geography, University of London School of Oriental and African Studies (May 1978), 578pp. maps.		
Thaba-Tseka Project	1985	James Gordon Ferguson. 1985. Discourse, knowledge, and structural production in the 'development' industry: an anthropological study of a rural development project in Lesotho. Unpublished PhD thesis in Anthropology, Harvard University (September 1985), ix + 442 + 99 + 9pp.	Ambrose Archives	
The Senqu River Agricultural Extension Project	1975	UNDP. The Senqu River Agricultural Extension Project. Report of the Evaluation Mission. 1975.	Green-Chakela Library	
Wetlands Restoration and Conservation Project (Pilot)	2013	Mott MacDonald. 2013. Strategic Performance Assessment of the Lesotho Wetlands Restoration and Conservation Project. Final Report. Contract No. WS-F-045-12.	Green-Chakela Library	

Project described	Year	Document	Housed/location	Remarks
Wool and Mohair Promotion Project	2015	IFAD: 2014. Final Project Design. Main report and Appendices. Project No. 1673. Report No.3549-LS.	Green-Chakela Library	
Wool and Mohair Promotion Project	2019	Mid-Term Review Main. Main report and Appendices. Mission Dates 09-21 September 2019. Report No. 5318-LS. Document Date 05/02/2020.	Green-Chakela Library	
Woodlot Programme (1972-1985)	1982	C.G. Wenner, 1982. Soil Conservation in Lesotho. Draft Discussion Document. 15th March 1982. SIDA Consultancy Report.	Green-Chakela Library	
Woodlot Project	1992	May, E. D. 1992. Social Forestry in Lesotho Records of Past Initiatives and Achievement. Miscellaneous Extracts from Bibliographic Sources in Lesotho.	Green-Chakela Library	
	1990	C.E. McKone. People's Participation Programme – the First 10 Years. Lessons Learnt and Future Directions. FAO.	Green-Chakela Library	
	2001	Nchemo Maile. 2001. The Forest Revenue System and Government.	Green-Chakela Library	
	2002	Vusi Mashinini & Gawie de Villiers. 2002. Non-governmental organisations.	Green-Chakela Library	
	2002	Marcus Nüsser 2002. Pastoral Utilization and Land Cover Change: A Case Study from the Sanqebethu Valley, Eastern Lesotho . ErdkundeBd. 56, H. 2 (Apr. - Jun., 2002), pp. 207-221 (21 pages).	Ambrose Archives	

Appendix 3: Examples of reasons for project under-performance

Reasons for poor performance	Project	Example	Whose contribution	Comment/ recommendation
			1. Agency 2. Donor 3. Both	
Entrusting the leadership of the project to GoL senior management. There is extensive evidence that GoL leadership in PMUs and other arrangements has largely been a major contributor to poor project performance. Poor or lack of accountability/responsibility and lack of commitment are main contributors.	Wool and Mohair Promotion Project (2014-to date)	Evaluation found project management to be moderately unsatisfactory. Governance structures were not adhered to, PMU staff turnover was high, the project had a slow start and disbursement lagged behind. ¹²⁹	1	At project design/planning, assignment of Ministry staff should not be automatic but committed and accountable staff should be hired based on qualification and competency.
	Conserving Mountain Biodiversity in Southern Lesotho (1999 – 2005)	At the start, the project was implemented through ad-hoc arrangements. ¹³⁰	1	
Assuming that there will be cooperation between different government ministries. NRM initiatives by their nature require a multi-sectoral approach and collaboration of a number of government and external entities. Poor and lack of coordination and cooperation among the ministries are legendary contributors to project poor performance. Yet it is mistakenly assumed that things will work if repeated, yielding the same unsatisfactory results.	Wool and Mohair Promotion Project (2014-to date)	Poor coordination among participating ministries in the PMU. Long standing operational challenges between MAFS and MFRSC contributed to sluggish implementation and under achievement of tangible results. pp.13 ¹³¹	1	The silo mentality among GoL ministries is a common phenomenon and at its roots is failure to demand and enforce accountability in government and hold people responsible.
	Land Management and Conservation Project (1987 – 1992)	The two key ministries (MOHA and MOA) never collaborated effectively. ¹³²	1	
Assuming that government staff will be provided and dedicated to the project/ programme from start to finish and beyond. In most cases the deployment of counterpart staff is delayed by months and even years. Staff turnover is also a major problem for project implementation.	Land Management and Conservation Project (1987-1992)	A coordinator, believed to be effective, was elevated to Deputy PS position in MOHA after being appointed the LMCP coordinator and had to share time between the two positions. ¹³³	1	GoL staff deployment is affected by a number of factors some of which are internal and under administrative control and other that are not. Promotions, reassignments and political appointments are under admin control but resignations and departures for greener pastures are not.
	Transboundary Water Management in SADCC Programme. Protection of the Orange-Senqu Water Sources (Sponges) Project Lesotho (2013 – 2015)	Government personnel experience significant movement of individuals due to promotions, transfers and resignations. This shift is unhealthy and counterproductive to sustainability of interventions. ¹³⁴	1	
Involving beneficiaries only in planning activities but not in budgeting and key decision making.	Review of all projects shows that none involved beneficiaries in decisions that involve allocation of resources and even in the determination of project components. Beneficiaries are only informed on how pre-determined activities will be carried out.		3	It is unlikely that projects will ever go beyond just consulting beneficiaries about their needs at project design.

129 IFAD. 2019. Wool and Mohair Promotion Project. Mid-term Review Report. 09 – 21 September 2019. H. Lessons Learned. pp4/42.

130 UNDP. Chapeyama. O, Letsela. T. 2006. Conserving Mountain Biodiversity in Southern Lesotho (CMBSL). Final Evaluation. Project No. LES/97/G31/B/IG/99. P7.

131 IFAD. 2019. Wool and Mohair Promotion Project. Mid-term Review Report. 09 – 21 September 2019. H. Lessons Learned. pp 13/42

132 Land management and conservation project. Type: Report/Evaluation Memorandum; Country: Lesotho; Region: Africa; Sector: Agriculture Adjustment; Major Sector: Agriculture; Project ID: P001390. p.1.

133 World Bank. 1995. Implementation Completion Report. Land Management and Conservation Project. (Credit 1987-LSO). Report No.15186. p.iii.

134 Gopa, GWC and Wetland Consulting. 2015. Transboundary Water Management in SADCC Programme. Protection of the Orange Senqu Water Sources (Sponges) Project. Lesotho. Final Report. p.20.

Reasons for poor performance	Project	Example	Whose contribution	Comment/ recommendation
			1. Agency 2. Donor 3. Both	
Assuming that beneficiaries will participate willingly in all activities even at the cost of their other livelihood activities because of the assumption that project activities are in their interests. It is always assumed that community members will understand that project activities are in their interest and that they should therefore participate and give free time and labour. NRM activity impacts go beyond the local catchment and have national and international benefits and thus locals can't be expected to bear the brunt of their implementation.	Area projects as described by Wenner. ¹³⁵ C. 1982	Most evaluations say that the area-based projects did not increase agricultural outputs because, among others, "most programmes did not consider how farmers think and react, because they were outlined at desks outside Lesotho". ¹³⁶	2	In the case of LHDA Contract 1044, although LHDA did not continue the project, communities continued to implement those aspects that were of direct benefit to them. This implies that there are aspects of the project that communities needed or wanted and which they perceived to be important in their daily lives.
	Integrated Catchment Management in Phase 1 Areas of the Lesotho Highlands Water Project. LHDA Contract 1044 (2005 – 2010)	Alignment of project priorities and community priorities. The lesson learned was that "...the communities in the highlands do not all perceive problems related to resources management as their top concern for external assistance and that if they were given funding and asked to carry out whatever development activity they wanted, it is likely that activity would not involve improving resources management". p.126	3	
The failure of project management to ensure that M&E starts at the same time as all other project activities and is implemented judiciously to ensure proper evaluation of project activities and to have a good record what happened and why.	Smallholder Agriculture Development Project. Project Completion Report (2011 – 2020)	Monitoring of project outputs and outcomes, only significantly improved in the last 2 years of implementation. ¹³⁷	3	Seemingly M&E is not seen as a core project activity as it is not seen as contributing to achievement of project goals. It is usually given lower priority at the start of implementation.
	Sustainable Agriculture and Natural Resource Management Programme (2005 – 2011)	The measurable evidence on rural poverty impact is limited. The programme's monitoring and evaluation system did not cater for relevant detailed data. IFAD should have provided a larger degree of support to resolve the poorly performing M&E system. M&E remained weak throughout programme implementation. ¹³⁸	2	An effective M&E system is a key success factor. An effective M&E system needs to feed continuously into programme management with operational, financial and other information on programme performance in order for timely, appropriate management decisions to be made. Developing efficient and effective monitoring systems should begin at programme start-up, with the help of external specialists. Baseline and impact studies must be conducted in a timely fashion and be clearly interlinked.
	Labour Construction Unit (1977 – 1996)	The various projects and initiatives in developing LCU were never subjected to formal log frame style project analysis. ¹³⁹	23	

135 Tebe-Tebeng Valley scheme, Taung Reclamation Scheme, Mejametalana Improvement Area, Thaba Putsoa Improvement Area, Leribe Project, Thaba Bosiu Rural Development Project, Senqu River Agricultural Extension, Khomokhoana Project and Thaba Tseka Mountain Development.

136 Wenner. C. 1982. Soil conservation in Lesotho. Draft Discussion Document. SIDA. P.68.

137 IFAD. 2021. Smallholder Agriculture Development Project. Project Completion Report. Main report and appendices. Project No. 1100001530. Report No. 5847-LS. p7/8.

138 IFAD. 2013. Evaluation Report No. 3379-LS 2014. By the Independent Office of Evaluation (IOE). 6-16 March 2013.

139 Stiedl. D, Danielsson. T and Sahle. D. 1997. Labour Construction Unit. SIDA Evaluation 97/5. p.43.

Reasons for poor performance	Project	Example	Whose contribution	Comment/ recommendation
			1. Agency 2. Donor 3. Both	
The role of the private sector and NGOs must be determined in activities where they are best placed to make greater impact than government and where they are likely to ensure sustainability of initiatives because of their greater levels of accountability.	Conserving Mountain Biodiversity in Southern Lesotho (1999 – 2005)	Institutional capacity limitations of government entities can be addressed through involvement of civil society entities. ¹⁴⁰	3	The mandates of GoL's cooperating partners (donors) are to work directly with GoL through its ministries. It is ministries that determine who to work with. In general, GoL operatives consider the private sector and NGOs not to have capacity.
	Sustainable Agricultural Development Programme for the Mountain Areas (2000 – 2005)	Partnerships with NGOs and the private sector are useful in reinforcing the government's capacity to provide core support services responsive to the needs of the people. ¹⁴¹	3	
	Land Management and Conservation Project (1987 – 1992)	Involvement of LNWMGA was a positive and necessary aspect in NRM. NGOs have a greater interest and potential accountability than GoL institutions. ¹⁴²	3	
Changing contexts that are brought about by politics and policy changes as well as lack of implementation of long-term vision in planning.	Wool and Mohair Promotion Project	Changes in the wool and mohair marketing regulations, adversely affected the project. ¹⁴³ p. 12/42	1	Political and other considerations take precedence over impact of ongoing projects and programmes when circumstances change.
	Land Management and Conservation Project (1987 – 1992)	The instability over the period of the project period affected the project as well as amendments to land legislation. ¹⁴⁴	1	
	Community Natural Resources Management Project (1992 – 1995)	The project proposed the implementation of a grazing fee. The country experienced political transformation from a military to democratic government which promoted national debate on issues pertaining to local natural resource management. ¹⁴⁵ The implementation of the grazing fee was suspended and this led to the premature termination of the project.	1	
Short or too short project timing. NRM initiatives require long project periods to entrench initiatives and ensure that they bring sustainable economic benefits to the communities.	Integrated Catchment Management in Phase 1 Areas. LHDA Contract 1044 (2002 – 2010).	Five years of the pilot project were not enough for a project with complex local administrative setup, involvement of the local communities and implementation of a large variety of concepts with very complex reporting and monitoring aspects.	2	In most cases project are arbitrarily given 3-5 year periods and there is never scientific justification for the period. There are few projects whose periods are much longer.
	Land Management and Conservation Project (1987 – 1992)	Had the project been implemented as anticipated, there was insufficient learning time for lessons from ongoing implementation to be fed into subsequent RMP preparation. ¹⁴⁶	3	

140 Chapeyama. O, Letsela. T. 2006. Conserving Mountain Biodiversity in Southern Lesotho. Final Evaluation. UNDP Project No. LES/97/G31/B/IG/99. p.11.

141 IFAD. 1998. Report and Recommendation of the President for The Sustainable Agricultural Development Programme for the Mountain Areas. Executive Board – Sixty-Four Session. p.4.

142 IFAD. Final Project Design. Main report and Appendices. Project No. 1673. Report No.3549-LS.p. 21/42.

143 IFAD. 2021. Smallholder Agriculture Development Project. Project Completion Report. Main report and appendices. Project No. 1100001530. Report No. 5847-LS. P12/42.

144 World Bank. 1995. Implementation Completion Report. Land Management and Conservation Project. (Credit 1987-LSO). Report No.15186. p.v.

145 Community Natural Resources Management Project. Final Report. Contract No. 532-0228. 1995. p.118.

146 World Bank. 1995. Implementation Completion Report. Land Management and Conservation Project. (Credit 1987-LSO). Report No.15186. p.vi.

Reasons for poor performance	Project	Example	Whose contribution	Comment/ recommendation
			1. Agency 2. Donor 3. Both	
Persistent failure of GOL or sponsor to continue the initiatives/activities at the end of the project despite written undertaking that it will at project planning. Also, failure to accept conditions of exit agreements.	Integrated Catchment Management in Phase 1 Areas. LHDA Contract 1044 (2002 – 2010).	LHDA did not commit to a full ICM project when the pilot ended despite the fact that the pilot was a precursor for a LWHP wide programme. ¹⁴⁷	2	Lesotho's commitment of long-term planning through a framework such as the constitutionally mandated Planning Board lends itself to ad hoc and short-term programmes. To a large extent programming decisions are also influenced by donor sentiments.
	LHDA/MAFS Agricultural Projects (2000 – 2008)	Despite existence of an explicit Exit MOU, LHDA decided to refuse to handover some of the resources to MAFS. ¹⁴⁸	2	
	IFAD 2013. Rural Financial Intermediation Programme. Supervision report. Project (2008 – 2015).	Despite detailed agreements on how to improve RUFIP progress, the pace of implementation has not moved as expected. ¹⁴⁹	1	
Design and planning failure and wrong assumptions.	Khomokhaona Rural Development Project (1975 – 1977)	The project failed in planning as per Wenner 1982 ¹⁵⁰ and an FAO Evaluation Mission of 1977. The project approach was wrong. People did not participate as they perceived there was no value from the work of the project.	2	Project design and development has over the years evolved and there are standard protocols that reduce chances of design flaws. Earlier in the review period there was a scramble to support Lesotho and projects were hurriedly put together.
	Conserving Mountain Biodiversity in Southern Lesotho (1999 – 2005)	One of the factors that led to project failure was poor design with no baseline before implementation. ¹⁵¹	2	
	Smallholder Agriculture Development Project Project Completion Report (2011-to date)	There were shortcomings in design of the project that had to be addressed during implementation. Being designed as a multi-donor project required dual reporting which was challenging to the PMU. ¹⁵²	2	
	Basic Agricultural Services Programme Project (1978 – 1987)	Bank assumptions on increasing crop yield were not based on actual experience or trials in the country but on a synthesis of experience obtained elsewhere. ¹⁵³	2	

147 LHDA. Contract 1044: Final Report. Integrated Catchment Management in Phase 1 Areas of the Lesotho Highlands Water Project. October 2010. SMEC. p.xvii.

148 MAFS/LHDA. Agricultural Projects Coordination Unit. Completion Report. Calvin Thulo Mafisa. Oct. 2008. pp.55

149 IFAD 2013. Rural Financial Intermediation Programme. Supervision report. Project No. 1371. Report No.3121-LS. p.1.

150 Wenner. C. 1982. Soil conservation in Lesotho. Draft Discussion Document. SIDA.

151 Chapeyama. O, Letsela. T. 2006. Conserving Mountain Biodiversity in Southern Lesotho (CMBSL). Final Evaluation. UNDP Project No. LES/97/G31/B/IG/99. P7.

152 IFAD. 2021. Smallholder Agriculture Development Project. Project Completion Report. Main report and appendices. Project No. 1100001530. Report No. 5847-LS. P7/8

153 World Bank. 1987. Basic Agricultural Services Program (BASP) Project (Credit 795-LSO). Project Completion Report. Report No. 6705. p.v.

Appendix 4: Lessons learned and recommendations and remarks

Item No	Project name	Lessons
1	Phuthiatsana Upper Catchment Irrigation (1971 -1977) ¹⁵⁴	
2	Pilot Agricultural Scheme in the Leribe Area (1970-1975) ¹⁵⁵	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The growing number of entities involved in development is producing an unnecessarily complex and confusing situation that is not conducive to optimum utilisation of resources (human, technical and financial), effective coordination or unity of purpose and action. • Whatever the official reaction to the concept of a single national entity with overall responsibility for rural development, there is room for improvement in the performance of the Ministry of Agriculture. • Available skilled manpower is inadequate to meet the staffing needs of ongoing development projects. Further overreaching of human resources may prove counterproductive with possible socioeconomic and political repercussions.
3	Woodlot Programme (1972-1985) ¹⁵⁶	Training Basotho foresters at diploma level in South Africa was expensive and there was political risk when Ciski in RSA became an independent homeland.
4	Senqu River Agricultural Extension Project Lesotho (1974-1977) ¹⁵⁷	<p>Despite good management, disappointing results were obtained due to faulty project design and shortfalls in performance inherent in an ambitious pilot project.</p> <p>Improvement in agriculture will largely depend on infrastructure improvement.</p>

154 The only information is a soil survey with no report dates. Have project location map.

155 C. G. Wenner, 1982. Soil Conservation in Lesotho. Draft Discussion Document. 15th March 1982. SIDA Consultancy Report. p65.

156 C. G. Wenner, 1982. Soil Conservation in Lesotho. Draft Discussion Document. 15th March 1982. SIDA Consultancy Report. p70.

157 UNDP. 1975. The Senqu River Agricultural Extension Project. Report of the Evaluation Mission. LES/72/003.

Recommendations	Remarks
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> The organisational requirements of rural development be clearly established and defined to facilitate preparation of a structural framework for achieving overall coordination of planning, programming and execution. Serious consideration be given to the creation of a single national entity endowed with legislative, financial and administrative powers necessary to discharge the function of stimulating, facilitating and undertaking rural development in designated areas. Active steps be taken to improve the structure and management of the Ministry of Agriculture especially with regard to technical and administrative capability, and channels of communication within and between all its divisions. As the overall staffing situation improves, a greater measure of decentralisation be introduced with appropriate delegation of authority to discharge and define responsibilities for which personnel should be held accountable. Adequate availability of skilled manpower represents a criterion to be satisfied prior to formal approval of new projects by responsible parties. Development policy to be modified to provide for concentration of available skilled manpower within projects (ongoing and approve but not yet operational) to facilitate their establishment on a sound footing. The more effective and rapid generation of skilled manpower capable of staffing new projects and pursuing the training process on a continuing basis. 	<p>The project managed to undertake a number of tasks that included</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> maintenance of terraces construction of diversion banks, small fishponds and roads gully control establishment of a small nursery and the planting of trees establishment of a meteorological station. <p>The dominating work was maintenance of terraces using machinery.</p>
<p>Develop the one-year forestry certificate course at Lesotho Agricultural College into a three-year certificate course.</p> <p>The Woodlot project be developed into a Forestry Division of the Ministry of Agriculture.</p>	<p>The project was successful due to its narrow mandate coupled with the expertise that was available. Many trees were planted and most survived despite challenges of grazing and damage by livestock and resistance by the people/chiefs to make more land available for woodlots. Staff shortages became a problem as trained staff took employment elsewhere. The project competed with similar activities of the Department of Soil Conservation Services Division.</p>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Undertake full project revision to cover the remaining period. The revision document should reflect different emphasis on the objectives and should include a modified work plan and increased inputs. Livestock activities to continue as is but to include the initiation of a pilot group ranch and a brown Swiss breeding herd. A crop specialist to be immediately recruited in order to intensify the search for improved crop activities and to produce suitable data for better farming systems. Plans to be developed for a surface irrigation scheme for the second phase of the project. Work should commence on the development of two unconsolidated conservation schemes of around 500 acres each. The project should liaise closely with all other area development schemes in the country and should consult the management of these schemes when identifying the objectives and scope of a second phase project. Immediately hire a physical planner, a sociologist and a volunteer with a background in economics/planning. Invest in new roads as a high priority. 	<p>The original objectives never resulted in improvements. Increased crop productivity was minimal or none except in an area with recently constructed terraces. No grazing improvement was reported. Irrigation was never accepted by the people. Regarding soil conservation, broad-base terraces were introduced.</p> <p>The recommendations made point to complete revision of the project which shows that it was a failure at the time of the review.</p>

Item No	Project name	Lessons
5	Khomokhoana Rural Development Project (1975 – 1977) ^{158 159}	The Khomokhoana project was evaluated in 1977. ¹⁶⁰ The evaluation found that each of the separate project activities was performing satisfactorily, but they had not been integrated to become an overall rural development programme.
6	Land and Water Resources Development Project LWRDP (1975-1983) ¹⁶¹	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Lack of economic training provision to the expatriate staff but only a cost effectiveness analysis. • Lack of research component in the programme. Therefore, the distinction between function and research in training were not recognised leading to: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - failure to recognise weaknesses in assumptions. - failure to recognise lack of availability of research elsewhere on adapting conservation programmes to the unique land tenure system of Lesotho. • Project efforts that were overly directed to increase short-term agricultural productivity and focused primarily on protecting existing cropland from erosion: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - failed to recognise need for institutional constraints. - sustained yields were not assessed for continuity. • The need for individual training plans were overlooked, these could have included: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - applied adaptive research. - oriented in-service training. - evaluation and dissemination of knowledge.

158 C. G. Wenner, 1982. Soil Conservation in Lesotho. Draft Discussion Document. 15th March 1982. SIDA Consultancy Report. p.67.

159 Michael. D. Stapleton.1977. Khomokhoana Rural Development Project. Terminal Report. FAO. TF/LES 9 (SWE).

160 Duncan, T., Baffoe, F. and Metell, K. 1994. SUPPORT AGAINST APARTHEID. An Evaluation of 28 Years of Development Assistance to Lesotho. p. 65.

161 Documentation housed in SWC library – MFRC.

Recommendations	Remarks
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • A second phase should be organised and based on the fielding of a formulation mission. The second phase should have as its primary objective the preparation of a comprehensive rural development plan for the area including the specification of investment possibilities and/or sub-projects for external financing. • Cottage industries and other means of vertically integrated agriculture enterprise also should be explored in the second phase. • Current phase activities should be continued with respect to technical and socio-economic investigations, staff training and institutional training. • It (current phase) should concentrate to an increasing extent on involving the local populace with the planning and development work so that development of their area is not simply something done to them by outsiders but becomes something done by them with the help of outsiders. • The second phase must contain a strong element of regional planning. For this to happen, it will be necessary for government to take steps to increase administrative and planning capacity in the area. 	<p>The project failed in the planning. The main work carried out was maintenance of terraces by machinery. An earlier evaluation mission had not been satisfied with the scale and impact of activities, nor the approach. The evaluation mission notes that people would participate if there was some value in it.</p>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • There is need to improve economic understanding of planners in soil conservation. • Include research component in the soil and water conservation project to enable learning and provide improved knowledge. <ul style="list-style-type: none"> – Remove all deficiencies in economic data collection and analysis by establishing an economic evaluation unit to serve as a connecting link to the planning unit of the ministry. <p>In addition to these specific recommendations, the LASA team made recommendations on:</p> <p>1. Programme Objective</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> a. Implement a nationwide grasslands soil bank programme to help reduce Lesotho's soil erosion problem in the short run, while providing options for the future use in project design b. A moratorium should be place on new area-based conservation projects. c. Livestock production should be recognized as an important social and economically viable enterprise that can be supportive of soil conservation objectives. d. The government should capitalise on, and maintain, soil conservation work already installed. e. Efforts should be made to help reduce the current agricultural labour bottleneck- by promoting some non-labour intensive aspects of agricultural development efforts. <p>2. Organisational improvement</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> a. Provide for effective government direction and coordination of soil conservation programmes. b. Develop a continuing soil and water conservation research and basic data collection network within the ministry. c. Reorganise and expand the conservation division of the ministry. <p>3. Infrastructure improvements</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> a. Carry out an assessment of agricultural labour force and initiate a manpower development programme within the ministry. b. Obtain legislative action to recognise grass as a crop within the legal context of land use, as defined in Laws of Lerotholi. 	

Item No	Project name	Lessons
7	Thaba Tseka Mountain Development Project (1975-1978)¹⁶²	<p>Since this was phase one of the project, the main lessons were what worked and where improvements need to be made, namely:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Poorly designed conservation structures were drawn to the attention of the soil water conservation unit. • Range management to improve livestock commercial production. • Proper selection of afforestation sites. • Proper data collection on farm trials and tree nursery site. • Projects must be designed with consideration for the evaluation methodology to ensure that assessment achievement or non-achievement of project goals and objectives will be possible.¹⁶³
8	Thaba Bosiu Rural Development Project¹⁶⁵	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Basotho farmers and land users must understand and accept the measures. • Delays getting conservation activities are often caused by lack of transport and the incompetency of procurement staff. • Lack of familiarity of consultants and purchasing staff not cognisant of conservation and road work to be accomplished. • Government's claim to recognise the cause of erosion and need for increase in agricultural production not support by provision of enabling environment. • Low effectiveness on the job is a constraint to implementation. • Lack of studies relating to the determination of cost effectiveness of conservation or related integrated farming programmes within the ministry. • The concept of integrated farming is not defined and is not understood by project staff. This hinders step-by-step efforts to improve agricultural productivity. • No analysis conducted to identify long-term losses which the country would incur if deterioration of natural resource were to continue at its present rate. • Overgrazing is recognised and there is a lack of control of implementation of proper management regulations. • Lack of coordination among the components of the project – conservation, roads, information, extension, marketing, and research. • An example of difficulties to rule and to calculate various costs in a project with various donors.¹⁶⁶

¹⁶² LASA Report No. 3 (p.123) describes Phase I of the project.

¹⁶³ CIDA 1978. EVALUATION: The Kingdom of Lesotho Rural Development. Thaba Tseka Project First Evaluation Report.

¹⁶⁴ Fergusson, J. & Lohman, L. 1994. The anti-politics machine: "development" and bureaucratic power in Lesotho. *The Ecologist*. 24.5 (September 1994): p176.

¹⁶⁵ James B. Davis, James J. Acres and William A. Daley. An Evaluation of the Thaba Bosiu Rural Development Project in Lesotho. 1975.

¹⁶⁶ C. G. Wenner, 1992 Soil Conservation in Lesotho: Draft Discussion document. SIDA Consultant. P. 66.

Recommendations	Remarks
<p>Recommendations were made to ensure that the problems identified should be attended to in phase II, namely:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Improvement of technical knowledge. • Carrying out of economic and social studies and agricultural surveys. • Crop production variety tests. • Tractor hire and livestock feeding trials. • Improved coordination. • Assessment of overall people's needs. • Policies should be directed towards encouraging the initiative and involvement of farmers and Basotho people in rural development and project and operations. 	<p>The absence of a full evaluation report means we have not been able to learn more from the evaluation. But several academic and political economic studies of the project have painted a very negative picture of it with emphasis on authoritarian centralism at its best. The following are some of the comments in the public domain:</p> <p>“Public village meetings conducted by project staff were peppered with political speeches, and often included addresses by a high-ranking police officer on the ‘security threat’ posed by the opposition Basutoland Congress Party. Any money remaining after project costs had been repaid went to the BNP’s Village Development Committees - leading one villager to note caustically, ‘It seems that politics is nowadays nicknamed ‘development’”¹⁶⁴</p>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Villages should make inputs through voluntary cooperation, with incentives managed by village community committees supported by external agencies of government. • Future projects should ensure that senior staff in charge of the project review the project area and assess the personnel and equipment needs. • Donor staff should be better appraised of their responsibilities to avoid high staff turn-over. • Legal framework should be development and strengthened to improved effectiveness. • Effectiveness on the job needs to be strengthened through improvement of knowledge and skills. • Training and experience should be provided though periodic evaluation to assure proper progress. • Analysis must be conducted with a long-term framework with careful consideration of future conditions and productivity. • Concerted effort to promote sound range management and improvement of management strategy and institutional support – local authorities, technical assessment, veterinary services, fodder production. • Develop and refine a procedure for reaching and effectively working with stockholder to plan, implement, and continue to carry out sound range and farm management acceptable to the culture of land users. 	<p>The successful parts of this project included introduction of cash-crops such as asparagus which were meant to boost exports but were inadequately supported with infrastructure and marketing facilities. The cannery that was established to process locally produced fruits failed to be sustained beyond the project.</p>

Item No	Project name	Lessons
9	Basic Agricultural Services Project (BASP) (1978- 1987) ¹⁶⁷ <small>168 169 170</small>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The importance of properly assessing the borrowers capability - even if bank crop assumptions had been correct - it is likely that the disorganisation which prevailed would have led to project failure. • The arrangements set forth in the appraisal report might have worked with a strong borrower, but the Ministry of Agriculture (MoA) was institutionally weak and ill-equipped to contend with the diversity of donors and conflicting interests and to mediate the procedural and technical problems encountered. • There was an awareness of this at appraisal but no adjustments were made. • Mistaken premises: Bank assumptions in increasing crop yield were not based on actual experience or trials in the country but on a synthesis of experience obtained elsewhere, which did not give proper weight to the relatively unique characteristics of Lesotho, among which climate and the lesser role played by agriculture are the most important. • Project objectives: Much of the development assistance of the country has been “part of a long-term process towards the viability of agriculture, which would have to absorb most of the migrants in the event of a large reduction in migrant labour in South Africa”. In fact, some reduction in employment opportunities in South Africa has occurred. However, it is not at all certain that the agriculture sector has the absorptive capacity to employ all, or the bulk of, the country’s migrant labour force now in South Africa. Before mounting any new agriculture projects, therefore, it seems imperative to review the country’s agricultural history to ascertain the practicable economic range of possibilities i.e., is crop farming destined to remain at subsistence level, can an improved yield be obtained at an economic price, and is there any basis for contemplating greater food sufficiency and/or absorbing the large absentee male population predominantly in the agricultural sector, other than through subsidies. • Inadequate dialogue: The borrower did not understand adequately the objectives of the project, lacked a full commitment to it, and did not share the bank’s perception in some instances. The lesson to be learned from this is the importance of having an adequate dialogue with the government. • Timing of the project: The project might have had a more successful outcome had it been delayed until the predecessor project was completed and results evaluated, as many of the latter’s failings were repeated in the project. • Bank processing and supervision: Altogether, the foregoing suggests that there was some haste in appraisal timing, perhaps due to anxiety to maintain a planned processing schedule so as to urgently assist the borrower in agricultural development. That apparently led to some deviation from normal project formulation practice. More critical attention could have been paid to assessing the technical and socio-economic parameters appraisal. In subsequent supervision, the regional headquarters could have assisted the Field Mission at Nairobi more actively in re-evaluating and possibly redirecting the project.
10	Agriculture Marketing and Credit Project ^{171 172}	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The need to adjust project design to accommodate a changing policy environment, for diligent implementation of project and realisation of its benefits. • Credit effectiveness could be enhanced if the factors specific to the country/project area are given due attention. A common wisdom is that credit services should be demand-driven. • Monitoring and evaluation should be viewed as a management tool.

167 C. G. Wenner, 1982. Soil Conservation in Lesotho. Draft Discussion Document. 15th March 1982. SIDA Consultancy Report. p. 69-70.

168 World Bank, 1978. Lesotho Appraisal of the Basic Agricultural Services Project. Report. No. 1524a-LSO. [Appraisal of BASP 1978.pdf].

169 World Bank, 1987. Project Completion Report: Lesotho Basic Agricultural Services Program Project (CREDIT 795-LSO) [BASP COMPLETION REPORT.pdf].

170 World Bank 1978. Report and Recommendation of the President of the International Development Association to the Executive Directors on a Proposed Credit to the Kingdom of Lesotho for a Basic Agricultural Services Project. Report No. P-2260-LSO [BASP RECOMMENDATION OF THE PRESIDENT.pdf].

171 IFAD 1991. Agricultural Marketing and Credit Project.

172 The project evaluation document could not be located.

Recommendations	Remarks
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The ministry should develop a functional system necessary to carry out its functions effectively. Essential components of which are: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Organization - Manpower capability - Management procedures • Ensure that project authority administration-caused problems are attended to. These include: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Duplication of responsibilities between existing agencies which often cause fragmentation and lack of coordination. - Use Standard practices at project authority that seeks to entrench autonomy and accountability - Provide clear role definitions among project administration and local authorities to ensure smooth transfer of functions of the project to local authorities to ensure sustainability. 	<p>The BASP project was based on insufficient analysis of the previous projects' experience, namely Khomo-Khoana and Thaba-Bosiu Rural Developments, and therefore the designs that led to the poor performance of the previous projects were repeated.</p>
<p>Project design</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> a. Introduce flexibility in project design to accommodate changes in policy during project implementation and monitor policy environment very closely to suggest necessary changes timeously. b. Avoid over-dependence on the implementation of activities which are not financed and not controlled by the project. c. Conduct necessary surveys to generate data needed for proper design of targeted components. d. Consider an implementation time-frame longer than five years, particularly for institution -building projects 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The assumption that the Thaba-Bosiu Rural Development project experience was up-scalable was contradicted by the performance of both BASP and its duplicate programme but under different donor funding. • The same fate that followed upscaling of FISC to PTC and Matelile to Mafeteng Project.

Item No	Project name	Lessons
11	Land Conservation and Range Development Project (1981-89). (1985-1992). ^{173 174}	<p>National laws and regulations</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Enforcement of grazing regulations is difficult given the apathy and disinterest of traditional local institutions. Hence, enforcement devolves to the GA and its elected riders. The best foundations for successful enforcement are GA policies which have been developed with a broad base of member participation. Members who are caught out of compliance can be held accountable to the very plans for which they have provided public input or support. • Enforcement actions are also necessary against non-members of the GA who will constantly test the integrity of the RMA boundary. Many of these individuals will be highly resentful of having been dispossessed of their grazing right within the RMA. They can be quite bellicose, and it is the riders who must bear the brunt of their animosity. The diligence of the riders must be maintained by providing them with meaningful remuneration and active leadership.
11	Phuthiatsana Integrated Rural Development Project ¹⁷⁵	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Inadequate preparation which led to project being set up without monitoring and evaluation plan, institutional design problems, and farming systems analysis (feasibility). • Insufficient precision in appraisal report led to project being operated at MoA department which gave rise to management difficulties.
13	Farm Improvement with Soil Conservation (FISC) Project in Maphutseng, Mophale's Hoek District (1985-1990) ^{176 177}	<p>There was too little participation from farmers in the planning process. Only representatives were involved.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Village planning was only concerned with soil and water conservation, whereas the aspirations of rural people are more complex. Range management and crop husbandry are often key areas. • When drawing plans with chiefs and VDCs, members also wanted to include rural development infrastructure and services like roads, clinics, schools and water supply. The agricultural issues often came far down in the VDCs' priority list. • The incentives and project inputs created a dependency syndrome. Some activities were carried out by the incentives, rather than to fulfil a felt, perceived and assessed need by the village.
14	Lesotho Agricultural Production and Institutional Support (LAPIS) Programme (1985-1992) ¹⁷⁸	<p>The lessons for this project are summarised in Appendix 5 because of their detail.¹⁷⁹ They are presented as eight groups.</p>
15	Matelile Rural Development Project (1986-1990) ¹⁸⁰	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The project demonstrated that small and medium size dongas can be blocked, stopped from growing, filled with sediment and turned into productive land. • Popularised the adoption of dongas as potentially useful places over which individual tenure may be asserted. • There is need to integrate range management with on-farm conservation practices, but this requires village-based land use planning.
16	Labour Construction Unit (LCU) (1978 -1987) ¹⁸²	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Legal or clear policy framework inhibits road infrastructure development. • Good roads improve economic benefits through easy access to agricultural services, public administration and health. • Labour intensive works reach areas inaccessible for machines, but provide employment to local labour.

173 Land conservation and range development project, Lesotho technical proposal submitted to the United States Agency for International Development, in response to RFP no. 632-0215, April 1981. [<https://www.worldcat.org/title/land-conservation-and-range-development-project-lesotho-technical-proposal-submitted-to-the-united-states-agency-for-international-development-in-response-to-rfp-no-632-0215-april-1981/oclc/26219556>].

174 Strategies and Tenure in African Livestock Development by Brent M. Swallow (wisc-0008.pdf).

175 African Development Bank Group. Phuthiatsana Integrated Rural Development Project. Project Performance Evaluation Report. Operations Evaluation Department. 1991.

176 Marake, M. V. and Shone, G. 1998. The Production through Conservation (PTC) Programme 1981-1996.

177 T.F Shaxson & D M Sehloho 1993. Draft report of the informal evaluation mission, The PTC 11 Programme Mafeteng, Mophale's Hoek, Quthing.

178 AMERICAN AG INTERNATIONAL: Consortium for International Development Fredrerisen, Kamine & Associates Lindsay/Dekalb International. 1992. Lesotho Agricultural Production and Institutional Support Project. LAPIS END-OF-REPORT. USAID Project No. 632-0221.

179 LAPIS 1991. LESSONS LEARNED FROM THE FORMATION OF GRAZING ASSOCIATIONS IN LESOTHO. Lesotho agricultural Production and Institutional Support. Ministry of Agriculture, Cooperatives and Marketing, Maseru, Lesotho [xdah027d.pdf]. See also Appendix 5.

180 Orientation Phase I.

181 Turner, S. D. 1995. Gully reclamation in the lowlands and foothills of Lesotho: the Matelile Rural Development Project and the Mafeteng Development Project. IN: CDCS 1995. Successful natural resources management in southern Africa. Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam.

182 G. Edmonds, K. Goppers, M. Soderback. 1985. Men or Machines. An evaluation of Labour Intensive Works in Lesotho. A SIDA Evaluation Report.

Recommendations	Remarks
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Develop policy and regulations supported by legally binding legislation. • Develop guidelines for engaging with the communities to enable formation and registration of grazing associations. • Legalise RMA as official management model for proper range management. 	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Integrate other livelihoods in the programme. • Incentives should be aligned with the needs and capacities of the beneficiary and their willingness to participate. 	
<p>The programme is currently carried out as part of the range resource management main tool and shows successful upscaling. The organisation framework used in this programme, supported by the most up-to-date legal framework (policy, regulations and bill), is worth emulating by ICM. Despite delays in decentralisation, this programme manages to reach local land users better than most.</p>	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Regularise tenure of reclaimed degraded land as part of allocation mode. • Gully reclamations techniques should move to simpler techniques using more dry stone and less cement and gabions. • Village-based land use planning should be central activity for support. 	<p>The major achievements of the project, though small, are important in re-emphasising the technical feasibility of gully reclamation by individuals with locally available technology and in promoting new consensus that the allocation of gullies to individuals can happen on a wide scale.¹⁸¹</p>



Item No	Project name	Lessons
17	Land Management and Conservation Project (1987-1992) ^{183 184}	<p>a. Programmes which seek to rely on local capacity, priorities and implementation need careful and detailed preparation. An approach, which affected LMCP design and its repercussions, was the speed with which the project was prepared. It appears that there was an assumption that the Development Councils Order reflected a reality of which both government officials and the councils were aware and with which they agreed. In fact, few officials and even fewer villagers were aware of the provisions of the Order and, consequently, of their rights and obligations.</p> <p>b. Thorough preparation would have revealed the strengths and weaknesses of both the ministries and the councils. Detailed examination would have shown the extent of training that was required. Training both in perceptions and changes in these characteristic of ministries, and the needs of the villagers (training in management, in decision-making, in conflict resolution, in the need for equitable choice).</p> <p>c. Should there have been a pilot? Views about this are not easily reconciled. The ICR is firm in its view that there should have been a <i>learning phase</i>. GoL, on the other hand, is of the view that since the project was extended only to two districts, with implementation of only two RMPs, these should be deemed to have been a pilot. However, it is apparent on the basis of the project implementation schedule that had the project been implemented as anticipated, there was insufficient learning time for the lessons from ongoing implementation to be fed into subsequent RMP preparation.</p> <p>d. The choice of districts. The ICR, and to an extent, the Beneficiary Impact Study, suggest that the project should have commenced in more hospitable districts than the mountain districts of Mokhotlong and Qacha's Nek.</p> <p>e. Organisational design. Considerations of the choice of district inevitably led to a discussion of the project's organisational design. The project design envisaged a series of organisational layers - from the VDC, to the DDC, to a coordination committee at the level of headquarters. From Lesotho, VDC proposals had to be submitted to Washington. This series of layers was both time-consuming and, with hindsight, not efficient.</p> <p>f. Flexibility of design. The organisational design of the project was relatively inflexible. It did not take into account the reluctance or inability of GoL ministries to work together. At the time when the project was being implemented this inability to coordinate affected project implementation. Changes that were proposed were made too late to win participation from either ministry.</p>
18	Soil and Water Conservation and Agroforestry Programme	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • More weight should be given to detailed analysis of farmers' resources, needs, priorities and perceptions of soil and water conservation in project design. • Donor-supported activities should complement or supplement, under an atmosphere of mutual agreement, existing agency activities. • There is a need for MoA to formulate an appropriate extension approach. • There is urgent need for objective soil erosion research. • The MFS concept needs support.

183 World Bank, 1995. Implementation Completion Report: Lesotho Land Management and Conservation Project (Credit1897-LSO).

184 Dee, Philippa; Diop, Ndiame; 2012. Lesotho - Land Management and Conservation Project. The World Bank ISBN: 0-8213-2578-7. "Lesotho - Land Management and Conservation Project"@eng.

Recommendations	Remarks
<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. More thorough preparation and participatory work would have revealed this inconsistency referred in a of the lesson 2. Further, programmes with conflicting approaches (“food for work”) and their impact would have been more carefully assessed. An essential tool in the process would have been provision, at preparation stage, of Systematic Client Consultation (SCC). 3. Sufficient time is necessary to learn lessons from implementation. 4. Replication to other mountain areas would only be possible to mountain areas with similar bio-physical properties 5. What is more appropriate and would be far more effective in future is to bring the level of decision-making to the lowest level possible - in this case, the VDCs. 6. Project design should have a built-in flexibility allowing for modification of targets and project structure without necessitating amendments to the Credit Agreement. 7. Legislative framework, where amendments to legislation, or enactment of new legislation is essential to project implementation, these should be in place before negotiations or be a condition of board presentation. Such amendments would be an indication of government concurrence with the goals of the project/programme. 8. In parallel financing, where an essential element of a project is financed by another donor, care should be taken to determine whether the assistance would be continued throughout the project life and at the level originally envisaged. In LMCP, not only did SIDA assistance for LUPD wane and disappear but, as the Beneficiary Impact Study points out, the land use plans were prepared with reference to the plans and goals of LUPD, not the VDCs. Nor could these plans or the assistance be modified or altered to take into account the VDC’s wishes. 9. Programmes of soil conservation and range improvement in southern Africa should be modest and undertaken with care. There have not been any successful programmes. A result which is, in part, largely due to the ignorance that pervades regarding the factors which motivate “overstocking” and “overgrazing”. In the result, partly because of being compelled to complete sub-programmes within a period of six months, most of the activities selected by VDCs were for projects with an immediate income benefit, not for major conservation works with delayed returns. 10. When project implementation is dragging for some time, measures should be taken to suspend project disbursement, restructure the project or convince government to cancel the credit. There are clear grounds in IDA’s “General Conditions” for doing so. However, these are employed reluctantly. 11. The bank is not the most efficient institution for providing emergency relief. Occasions when it was called upon to do so should encourage in-depth scrutiny and a redirection of the request to agencies that are better suited to the provision of speedy relief. 	<p>The project failed and its design is largely to blame. In addition, some assumptions that we made were wrong and untested. The role of the political climate and climatic conditions also had a bearing on the failure of the project.</p> <p>Poor timing and inflexibility also had a bearing on implementation of the project.</p> <p>Donors also played a role in the failure of the project.</p>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Participation by the target group and the on-the-ground implementers during design and implementation would allow tentative ideas conceived elsewhere to be radically changed by local discussion. • The donor should not be felt as the dominant partner. • Formulate appropriate measures to support an effective multi-purpose extension system based on genuine client demand. • Revisit the RCs concept prior to further duplication. • The concept of client demand should be revisited to include a two-way approach to tapping this demand from the inception of the project. • Make a serious effort to collect quantitative data which can support or refute many standard beliefs about gully origin, growth and control. • Carry out detailed cost/benefit studies of the MFS. Carry out formal studies into a multitude of practices that could be used within the MFS concept. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The project was able to, among others, bring to light efforts individual farmers around the country. It is necessary that projects should work with such individuals who are located in their areas of operation. This is because other locals would easily relate to what is being done in their area. Progressive farmers were found to be the ones that took most advantage of innovations associated with free inputs. • It is important to note that the selling point of the MFS is self-help, complemented by the need for very few cash inputs which allows participants to produce food for consumption and an output for sale. • The work of the project put a spotlight on the targeting of the poor. Studies and workshops failed to clarify the definition of poor. At the community level it created tension by giving opportunities selectively. Also, a social concern was the stigma of some community members being called poor.

Item No	Project name	Lessons
19	Soil and Water Conservation and Land Utilisation (SWCLU) Programme ¹⁸⁵	<p>Three untapped potentials were identified through programmes of the components:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The traditional knowledge and experience of farmers in regard to their environment and the farming systems which they operate. • The latent skills and enthusiasm of local people for approaches and activities which interest and concern them in achieving their goals. • The self-regenerating capacities of soils and vegetation after damage when adequately managed: such capacities reside particularly in their organic materials, organisms and processes. <p>Furthermore, the programmes identified the following success criteria:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Productive, economically viable and environmentally sustainable systems. 2. Diverse production systems and fall-back activities. 3. Diversity of farming enterprises underscores the risk assessment and aversion capability. 4. Innovative: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Local innovations. - Positive attitude and response to external stimuli. - Very adaptive. 5. Unique personalities but common character traits: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Courage - Dedication - Commitment
20	SOWACO Project ¹⁸⁶	
21	Matelile Rural Development Project (Implementation Phase I and II) (1990-1996)	
22	Community Natural Resources Management Project (1992-1995)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • All parties involved in the administration of natural resource management, especially community -based natural resources, must accept the premises upon which this approach is founded. If any parties (donor, host government, implementing ministry, project implementors or beneficiaries) do not embrace the general concepts of community-based natural resource management, there will be problems. • Organisational capacity to manage the resource base can be enhanced, but not created. Community natural resource management initiatives must start with a strong foundation of interest and commitment on the part of local residents. • The assumptions and issues which define the initial development setting, as provided in a project design, are subject to the evolving social, political and legal realities of a dynamic country. • A firm legal foundation and a clear national government policy mandate embracing the concept of community management of natural resources is essential. • Effective conflict resolution mechanisms for communal natural resource management issues must emerge from the local community. • The lack of a clear and concise RMA programme goal and strategy can result in piecemeal projects, within the programme, that are not complementary nor human and financial resourceful. A national programme vision for the RMA must be developed and promoted.
23	Production Through Conservation (1990-1996) ¹⁸⁷	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • That the chiefs perceived development differently from the target population. • That chieftainship institutions enjoy little support from the central government to improve their administrative capacity and leadership quality. • The village administration is, in most instances, run single-handedly by the chiefs without the requisite transparency and accountability. • The community members lack the forum to voice their development aspirations or to make demands on the authorities. • That villagers have lost interest and respect for their village institutions. • That projects and government service institutions come in a fragmented manner. • That departments fail to provide a wide range of options appropriate to the divergent aspirations of individuals with different social and economic backgrounds.

185 Segerros, M.; Prasad, G. and Marake, M. Let the farmer speak: Innovative Rural Action Learning Areas IN: CDCS 1995. Successful natural resources management in southern Africa. See page 107 for identified success criteria.

186 Hall, D. 1990. A Comprehensive Approach to Village-Based Conservation Development. A Case Study from 21 Villages in Mohale's Hoek District, Lesotho. Results of a Survey for the SOWACO Project.

187 Marake, M. V, with contributions from Shone, G. J. Carlsson, Y. Khatwa and M. Segerros. 1998. The Production through Conservation (PTC) Programme. 1981-1996. A Historical Document.

Recommendations	Remarks
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • When designing and implementing a community-based natural resource management project, all parties must accept the approach and strategy. • A participatory process should be used between donor, client and beneficiary in the design and finance of natural resource management initiatives. • Project design and management must allow for latitude, flexibility and innovation in the eventual implementation of natural resource management initiatives. • Community-based natural resource management initiatives require that an enabling legal and policy foundation already exists or can be created as an initial project component. • Community natural resource management initiatives should encourage and support the development of conflict resolution mechanisms at the local level. • The RMA programme must have a concise goal, objectives and strategy; and then solicit resources to accomplish that goal. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The implication of the first lesson learned is that there has to be extensive education of all those that will be involved in the project. Yet projects are designed and appraised without some of those that are involved in their implementation and the beneficiaries. • Project design assumes there will be commitment by local residents because they are not consulted at the design of the project. It is always assumed that they will be committed because the project is in their interest. <p>In most cases it is assumed that the legal and policy framework can be developed or changed while the project is being implemented and in many cases, processes take long and fail to influence project outcomes.</p>
<p>The approach of PTC was lauded as having promise and had the potential to be used nationwide. This was because it had been able to successfully change the attitudes of planners, experts and development practitioners. The following are among the recommendation coming of the project:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The technical aspects of soil conservation should take cognisance of the human aspect to ensure sustainability • Land users participate in conservation activities when they see immediate benefits and are assured of access to inputs that have little cost to them 	<p>PTC was found to represent a significant breakthrough in approaches to achieving conservation-effective rural development in Lesotho. It was found to be able to use the enthusiasm of the people as well as their skill and local knowledge.</p> <p>The sustainability of the project approach depended on how the government would apply it country wide.</p>

Item No	Project name	Lessons
24	Local Initiative Support Project (LISP) ¹⁸⁸	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Technically complex development projects require technical support. • Community organisation and group formation is a specialised job which requires expertise, motivation, dedication and time. • Technology adoption by risk averse, small farmers is subject to certain pre-requisites.
25	Rural Finance and Enterprise Support Programme (1993-2002) Project ID: 1100000468 ¹⁸⁹	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Mobilising and forming groups is a time-consuming and painstaking process.
26	Mafeteng Development Project	
27	Conserving Mountain Biodiversity in Southern Lesotho, 1995 (CMBSL) LES/97/G31/B/1G/99 ¹⁹⁰	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Biodiversity conservation projects need to be preceded by a comprehensive situation analysis covering biodiversity, and social and economic conditions at the proposed sites. • Institutional capacity limitations are a common feature among most government entities in developing countries. • For a project to be successful, among other things it must have a “champion” - somebody or some institution that is determined that it achieves its stated objectives. • There is a strong need in projects concerning biodiversity conservation to have regular technical input from conservation or biological scientists, particularly if such skills are not available on the project staff. As seen here, the initial conservation objective can be lost sight of, or poor technical decisions made regarding conservation interventions. This technical input is ideally in the form of a backstopping technical agency or could be in the form of regular advisory consultancies. It should also be consistent - not a “pick and choose” approach. Regular monitoring and supervision from GEF is also essential. • Modalities, and the relative strengths of implementing departments and agencies, need to be carefully appraised during project formulation. Changes to them (such as rearrangement of ministries and departments) should be addressed, if need be, by changes in project design, rather than by minor modifications. Many countries lack capacity in key areas which is part of the justification for donor support - and these limitations in capacity should not be unduly strained by project demands such that they become the weak links and causes of project failure. Empowerment for sustainability should be the central aim. • Steering committees, however well-constituted, can lack the ability to have a significant influence or redirect a project. • Participatory management is a good idea, but if things go wrong, one needs clearly defined responsibilities if the problem is to be solved. • The sites at which a project will work need to be clearly articulated during the formulation stage. Likewise, the type of activities that will take place there, targets and expected achievements ought to be specified in the log frame. • Monitoring and evaluation modalities need to be thought through during the formulation stage and adhered to during implementation. • Regular external review missions are important.

188 IFAD 1993: Local Initiatives Support Project

189 Only summary available online. The President’s Report- Rural Finance and Enterprise Support, could not be located.

190 Oliver Chapeyama and Taelo Letšela. 2006. Conserving Mountain Biodiversity in Southern Lesotho (Cmbssl). Final Evaluation (Project Number LES/97/G31/B/1G/99).

Recommendations	Remarks
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Provide adequate technical support for each of the components from the project staff and support from other agencies staff should also be adequate. • Participatory approaches need longer periods for implementation, particularly in the design and execution of micro enterprises/projects. This is an added reason to increase the period for project implementation. • Land tenure, hired and household labour, credit availability and access, prices, and factor and product markets, as well as social acceptability are factors to be carefully studied and integrated into the package. 	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Carry out baseline studies for biodiversity conservation projects. • Limitations can be addressed through the involvement of civil society entities working to compliment government efforts. • The engagement of people with appropriate technical skills to manage projects will ensure that appropriate action is taken to correct misdirected project initiatives. • Have a project champion that can be looked up to by those involved. • Steering committee members need to be well-informed, have continuity and commitment of membership, and be able to actively influence progress if required. • NES should re-engage with relevant government entities proposing biodiversity conservation projects involving community groups in the former project areas to ensure that the high levels of motivation that are evident among these communities for involvement in future conservation programmes are marshalled and put to effective use. • Some useful studies have been conducted on the biodiversity and tourism potential of the southern mountains of Lesotho as part of the CMBSL initiative. These need to be properly packaged for use by on-going and future initiatives. These could also lay the foundation for a body of knowledge about this important eco-region in Lesotho. • The CMBSL experience with the approach of using the PIU model for project management should be documented and shared with other government entities so that the experience is used to inform choices of project management models in future. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Biodiversity conservation projects need to be preceded by comprehensive situation analysis covering biodiversity, and social and economic conditions at the proposed sites. • Institutional capacity limitations are a common feature among most government entities in developing countries. • For a project to be successful, among other things it must have a “champion”, somebody or some institution that is determined that it achieves its stated objectives. • There is a strong need in projects concerning biodiversity conservation to have regular technical input from conservation or biological scientists, particularly if such skills are not available on the project staff. As seen here, the initial conservation objective can be lost sight of, or poor technical decisions made regarding conservation interventions. This technical input is ideally in the form of a backstopping technical agency or could be in the form of regular advisory consultancies. It should also be consistent - not a “pick and choose” approach. Regular monitoring and supervision from GEF is also essential. • Modalities, and the relative strengths of implementing departments and agencies, need to be carefully appraised during project formulation. Changes to them (such as rearrangement of ministries and departments) should be addressed, if need be, by changes in project design, rather than by minor modifications. Many countries lack capacity in key areas which is part of the justification for donor support - and these limitations in capacity should not be unduly strained by project demands such that they become the weak links and causes of project failure. Empowerment for sustainability should be the central aim. • Steering committees, however well-constituted, can lack the ability to have a significant influence or redirect a project. • Participatory management is a good idea, but if things go wrong, one needs clearly defined responsibilities if the problem is to be solved. • The sites at which a project will work need to be clearly articulated during the formulation stage. Likewise, the type of activities that will take place there, targets and expected achievements ought to be specified in the log frame. • Monitoring and evaluation modalities need to be thought through during the formulation stage and adhered to during implementation. • Regular external review missions are important.

Item No	Project name	Lessons
28	Environment and Land Management Sector, SADC ELMS (Phase II of SWCLUP) IRAL Project	<p>Identified Success Criteria:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Productive, economically viable and environmentally sustainable system; 2. Diverse production systems and fall-back activities. 3. Diversity of farming enterprises underscores the risk assessment. 4. Innovative: <ol style="list-style-type: none"> a. Local innovations. b. Positive attitude and response to external stimuli. c. Very adaptive. 5. Unique personalities, but common character traits: <ol style="list-style-type: none"> a. Courage b. Dedication c. Commitment
29	Maloti-Drakensberg Conservation and Development Project ^{191 192}	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The Land Management and Conservation Project (LMP) in Lesotho was designed to develop local skills in the planning and management of nature resources through a participatory approach. The credit became effective in December 1988, but the project was closed ahead of schedule in June 1995. The project aimed to prepare and implement 47 Resource Management Plans to improve land management of both range and village lands in seven of the ten districts in Lesotho. The project fell far short of its expectations. <p>The Implementation Completion Report (ICR) summarises a set of lessons learned:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The need for careful and detailed preparation. • High training needs within ministries and councils; decision making at lowest appropriate levels. • Flexible project design. <p>There is a strong capacity building component for Lesotho institutions and communities, building in opportunities for training and exchange of expertise between Lesotho and RSA.</p>
30	Sustainable Agricultural Development Programme for the Mountain Areas (SADPMA) (2000-2005) ¹⁹³	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. The constraints to smallholder agriculture place a premium on the exploitation of low-risk and high-yielding farming systems such as the “Machobane” system. 2. Partnerships with NGOs and the private sector are useful in reinforcing the government’s capacity to provide core support services responsive to the needs and priorities of rural households. 3. Implementation of programme activities through the existing institutional framework is more cost-effective and critical for continuity and sustainability. 4. Clearly defined arrangements for programme coordination, organisation and management are crucial to ensuring timely implementation. 5. Increased agricultural productivity greatly depends on complementary investments in social infrastructure, such as potable water supply, primary education, health care facilities, rural access roads, etc. 6. The sustainability of project investments is largely proportionate to the level and scope of beneficiary participation. These lessons have been taken fully into account in the design of the Sustainable Agricultural Development Programme for the Mountain Areas (SADPMA).

191 Maloti-Drakensberg Transfrontier Conservation Area. Action Plan for Phase IV of the Maloti-Drakensberg Transfrontier Programme. 2018-2023.

192 Zunckel, K. The Maloti Drakensberg Transfrontier Conservation and Development Programme: A Cooperative Initiative between Lesotho and South Africa.

193 IFAD 1998. Report and Recommendations of the President. ED 98/64/R.19/Ref 1 Sept. 1998.

Recommendations	Remarks



Item No	Project name	Lessons
31	MAFS/LHDA Agricultural Projects Coordination Unit. Contract 21615 ^{194 195}	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Working in an integrated manner brought efficiencies in the deployment of resources, especially human. This reduced conflicts generated by professional jealousy due to different working conditions. 2. The joint implementation allowed for a smooth handover which should reduce the chances of collapse when the donor exits as projects were implemented by staff seconded to LHDA by concerned ministries. 3. Good agreements on paper are not that good if they are not followed. Handover agreements were not followed to the letter. To realise greater benefits, parties to the agreements should be completely committed to the spirit and letter of the same. 4. Unstructured and indiscriminate donor financing and other material support to agricultural projects, for the most part, are counterproductive and have a tendency to create dependency. 5. Policies and procedures have to be followed and applied uniformly. There should be transparency and accountability, especially with the financial resources of the communities. 6. Providing incentives to seconded staff that GoL ministries will not afford at the end of the project sets the project for failure when donor funding ends.
32	LHDA Contract 1044 Integrated Catchment Management Project in Phase I Areas of the Lesotho Highlands Water Project (2004-2010) ¹⁹⁶	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Ultimately the success of the established catchment-level and community-level institutions will be determined by success of decentralisation. • Achieving early and ongoing tangible results in the field is important for motivating and maintaining a positive and supportive work environment. • Alignment of project priorities and community priorities. The lesson learned was that “...the communities in the highlands do not all perceive problems related to resources management as their top concern for external assistance and that if they were given funding and asked to carry out whatever development activity they wanted, it is likely that activity would not involve improving resources management”. • Hiring and using local community level coordinators facilitates easy organising and mobilising of communities. • A key element of the ICM approach is wide participation of stakeholders, especially the communities. • Timely and proper counterparty for capacity building of staff. • Farmers are reluctant to test practices on their best land (fields). • Weak enforcement of land use and grazing management plans by community structures. • Expectancy of handouts and/or payments to implement communal activities. • Full integration and harmonisation of plans among all stakeholder is a long-term goal. • Communities generally understood the need and benefits of soil conservation measures. However, community members were not willing to construct/install the measures on their communal land without payment for the labour. • Field owners are interested in protecting their marginal fields with buffer strips but are not willing to install them where they will reduce the productive area of the field. • Communities are interested in planting trees for fuelwood at their home and communal areas without pay. • Keyholes gardens for vegetable production were popular and community members learned from each other. • Environmental education in schools was popular. • Community ICM meetings, pitsos and brochures help raise environmental awareness.

194 Calvin Mafisa. 2008. MAFS/LHDA Agricultural Projects Coordination Unit. LHDA Agricultural Projects Completion Report.

195 LHDA Agricultural Projects Exit Strategy. Prepared by the Projects Coordination Unit 22nd July 2003.

196 SMEC 2010: LHDA Contract 1044: Integrated Catchment management in Phase I Areas of the Lesotho Highlands Water Project. Final Report.

Recommendations	Remarks
<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Project management agreements have to be made such that there is no ambiguity in terms of roles and responsibilities. This is to avoid unnecessary apportion of blame where failures are registered. 2. It is necessary to address issues of financial mismanagement when it comes to the issues related to the communities' monies. 3. In future, incentives should be determined in consideration of the situation of seconded staff that would return to at the end of the project. 4. GoL should attach people who will be promoted on return from project duty to ensure that they don't regress in pay when they return to their parent ministries. 5. Donors, LHDA in this case, should continue support to projects as per exit strategy clauses to ensure sustainability of project activities. 	<p>The project brought about a number of key issues. First is the advantage of an approach that ensures cooperative working which reduces conflicts. It also highlights the need for adhering to agreements fully and ensuring that they are implemented to the letter.</p>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • That the counterparts should be retained to work on ICM after end of project to ensure that the achievements of the project are not lost. • For resources inventory, studies and/or reviews be conducted annually to update the inventory. • Integrated Catchment Management Plans (ICMPs) be reviewed and updated/revised annually in consultation with communities, local leaders and relevant stakeholders. New ICMPs be developed for any new areas where ICM may be expanded/extended. • LHDA together with the relevant government ministries and catchment management institutions continue working closely with pilot area communities and individuals to train and encourage adoption of the ICM promoted activities. • The monitoring and evaluation of all ICM activities of the past and in the future should continue for many years after the activities are completed as impacts often may be seen several years after activities are implemented. 	<p>Consultations with communities were made on programming and activities but not on decisions of resource allocations. Wrong assumptions were made about some aspects of the project, such as that local communities would agree to carry out labour intensive soil conservation activities for no pay, but they refused to do so. But as it turned out, they were ready to undertake work on their fields and homesteads without being paid.</p> <p>The project was feasible and well-conceived but potentially very complex. It needed a much longer period, and an overlap between the pilot and the extension to new areas, to maintain the learning momentum while at the same time embedding the approach through its application over a long period of time.</p> <p>The context at the start was the GoL decentralisation and all efforts were made to align with an integrated implementation approach in a situation where ministries have always worked in silos. The project was, to a large extent, able to get the different entities to work together and was able to achieve a fair amount of success. The project was able to develop local capacity for the implementation.</p> <p>The counterpart staff had only a maximum of two years before they were to take control of the project which was unrealistic.</p> <p>Being a consultant developed and managed project, the development of the monitoring programme was detailed and well-defined. In addition, the monitoring programme was revised and revamped based on the experiences from project implementation. The end result was a robust plan that was not only able to track project implementation at the activity and outcomes level, but laid a foundation for good post-project monitoring. It is therefore unfortunate that LHDA showed reluctance to commit to a post pilot project that would then use the extensive monitoring programme.</p> <p>Although LHDA did not continue the project, communities continued to implement those aspects that were of direct benefit to them. This implies that there are aspects of the project that communities needed or wanted and which they perceived to be important to their daily lives.</p> <p>Challenges to the project included issues brought about by the compensation programmes and the historic payments for conservation activities. A most startling challenge is LHDA's reluctance to fully commit long term to the ICM programme.</p> <p>The project made a flawed assumption that communities would implement and monitor the plans on their own with their resources. When this did not happen they were said to be not cooperative.</p>

Item No	Project name	Lessons
33	Sustainable Agriculture and Natural Resource Management Programme. (2005-2011) ¹⁹⁷	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> a. Successful implementation requires improved staff capacity. Involvement and good performance of the extension service was critical to the implementation of programme activities, but was below expectation. b. A more integrated approach in smaller areas is preferable. An integrated watershed management approach would be more effective than isolated programme activities scattered over a large geographical area. This would mean the implementation of different conservation and production-related activities in a coordinated manner, to demonstrate how these activities relate and can reinforce each other. c. Successful implementation requires ownership, proactive and committed management, and improved staff capacity at all levels. d. Institutional framework should ensure ownership at all levels. The SANReMP was not well integrated in government operations due to poor ownership and coordination amongst the central and district-level institutions. Efforts made to integrate land and water activities with crop and livestock production had limited success due to poor coordination between the MAFS and the MFLR. e. Cost sharing and beneficiary contributions must be clearly defined, enforced and recorded. In order to ensure the sustainability of services following programme completion, it is advisable to institute cost sharing principles and user fees from the outset of implementation to the extent feasible. f. Future IFAD operations in Lesotho should support market linkages and a value chain approach. g. Rural financial services. The lack of short- and medium-term finance was a serious constraint to the access of inputs on which increased productivity is largely dependent. h. Effective M&E system is a key success factor. An effective M&E system needs to continually feed programme management with operational, financial and other information on programme performance in order to take appropriate management decisions timeously. Developing efficient and effective monitoring systems should begin at programme start-up, with the help of external specialists. Baseline and impact studies must be conducted in a timely fashion and be clearly interlinked. District staff should be provided appropriate training, including on record keeping and report writing, as well as on requirements regarding data collection, analysis and submission.
34	CARE's Livelihoods Recovery Through Agriculture Programme (LRAP) ¹⁹⁸	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Difficulties in overcoming resistance in traditional society for change. • Lack of education and ignorance of how to relate successfully to the culture which dominates labour reserve conditions in Lesotho. • The following elements of hardships are identified in integrated farming systems of Lesotho: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - A lack of education. - Ignorance of how to relate successfully to the culture which now dominates southern African society thoroughly. - A lack of (agricultural) inputs and cattle. - A lack of farm implements, illness, and material comforts.
35	Crop Production: Small-Scale Irrigation Development Project (SSIDP) ¹⁹⁹	

¹⁹⁷ Evaluation Report No. 3379-LS 2014. By the Independent Office of Evaluation (IOE). 6-16 March 2013.

¹⁹⁸ Turner, S. D. 2005. Livelihoods and sharing: Trends in a Lesotho Village, 1976-2004. Research Report no. 22. Care.

¹⁹⁹ NEPAD/FAO 2005. Support to NEPAD-CAADP Implementation TCTC/ LES/209(I). AE901E00.pdf.

Recommendations	Remarks
<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Institutional framework should ensure ownership at all levels. Although programme implementation was carried out by established government institutions, ranging from the local chiefs and district administrators to the various ministries and agencies in Maseru, the SANReMP was not well integrated in government operations due to poor ownership and coordination amongst the central and district-level institutions. 2. Cost-sharing and beneficiary contributions must be clearly defined, enforced and recorded. In order to ensure the sustainability of services following programme completion, it is advisable to institute cost sharing principles and user fees from the outset of implementation to the extent feasible. 3. Future IFAD operations in Lesotho should support market linkages and a value chain approach. Marketing under the SANReMP was touched upon very slightly, mostly in connection with the wool and mohair growers' associations. Future IFAD-funded projects need to provide institutional support for various marketing activities at several levels, including assistance to farmers, farmer groups and entrepreneurs, for establishment via credit and initial operation of marketing associations of agricultural produce or purchase of inputs, private small and medium scale processing plants and quality testing. 4. Rural financial services. The lack of short- and medium-term finance is a serious constraint to the access of inputs on which increased productivity is largely dependent. Landless and poor farmers need to rely on credit opportunities for on-farm investments and off-farm income generation. 5. IFAD visibility. SANReMP productive resources were spread too thinly so that programme visibility was not easily seen. IFAD's activities in Lesotho are not well known to the programme beneficiaries and clients, let alone the general public. In future, IFAD's operations in Lesotho could benefit from a more proactive communications and dissemination activity and resources should be invested in a manner that would enhance the IFAD visibility in the country. 	<p>Although the SANReMP project was a successor to a number of other IFAD projects, it has suffered similar fate to many others. Main reasons for its sub-par performance is the support from GoL parent ministries as well as the poor support at the operational level (district). The project was initiated as a response to the drought at the time and focused, largely, on improving food security, family nutrition and household incomes in Mafeteng, Mohale's Hoek and Quthing. To be able to achieve this aim, its design focused on creating a conducive environment to be able to attain its goal.</p> <p>Typically, addressing food security, the project focused more on access to food and not food security itself. Food security does not have to only address access to food that is produced but should embrace the fact that one should also be able to sell some of the produce and have access to resources to purchase food at a later stage. That being the case, the project, and others, should have addressed the marketing more vigorously and should have established a vibrant marketing system with correct linkages and points of aggregation and transport using local players.</p>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Provision of high intensity village extension is required to administer integrated conservation and cash cropping programmes through village institutions. • Village communities must be individually approached and convinced of the desirability of conservation and ways in which it can be linked to more lucrative livelihoods from the well-managed land resource base. • Government should abandon adopting the traditional share cropping as a development strategy because it benefits neither the government nor the land user. <p>Donors should consider whether they can enhance their development and welfare support to vulnerable households through a programme of action with these new elements included</p>	

Item No	Project name	Lessons
36	Lesotho Wetlands Restoration and Conservation Project. (2008-2013) ²⁰⁰	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Ecologs, sack gabions and rock packs are effective in stopping small gully incisions. • Ecologs, sack gabions and rock packs are highly replicable due to their low cost and limited environmental footprint. • The sustainability of the structures is threatened by the action of the endemic ice rat within and around the structures. • A major limiting factor in the restoration was the limited effort in active re-vegetation of the bare soil areas and in encouraging and enforcing sustainable grazing practices in the pilot catchments. • Any roll-out of restoration measures in other catchments requires a clear framework for planning, design, implementing and monitoring of the structures. • Bio-physical monitoring has been very challenging in terms of loss/failure of equipment. • Outreach activities were very effective as stakeholders in the Project areas became generally well aware of wetland degradation and the consequences. • Stakeholders, even herders, appear willing to change grazing patterns. • Decisive leadership and enforcement measures are required to achieve sustainable grazing patterns. • Alternative livelihood activities have partly been effective due to a range of factors, including the failure to undertake a proper situation analysis at the start. The activities are unlikely to result in reduced grazing pressure on the wetlands or changed grazing patterns. • Several policies exist that relate directly or indirectly to wetlands. All are too broad and overly ambitious to be effective, while many policies do not find their way to implementable strategies. • Capacities at the national level to deal with wetlands are not just constrained by a wide distribution of roles and responsibilities; they are also very limited in terms of human and financial resources. • While capacities at the national level are very modest and largely over-stretched, this is even more so the case at the sub-national level.
37	The Rural Finance Intermediation Programme (2008-2015) ²⁰¹	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • There is weak internal budget control, poor procurement planning and management, including poor record keeping. Neither of the two management committees meets to provide guidance. • Delays in contracting NGOs reduce the likelihood of reaching targets. • No exact data of the sustainability of the FCs and groups promoted by the DOC and MAFS is available.

200 Mott MacDonald in Association with Green's Integrated Services. 2013. Strategic Performance Assessment of the Lesotho Wetlands Restoration and Conservation Project. Final Report. Millennium Challenge Account Lesotho Contract No. WS-F-045-12.

201 IFAD President's Report. Proposed loan and grand to the Kingdom of Lesotho for the Rural Financial Intermediation Programme. Approval. 2007.

Recommendations	Remarks
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Having a Project Implementation Unit as the nucleus for any new, major efforts on wetlands. This can only be an efficient arrangement for short-lived tasks, primarily at national level. A PIU or PMU cannot effectively design, develop, organise and manage a complex, nation-wide programme that needs solid inputs from existing departments, local government and civil society. • Continuing the current fragmentation of roles is not an option. This will not be adequate in case more extensive, dynamic and coherent attention needs to be given to wetlands matters. • Selecting a lead agency from among the currently involved departments is not ideal. None of the currently involved departments fully qualifies for becoming the lead agency and it is likely that, whatever arrangements are made, inputs from all departments will continue to be required. It may, however, be considered to assign some lead roles to one of the key departments. • Not to invest substantially in developing or adjusting policies. • Serious attention is given to developing and agreeing upon strategic plans for the work on wetlands by the various departments. • There is an urgent need and sound justification for a new, substantial programme on wetlands restoration, conservation and management. The most important justification for a new wetlands programme lies in the urgency and magnitude of the threats. • The focus of future work on wetlands should mostly be on addressing key implementation issues and on facilitating large-scale implementation. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • It was not a project designed with a predetermined endpoint but with an inherent flexibility to monitor progress, learn lessons and adjust the approach and implementation accordingly. Pilot projects are, by definition, projects whose main accomplishments are to provide indicators of what will and what will not work. • Later socio-economic studies provide a more solid base, although it remains unclear to what extent the recommendations resulting from these studies were actually used by the Project. • The Project did not have resources to specifically work on institutional topics. Consequently, it has not been able to influence national leadership regarding wetlands. There is no clear political support, linkages among stakeholders are limited, and there is no political linkage between wetland conservation and water production. • In summary, lessons learned, and unresolved issues include: • Overlapping jurisdictions of institutions with control over the same natural resources. • Ineffective grazing control. • Non-sustainability of the existing rural economy. • Complexity of local government. • The lack of a strong political constituency for wetlands conservation and management and therefore: • Lack of financing of wetlands work. • The need for low-cost measures and structures to restore, conserve and manage wetlands, and the non-affordability of several methods and approaches developed under the WRCP for replication on a large and wider scale. • The SPA team identified the 11 priority areas for strategic direction to achieve wetlands conservation at local, district and national levels.
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Board of LPB to make a decision on appropriate strategy for the banks. If done, MoU between RUFIP and LPB to be signed on future cooperation. • PCU, with the support of Ministry of Finance, needs to improve coordination of programme activities and build on synergies with other programmes. • Contracts with CARE and CRS on VSLA promotion to be signed for two years. <p>M&E capacity needs to be raised in RUFIP, particularly as project completion approaches.</p>	<p>A key learning aspect was the vulnerability of state-owned banks such as LPB to changes in their top management, particularly if this is combined with weak control by the board. After the board approved a new strategy for the bank, which was clearly against the LPB mandate and RUFIP objectives, the benefits from earlier RUFIP investments in the bank became doubtful, resulting correctly in the suspension of disbursements to this component.</p>

Item No	Project name	Lessons
38	Protection of Orange-Senqu River Water Sources 'SPONGES' Project ^{202 203}	<p>Wetlands information</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The review of the quality of the spatial data available to the DWA revealed difficulties in overlaying the various themes and importing information from one data source to another due to the use of different geographic projection systems. • The current DWA GIS-WIS platform including all the other sources gathered during study and available data provide only spatial information and lack attributes such as the Why? What? How? which needs to be recorded systematically in the meta data to allow for their inclusion as attributes to the corresponding layers. <p>Selection of study area</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Lack of well-defined criteria for selection of study area criteria. • There is still a need for more in-depth research on crucial aspects such as: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Hydrological dynamics of wetlands. - Erosion measurement. - Methodological approaches to rehabilitation and restoration of degraded wetlands. - Approaches to alternative livelihood options for wetland users. <p>The status of the wetlands</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • More data analysis is needed to establish the trends in water retention capacity in the wetlands. • Although wetlands show signs of erosion, the outflow water quality was good in terms of total dissolved solids, dissolved oxygen and pH. • Livestock overgrazing and trampling, and ice rats are affecting the rate of erosion of the wetlands. • It has been observed that the highly degraded wetlands have scanty vegetal cover. • The wetlands in Khubelu catchment are used by a majority of interviewees to graze animals and most of the cattle posts are located around or within the wetlands.

202 ORASECOME 2008. Protecting the Orange-Senqu Water Sources 'Sponges' Project. Report Number ORASECOM 001/2008. INVENTORY REPORT. FINAL REPORT September 2008. [208_001-2008_FGEF-Sponges Inventory Report Final 30 Oct 2008.pdf].

203 Orange-Senqu River Basin/ORASECOM Transboundary Diagnostic Analysis.

Recommendations	Remarks
<p>Wetlands information</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The review of the quality of the spatial data available to the DWA revealed difficulties in overlaying the various themes and importing information from one data source to another due to the use of different geographic projection systems. • The current DWA GIS-WIS platform including all the other sources gathered during study and available data provide only spatial information and lack attributes such as the Why? What? How? which needs to be recorded systematically in the meta data to allow for their inclusion as attributes to the corresponding layers. <p>Selection of study area</p> <p>The following parameters and criteria were established to select the inventory phase study areas:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Wetlands falling within the category of Palustrine wetlands. • Wetlands which are sources of major tributaries to the Orange-Senqu River. • Wetlands under pressure from development plans such as an envisaged LHWP Phase II dam below the confluence of Khubelu and Senqu River. • Wetlands where little or no information is available. • Wetlands which seem to be vulnerable and are not earmarked for future projects. <p>Management of the wetlands</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The previous range management procedures are no longer effective and a concerted effort by Government of Lesotho is needed to establish effective range management. <p>The selection of a pilot project area</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • It is proposed to continue the project activities in the Khubelu Catchment Area – focusing on the upper and middle sections 	



Item No	Project name	Lessons
39	Capacity Building and Knowledge Management for Sustainable Land Management (2009-2016)	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. The basis for project design should be a theory of change so that a clear strategy for connecting and sequencing outputs to deliver the intended targets is developed. 2. Using existing information will help to design better projects and avoid redesign once implementation starts, which is costly in management time. 3. The IGAs seem to have been instrumental in promoting community cohesion and may therefore be considered as an integral part of a community-based range management strategy. 4. It is well understood that communities need to see benefits accruing to them from their investment of time in a group range management scheme. 5. The management team was too thinly spread and this negatively affected project results. Getting an adequate management team in place to cover all bases may be seen as costly, but with the right people in place, it is an investment in project success. 6. Implementation would have worked better had it been based on a meaningful partnership model, delegating authority to competent agencies within and outside the private sector where the expertise and experience lies. 7. Work to implement the GA system should be carried out from the field in order to make the funds go further and crucially, to provide a better service to communities. 8. The land degradation issue in Lesotho needs a sustained, longer-term effort that approaches the problem from an integrated systems perspective. This means that it requires effective inputs from a multi-disciplinary team of implementing partners to work in their respective expertise and ideas, calling for effective coordination. The disciplines that SLM needs to cover include agriculture, livestock management, veterinary services, energy, water, marketing, economics, institutional development, training, and transport. This implies the need for larger programmatic projects. Small budgets can still be useful but should be focused on delivering results in niche areas with working connections to the bigger whole.

Recommendations	Remarks
<p>Promoting better coordination and collaboration between ministries</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Constitute a Strategic Investment Programme Board. It is clear that better ways must be found to engage other ministries for cross-government learning and strengthened policy making. 2. Establish a programmatic approach to dual-focused project steering committee meetings. 3. Incentivise ministry staff to work with the project through non-monetary incentives. This strategy should be considered a sustainability strategy as institutional support makes or breaks a project. <p>Improving the performance of ministry staff</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 4. Consider how ministry staff time is used. A greater de-concentration of ministry staff would deliver better support service to communities and help to support continuation of these GAs. 5. Develop training standards for communities. <p>SLM policy development</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 6. Use the CSIF as a platform to mainstream SLM in the next iteration of the National Strategic Development Plan. <p>Management policy</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 7. Policy needs should frame the efforts on knowledge management and project data monitoring. <p>Developing the range management governance model</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 8. Develop evaluative case studies on the different models under operation and success factors, in order to inform policy decisions on the choice of implementation strategies regarding range management. 9. Support the continuation of the district-level project implementation forums which have had good feedback in bringing all relevant parties together. 10. Develop an engagement strategy with the chiefs since they are a critical part of the range management system while the new system of democratic governance phases in, which could be a 10-year medium-term prospect. 11. 12. Community empowerment is part of the solution. Farmer-to-farmer learning blended with more conventional training should be continued so is supporting CSOs and NGOs in areas where they are already working. <p>Improving management efficiency</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 12. Develop cost-output benchmarks that can be used for budget planning and control. 13. Training workstreams should be subcontracted to a professional training organisation, working closely to develop the materials and training plan, possibly by establishing a partnership with the Lesotho Civil Service Training Institute.²⁰⁴ 	

Item No	Project name	Lessons
40	Priority Support Programme, Lesotho (2006–2009) ²⁰⁵	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Strategies to promote food security through food production must recognise the specialised needs and capacities of poorer, vulnerable households (often with HIV positive members). • Those considering external support to the promotion of food security in Lesotho must avoid the misleading assumptions that have often been made about rural Basotho being farmers, or rural Lesotho being an agrarian society served by small-scale, highly nutritious crops. • One of the most common weaknesses of policy in developing countries is a lack of realism about how it will be implemented. Strong analytical content is followed by weaker, less thorough proposals about institutional and implementation arrangements. Lesotho's food security policy is guilty of this. • The economics of grain crops in Lesotho are unpromising, but government remains committed to a block farming programme for larger-scale grain production that consumes large amounts of money and of which donors have been understandably wary. • Donors have focused more on a smattering of small-scale strategies that are mostly aimed at reinforcing the livelihoods of the rural poor rather than effecting a market-oriented transformation of the rural cropping sector. Some of these strategies have proven successful e.g. keyhole gardens. • Efficient extension systems are an important prerequisite for the effective enhancement of food security. However, the MAFS' Unified Extension System is not functioning effectively at present.
41	Lesotho Adaptation of Small-Scale Agricultural Production (LASAP) (2011–2015) ²⁰⁶	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Close connection and articulation between the GEF project and its baseline "parent" project is essential to achieving multiplied results for both projects. • The role of extension workers and their ownership of resilience issues is key to achieving long-term transformation of the agricultural sector. • Because so many countries face constraints in ensuring the operations of their extension service, the project not only benefits from the strength of the Lesotho extension service but also will provide additional capacity building, tools and methods that can be owned and deployed by the government on a larger scale later on.
42	Smallholder Agriculture Development Project I and II (2011–2020) ²⁰⁷	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • When a project aims to promote commercial agriculture, a mix of activities including investments and institutional support is critical. • Assessing critical conditions during project preparation is important for ensuring the achievement of intended outcomes. • This project was able to change the mind-sets of smallholder agricultural producers but the ICR did not provide any evidence to back up those claims. • The provision of financial capital needs to be combined with building resilience of agribusinesses to climate shocks.
43	Demonstration Project on Community Based Rangeland Management in Lesotho	

205 S.D. Turner 2009. Promoting food security in Lesotho: issues and options. [10.11.639.7641.pdf].

206 Project Document 12-26-2013_ID4453_Projdoc.pdf.

207 World Bank. Appraisal Report for Smallholder Agricultural Development Project. 2011. Report No: 64990-LS.

Recommendations	Remarks
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> MAFS, in collaboration with the Cabinet Sub-Committee on Food Security, should intensify its policy monitoring and programme and budget management for national food security. They should track the funding and implementation of the food security policy and the National Action Plan for Food Security and assess the need for revisions to the latter. GoL and its development partners should sustain and strengthen the contributions of NGOs in the food security sector. The Director of Field Services should give priority to the monitoring, support and expansion of the community-based extension worker network across the country and ensure that District Agricultural Officers do the same in their respective areas. MAFS should collaborate with NGOs for this purpose, and with the Ministry of Health and Social Welfare in order to maintain and build on the collaboration with the community support groups and Community Health Workers that PSP promoted. Through their extension programmes and budgets, MAFS and the NGOs with which it collaborates should continue active promotion of homestead food security techniques. A vital strategy to continue building progress towards food security is to make the GoL budgeting and development planning processes more meaningful and effective. This means MAFS giving more thorough attention to the content of its budget framework papers, and the Ministry of Finance and Development Planning managing the medium-term expenditure framework (MTEF) process in a manner that gives at least as much weight to strategic content as it does to budgetary accounting mechanisms. The new national development plan should integrate the enhancement of food security in a convincing and comprehensive set of measures to alleviate poverty, complementing initiatives to stimulate growth and employment. These measures should also incorporate a comprehensive and effectively coordinated social protection strategy. Government and civil society have not yet succeeded in formulating such a strategy. It is urgently needed and should be one of the cornerstones of any future national development plan. 	<p>We recommend strongly that ICM consults not only the document from which we have extracted the lessons and recommendations, but the full study of which this document is a follow-up.</p>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Close integration will be achieved by embedding LASAP project staff into the SADP existing PMU and project structure. Strengthen extension services and provide addition capacity building, tools and methods that can be owned and deployed by the government. Promote an increased awareness among smallholders of the economic benefits they can accrue and maintain in the long term by adopting adaptive approaches. 	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> The provision of financial capital needs to be combined with building resilience of agribusinesses to climate shocks. The importance of farmers having incentives to work together in groups should be sufficiently identified during project preparation to ensure that sub-projects are sustainable and performed efficiently. 	<p>It is noteworthy that the original and revised objective of the project were not sufficiently specific. The original and revised objectives did not clearly state what outcomes were to be achieved through increasing marketed output among project beneficiaries in Lesotho's smallholder agriculture sector. Therefore, the theory of change and how key activities and outputs were to result in the intended outcomes was not clear.</p> <p>It has to be noted that the project went ahead despite the risk of weak implementation capacity being rated as high and a number of other risks as substantial. Mitigation measures identified did not work.</p> <p>While this project did not address harsh weather and climatic events in its project design, it was sufficiently flexible to introduce climate-smart agriculture practices and activities during project implementation resulting in long-term climate resilience by project beneficiaries.</p>

Item No	Project name	Lessons
44	CRS. Lesotho Food Security Relief and Resilience Project - LFRSP (2012-2014)	
45	Smallholder Agriculture Development Project (2012-2018) ²⁰⁸	
46	Khubelu "SPONGES" Pilot Project (2013-2015) ^{209 210 211 212 213}	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Visits to illustrated success story sites speeded up understanding of holistic grazing and its potential for environmental protection, rehabilitation and economic development to livestock farmers in the area. • Rural communities, especially farmers, are trainable and are capable of leading development that affects their lives and livelihoods. • The concept of holistic management became well understood and the majority of participants would like to implement the concept. • Farmers who practice holistic grazing already reported a general health status improvement of their livestock. • Ice rat infestation is an indicator of degradation of the wetlands, not a cause. Ice rats require non-waterlogged soils for their burrows; therefore, healthy peat forming hydric soils does not contain ice rat burrows. Therefore, maintaining a high-water table on the total habitat area can reduce, but not totally eliminate ice rat infestation. • Poorly defined roles among institutions involved in grazing management creates a challenge in the implementation of holistic management in the biological rehabilitation intervention, as both high-density grazing and mobile kraaling require mixing of livestock which livestock owners oppose • Herders are a critical component in successful livestock agriculture, but currently their labour rights are not adequately addressed. • It has been identified that land degradation results from overgrazing and over-resting of plants by providing livestock opportunities for selective grazing, which is encouraged in a situation of randomized grazing. This occurs where herders operate in a harsh environment and are not adequately protected against the elements. They therefore seek refuge away from the animals and leave them to graze randomly and selectively. • Knowledge management and documentation of the interventions is not systematised. A way should be found to compile all the lessons contained in these documents into a single document and distributed widely especially among the stakeholders that have participated in enabling their discovery.
47	Climate Change Adaptation for Sustainable Rural Water Supply in Lowlands Lesotho (2013-2015)	

208 World Bank 2019. Smallholder Agricultural Project. Project Appraisal Document. Report No. PAD 3320

209 Orange-Senqu River Basin/ORASECOM Transboundary Diagnostic Analysis.

210 TCC, DHI and PEM Consult. 2008. Feasibility Study of the Protection of Orange-Senqu River Water Sources ('Sponges' Project): Final Report. Report Number ORASECOM 004/2008.

211 Sefali. N. 2014. Khubelu Sponges Midterm Report. Trans-boundary Water Management in SADC Programme Protection of the Orange-Senqu Water Sources (Sponge)- Project Lesotho.

212 Schusser. C. 2015. Lessons Learnt Report. Transboundary Water Management in SADC Programme Protection of the Orange-Senqu Water Sources (Sponge)- Project Lesotho.

213 Chakela. Q and Green. T. 2017. End-of-Pilot Project Report. Transboundary Water Management In SADC Programme Protection of the Orange-Senqu Water Sources (Sponge Project).

Recommendations	Remarks
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • For monitoring livestock movement, have a number of animals that have electronic tags that can be tracked by satellite or through the GSM infrastructure. • The use of concrete physical structures in wetland rehabilitation of wetlands is discouraged. Their installation is very expensive. The time needed to build them is long and the summer window period when the work can be done is short. They are an eyesore. They have an extensive and long-lasting footprint from vehicles that bring materials to site. They create areas of desiccation where ice rats seem to thrive. Due to their logistical requirements, it will not be possible to use them in some of the very remote sites when activities are scaled up. One alternative is the use of sharpened wooden staves that are then impact-driven into the soil. These would then be packed on the upper end with shrubs (e.g. sehalahala) that are removed from the surrounding area. • There is a need to increase the number of local community groups in the activities to enhance the potential for successful interventions in the interest of all residents of the project area. The project should work on empowering local groups to act as watchdogs of the work of those directly involved. • The involvement of traditional herbal practitioners is essential and critical in removing shrubs. This should not only be done considering grazing potential but also for protection of medicinal plants, utility grasses (hat, rope, and matt-making plants) etc. • Use drones with video cameras that are programmed to fly over designated areas to monitor both illegal grazing and the use of high density grazing and kraaling. • Hiring rangers who are equipped with cameras, preferably video cameras, to take clips of animals that are grazing illegally on the rangelands and whose herders are not complying with stipulated grazing patterns. • For the capacity building efforts to be sustained, the Department of Range Resource Management through its field officers should develop an effective strategy to monitor the work of GAs and be able to intervene where necessary. • It is therefore recommended that a system of certification for both farmers and herders be developed, similar to trading license, which can be revoked if the farmer/or herder contravenes the principles of good land husbandry. 	<p>The pilot project's objective to rehabilitate the wetland and the related interventions are relevant to the efforts to protect and conserve this natural resource of great importance to local communities, the Lesotho nationals and SADCC region.</p> <p>The pilot project was effective in demonstrating that wetland degradation can be ameliorated by applying physical measures, removal of shrubs as part of biological measures works, and using intensive grazing to improve pasture quality.</p> <p>The use of concrete structures was not efficient and had negative impacts on the wetlands. Biological measures should be used.</p> <p>The impacts of most measures were immediate but would not be maintained in the long run. Uncontrolled grazing will negate positive impacts of intensive grazing. Concrete structures will need expensive maintenance and coordination work of local institutional structures will not survive post the project.</p> <p>The use of physical structures is not sustainable because they would be too expensive to scale for the large areas that require attention. GoL does not have resources to continue maintenance and monitoring activities to sustain the work started by the project.</p>

Item No	Project name	Lessons
48	Wool and Mohair Promotion Project (WAMPP) (2014-to date) ^{214 215}	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Project Field Office should be better integrated in the programme, provided with adequate operational resources, and encouraged to bring lessons from the ground to feed into planning of operational activities at national level. • Development of AWPB should start from district level to ensure it is “fit for purpose”. • Joint planning of activities. Activities in the three technical components should be planned jointly, involving all technical staff and PFOs in order to improve component synergies and interlinkages at operational level. • To enhance PCU staff retention, decisions to remove staff members should only be performance based and justified staff changes should be assessed and endorsed by PSC, with proper overlap plans to allow business continuity. • The Participatory Integrated Climate Services for Agriculture Approach (PICSA) is an approach that seeks to build resilience at the farm level by supporting decision-making through the integration of information on location-specific climate, crops, livestock, and livelihoods. It emphasises practical hands-on methods that can easily be used and understood by farmers by integrating livelihood alternatives to those on-farm. Extension service workers are trained on PICSA and then they go out and train farmers. • Good to notice the strong link between M&E and climate adaptation activities. Solid evidence on PICSA would be very helpful as this seems a promising innovation. • Disbursement pressure overtook project committee engagement. The WAMPP project had a slow start-up and lagged disbursement, especially on time bound OFID funds. IFAD escalated this situation to the PS MAFS in Nov 2017 and March 2018, which led to increased attention to the project at PS level. Consequently, the project did speed up implementation and disbursement. Yet, consultation through planned committee work at national and district level became more erratic, leading to some lower than desired ownership and lack of awareness by certain key stakeholders (especially at district level).
49	Biological Resources Monitoring within Phase I of the LHWP Catchments. LHDA Contract 1273.	
50	Strengthening Capacity for Climate Change Adaptation through Support to Integrated Watershed Management Programme in Lesotho (2015-2019) ²¹⁶	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Livelihoods and other pressing needs (water, food security) must be at the heart of sustainable development initiatives to obtain traction. 2. Decentralised elements of the project team were successful. 3. The Project Steering Committee must be composed of members with some programmatic clout who can influence work in their own divisions/departments to complement the project. 4. Although climate data is available, it still does not meet the needs or expectations of users at the local level. 5. Having an NPC working in the government offices is beneficial for project ownership, alignment of the project with national programmes, capacity building, and the retention of skills in the government. 6. Project Steering Committee budget costs should include modest costs related to Project Steering Committee site visits, which can be paid for by co-financing. 7. The lack of a dedicated M&E staff member was perceived as a weakness in monitoring project progress and measuring results. 8. For any physical work, additional FAO oversight should be ensured beyond the government processes. 9. Training on FAO procurement policies must be carried out as soon as staff are retained for future projects. Lessons learned from procurement challenges should be documented by the project

214 IFAD. 2014. Wool and Mohair Promotion Project (WAMPP) Final project design report. Main report and appendices. Report No. 3549-LS. Project NO. 1673.

215 IFAD. 2020. Wool and Mohair Promotion Project (WAMPP) Mid-term Review. Main report and appendices. Report No. 5318-LS. Project NO. 2000000053.

216 FAO. 2021. Terminal evaluation of the project “Strengthening capacity for climate change adaptation through support to integrated watershed management in Lesotho” Project symbol: GCP/LES/049/LDF GEF ID: 5124.

Recommendations	Remarks
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Partial restructuring of component A2, affecting the budget allocation and implementation arrangements by adding a third-party for fast-tracking the planned activities implementation. • Reallocation of OFID funds from A to B and C, and revision of current AWBP and PP in line with updated costs and timelines as discussed with the mission. • Strong attention to post-project sustainability for the set of activities under component B in the form of strengthening the growers association to take over full responsibility as the project approaches closing date. • Increased attention to project-related inter-ministerial communication and coordination at national and district level to ensure this multi-sectoral value chain project can achieve its objective. 	<p>The project was affected by sub-par management and coordination between the various ministries and other stakeholders. Poor financial management reduced accountability. Poor M&E also meant poor impact and progress assessment.</p> <p>Of direct relevance to ICM is the range management component of the project. Despite extensive experience with GAs in Lesotho from as far back as the US-funded project in Sehlabathebe and Ramatseliso in Qacha's Nek, the current project does not seem to have taken into consideration lessons learned from previous projects. So far, it has not implemented the component directed at achieving the objective to "establish a sustainable system of communal grazing and rangeland management with the objective of improving livestock nutrition and maximising production and returns for smallholder wool and mohair producers".</p> <p>The activities that have to be undertaken to achieve this will require extensive consultations with members of GAs and communities. Central to discussions will be rights and responsibilities and to define the range land resources which community members have the right to use. The design document shows that "WAMPP will take a community-based approach to delineating grazing areas, establishing stocking rates and developing grazing plans, following a participatory rangeland management methodology". It is clear that the project is unlikely to be able to fully achieve its objectives since at the time of the MTR, not much had been done and a six month recovery plan was only then being developed.</p> <p>Our view is that ICM-related projects have prioritised activities aimed at engaging with communities on natural resource management and started these early in the life of the project, have paid consistent attention to communication with communities, as well as adhered strictly to recording of proceedings and giving feedback to communities.</p> <p>We regard the involvement of the LNWGMA as a positive and necessary aspect in NRM as NGOs have a greater interest and potential accountability than GoL institutions. NGOs such as the LNWGMA have a narrow and commercial focus and are likely to ensure sustainability of initiatives.</p>



Item No	Project name	Lessons
51	Reducing vulnerability from climate change in the Foothills, Lowlands and the Lower Senqu River Basin (2015-2020)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Livelihoods and other pressing needs (water, food security) must be at the heart of sustainable development initiatives in order for them gain traction. • The project was able to manage this by creating an ongoing presence at the local level, leaning on social structures (chiefs, grazing associations, lending groups, nutrition groups) and including people in a learning-by-doing approach. However, the question of incentives in how to motivate people to work on communal projects without financial gain will be an ongoing challenge for other projects. • Decentralised elements of the project team were successful. Having people residing in the districts where activities are underway creates stronger linkages, opportunities for feedback and adaptive management. It also fosters a culture of trust among stakeholders. • The Project Steering Committee must be composed of members with some programmatic clout who can influence work in their own divisions/departments to complement to the project. This would ensure greater ownership of project activities, synergies and buy-in from the national government. Project Steering Committees often play a rubber-stamping role; however, inviting members for field visits and oversight missions can be extremely beneficial. • Although climate data is available, it still does not meet the needs or expectations of users at the local level. These needs must be clarified since there is a gap in communications and expectations. • Having an NPC working in the government offices is beneficial for project ownership, alignment of the project with national programmes, capacity building, and the retention of skills in the government. However, the salary of this position should be commensurate with expectations of a United Nations project for purposes of equity with the rest of the project team financed by the project. • Project Steering Committee should take steps to facilitate their access to the project sites. The Project Steering Committee participation was seen as a strength of this project, which was partially due to the site visits they made. In order to avoid financing issues on this front, this should be added to the co-financing budget.
52	Strengthening National Agricultural Research and Extension in Lesotho (2015-2017)	
53	Restoring Ecosystems and Livelihoods (REAL) Project	
54	UNDP-GEF Support to the Orange-Senqu River Strategic Action Programme Implementation (2017-2023)²¹⁷	
55	LHDA Contract 1330: Development of the LHWP Wetlands Conservation Strategy and Monitoring Plan (2020-)²¹⁸	
56	Integrated Catchment Management (2020-2023)	

217 United Nations Development Programme Project Document: Support to the Orange-Senqu River Strategic Action Programme (ID9054_PIMS_5506_ORASECOM_Produc-Revised-2Dec2018.pdf).

218 Anchor Environmental Consultants (Pty) Ltd in association with Wetland Consulting Services (Pty) Ltd. 2020. Vol III Review of rangeland management, issues and potential solutions. Contract 1330.

Recommendations	Remarks
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Gender-disaggregated indicators, baselines and targets should be developed. In addition, the project should make an additional effort to promote a more equal gender participation in trainings. The results framework should be significantly adjusted. Modifications should involve the structure of components, outcomes and outputs, as well as the indicators, baselines, targets and means of verification. 	<p>The challenge is to maintain interest in communal sustainable development initiatives that do not directly yield income.</p>
[Redacted]	[Redacted]



Appendix 4a: Lessons learned from reviewed projects

Appendix 4 a-i: Lessons learned from 1970-1979 projects

Item No	Project name	Lessons
2	Development of a Pilot Agricultural Scheme in the Leribe Area (1970-1975) ²¹⁹	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The growing number of entities involved in development is producing unnecessarily complex and confusing situations that are not conducive to optimum utilisation of resources (human, technical and financial), effective coordination or unity of purpose and action. • Whatever the official reaction to the concept of a single national entity with overall responsibility for rural development, there is room for improvement in the performance of the Ministry of Agriculture. • Available skilled manpower is inadequate to meet the staffing needs of ongoing development projects. Further overreaching of human resources may prove counterproductive with possible socioeconomic and political repercussions.
5	Khomokhoana Rural Development Project (1975-1977)	The Khomokhoana project was evaluated in 1977. ²²⁰ The evaluation found that each of the separate project activities was performing satisfactorily but they had not been integrated to become an overall rural development programme.
8	Thaba Bosiu Rural Development Project ²²¹	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Basotho farmers and land users must understand and accept the measures that have been introduced. • Delays in conservation activities are often caused by lack of transport and the incompetency of procurement staff. • Lack of familiarity of procurement consultant with soil conservation and road works. • Government's claim to recognise the need for increase in agricultural production is not supported by the provision of an enabling environment. • Low effectiveness on the job is a constraint to implementation. • Lack of studies relating to the determination of cost effectiveness of conservation or related integrated farming programmes within the ministry. • The concept of integrated farming is not defined and understood by project staff. This hinders step-by-step efforts to improve agricultural productivity. • No analysis was conducted to identify long-term losses which the country would incur if deterioration of natural resources were to continue at its present rate. • Overgrazing is recognised as a major problem and lack of control for the implementation of proper grazing management regulations is the root cause. • Lack of coordination among the components of the project – conservation, roads, information, extension, marketing, research. • An example of a difficulty is the calculation of various costs in a project with various donors.^{222 223}

219 C. G. Wenner, 1982. Soil Conservation in Lesotho. Draft Discussion Document. 15th March 1982. SIDA Consultancy Report. p 65.

220 Duncan, T., Baffoe, F. and Metell, K. 1994. SUPPORT AGAINST APARTHEID An Evaluation of 28 Years of Development Assistance to Lesotho. p. 65.

221 James B. Davis, James J. Acres and William A. Daley. An Evaluation of the Thaba Bosiu Rural Development Project in Lesotho. 1975.

222 C. G. Wenner, 1992 Soil Conservation in Lesotho: Drat Discussion document. SIDA Consultant. P.66.

223 IBRD/IDA 1973. Appraisal of Thaba-Bosiu Rural Development Project Lesotho. January 1973 Report No. PA -147a.

Recommendations	Remarks
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> The organisational requirements of rural development be clearly established and defined to facilitate preparation of a structural framework for achieving overall coordination of planning, programming and execution. Serious consideration be given to the creation of a single national entity endowed with legislative, financial and administrative powers necessary to discharge the function of stimulating, facilitating and undertaking rural development in designated areas. Active steps be taken to improve the structure and management of the Ministry of Agriculture and more especially with regard to technical and administrative capability, and channels of communication within and between all its divisions. As the overall staffing situation improves, a greater measure of decentralisation be introduced with appropriate delegation of authority to discharge and define responsibilities for which personnel should be held accountable. Adequate availability of skilled manpower represents a criterion to be satisfied prior to formal approval of new projects by responsible parties. Development policy to be modified to provide for concentration of available skilled manpower within ongoing and approved projects not yet operational. This is to facilitate their establishment on a sound foundation and the more effective and rapid generation of skilled manpower capable of staffing new projects and pursuing the training process on a continuing basis. 	<p>The project managed to undertake a number of tasks that included:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> Maintenance of terraces. Construction of diversion banks, small fishponds and roads. Gulley control Establishment of a small nursery and the planting of trees Establishment of a meteorological station. The dominating work was maintenance of terraces using machinery.
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> A second phase should be organised and based on the fielding of a formulation mission. The second phase should have as its primary objective the preparation of a comprehensive rural development plan for the area including the specification of investment possibilities and/or sub-projects for external financing. Cottage industries and other means of vertically integrated agriculture enterprise also should be explored in the second phase. Current phase activities should be continued with respect to technical and socio-economic investigations, staff training and institutional training. It (current phase) should concentrate to an increasing extent on involving the local populace with the planning and development work so that development of their area is not simply something done to them by outsiders but becomes something done by them with the help of outsiders. The second phase must contain a strong element of regional planning. For this to happen, it will be necessary for government to take steps to increase administrative and planning capacity in the area. 	<p>The project failed in the planning. The main work carried out was maintenance of terraces carried out by machinery. An earlier evaluation mission had not been satisfied with the scale and impact of activities, nor the approach. The evaluation mission notes that people would participate if there was some value in it.</p>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Villages should make inputs through voluntary cooperation, with incentives managed by village community committees supported by external agencies of government. Future projects should ensure that senior staff in charge of the project review the project area and assess the personnel and equipment needs. Donor staff should be better appraised of their responsibilities to avoid high staff turn-over. Legal framework should be development and strengthened to improve effectiveness. Effectiveness on the job needs to be strengthened through improvement of knowledge and skills. Training and experience should be provided though periodic evaluation to assure proper progress. Analysis must be conducted with a long-term framework which carefully considers future conditions and productivity. Concerted effort to promote sound range management and improvement of management strategy and institutional support by local authorities, technical assessment, veterinary services, and fodder production. Develop and refine a procedure for reaching and effectively working with stockholders to plan, implement, and continue to carry out sound range and farm management acceptable to the culture of land users. 	<p>The successful parts of this project included introduction of cash-crops, such as asparagus, which were meant to boost exports but were inadequately supported by infrastructure and marketing facilities. The cannery that was established to process locally produced fruits failed to be sustained beyond the project.</p>

Item No	Project name	Lessons
9	Basic Agricultural Services Project (BASP) (1978- 1987). ^{224 225 226 227}	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The importance of properly assessing the borrowers capability. Even if bank crop assumptions had been correct, it is likely that the disorganisation which prevailed would have led to project failure. • The arrangements set forth in the appraisal report might have worked with a strong borrower, but the Ministry of Agriculture (MoA) was institutionally weak and ill-equipped to contend with the diversity of donors and conflicting interests and to mediate the procedural and technical problems encountered. • There was an awareness of this at appraisal but no adjustments were made. • Mistaken premises: Bank assumptions in increasing crop yield were not based on actual experience or trials in the country but on a synthesis of experience obtained elsewhere. These did not give proper weight to the relatively unique characteristics of Lesotho, among which climate and the lesser role played by agriculture are the most important. • Project objectives: Much of the development assistance of the country has been “part of a long-term process towards the viability of agriculture, which would have to absorb most of the migrants in the event of a large reduction in migrant labour in South Africa”. In fact, some reduction in employment opportunities in South Africa has occurred. However, it is not at all certain that the agriculture sector has the absorptive capacity to employ all, or the bulk of, the country’s migrant labour force now in South Africa. Before mounting any new agriculture projects, therefore, it seems imperative to review the country’s agricultural history to ascertain the practicable economic range of possibilities i.e., is crop farming destined to remain at subsistence level, can an improved yield be obtained at an economic price, and is there any basis for contemplating greater food sufficiency and/or absorbing the large absentee male population predominantly in the agricultural sector, other than through subsidies? • Inadequate dialogue: The borrower did not understand adequately the objectives of the project, lacked full commitment to it, and did not share the bank’s perception in some instances. The lesson to be learned from this is the importance of having an adequate dialogue with the government. • Timing of the project: The project might have had a more successful outcome had it been delayed until the predecessor project was completed and results evaluated, as many of the latter’s failings were repeated in this project. • Bank processing and supervision: Altogether, the foregoing suggests that there was some haste in appraisal timing, perhaps due to anxiety to maintain a planned processing schedule so as to urgently assist the borrower in agricultural development. That apparently led to some deviation from normal project formulation practice. More critical attention could have been paid to assessing the technical and socio-economic parameters appraisal. In subsequent supervision, the regional headquarters could have assisted the field mission in Nairobi more actively in re-evaluating and possibly redirecting the project.

Appendix 4a-ii: Lessons learned from 1980-1989 projects

Item No	Project name	Lessons
10	Agriculture Marketing and Credit Project ^{228 229}	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The need to adjust project design to accommodate a changing policy environment, for diligent implementation of project and realisation of its benefits. • Credit effectiveness could be enhanced if the factors specific to the country/project area are given due attention. A common wisdom is that credit services should be demand-driven. • Monitoring and evaluation should be viewed as a management tool.

224 C. G. Wenner, 1982. Soil Conservation in Lesotho. Draft Discussion Document. 15th March 1982. SIDA Consultancy Report. p. 69-70.

225 World Bank, 1978. Lesotho Appraisal of the Basic Agricultural Services Project. Report. No. 1524a-LSO. [Appraisal of BASP 1978.pdf].

226 World Bank. 1987. Project Completion Report: Lesotho Basic Agricultural Services Program Project (CREDIT 795-LSO) [BASP COMPLETE REPORT.pdf].

227 World Bank 1978. Report and Recommendation of the President of the International Development Association to the Executive Directors on a Proposed Credit to the Kingdom of Lesotho for a Basic Agricultural Services Project. Report No. P-2260-LSO [BASP RECOMMENDATION OF THE PRESIDENT.pdf].

228 IFAD 1991. Agricultural Marketing and Credit Project.

229 The project evaluation document could not be located.

Recommendations	Remarks
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The ministry should develop a functional system necessary to carry out its functions effectively. Essential components of which are: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Organisation - Manpower capability. - Management procedures. • Ensure that project authority administration caused problems are attended to. These include: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Duplication of responsibilities between existing agencies which often causes fragmentation and lack of coordination. - Use standard practices at project authority which provide for autonomy, accountability which are not the same as in government. <p>Provide clear role definitions among project administration and local authorities to ensure smooth transfer of functions of the project to local authorities to ensure sustainability.</p>	<p>The BASP project was based on insufficient analysis of the previous projects' experience, namely Khomo-khoana and Thaba-Bosiu Rural Developments, and therefore the designs that led to the poor performance of the previous projects were repeated.</p>

Recommendations	Remarks
<p>Project design</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Introduce flexibility in project design to accommodate changes in policy during project implementation and monitor policy environment very closely to suggest necessary changes timeously. • Avoid over-dependence on the implementation of activities which are not financed and not controlled by the project. • Conduct necessary surveys to generate data needed for proper design of targeted components. • Consider an implementation time-frame longer than five years, particularly for institution-building projects. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The assumption that the Thaba-Bosiu Rural Development project experience was up-scalable was contradicted by the performance of both BASP and its duplicate programme but under different donor funding. • Matelile to Mafeteng Project faced the same fate that followed the upscaling of FISC to PTC.

Item No	Project name	Lessons
11	Land Conservation and Range Development Project (1981-89). 1985-1992) ^{230 231}	<p>National Laws and Regulations</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Enforcement of grazing regulations is difficult given the apathy and disinterest of traditional local institutions. Hence, enforcement devolves to the GA and its elected riders. The best foundations for successful enforcement are GA policies which have been developed with a broad base of member participation. Members who are caught for non-compliance can be held accountable to the very plans for which they have provided public input or support. • Enforcement actions are also necessary against non-members of the GA who constantly test the integrity of the RMA boundary. Many of these individuals will be highly resentful of having been dispossessed of their grazing right within the RMA. They can be quite bellicose, and it is the riders who must bear the brunt of their animosity. The diligence of the riders must be maintained by providing them with meaningful remuneration and active leadership.
13	Farm Improvement with Soil Conservation (FISC) Project in Maphutseng, Mohale's Hoek District (1985-1990) ^{232 233 234}	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • There was too little participation from farmers in the planning process. Only representatives were involved. • Village planning was only concerned with soil and water conservation, whereas the aspirations of rural people are more complex. Range management and crop husbandry are often key areas. • When drawing plans with chiefs and VDCs, members also wanted to include rural development infrastructure and services like roads, clinics, schools and water supply. The agricultural issues often came far down in the VDC's priority list. • The incentives and project inputs created a dependency syndrome. Some activities were carried out because of the incentives, rather than to fulfil a felt, perceived, and assessed need by the village.
14	Lesotho Agricultural Production and Institutional Support (LAPIS) Programme (1985-1992) ²³⁵	The lessons for this project are summarised in Appendix 5 because of their detail. ²³⁶ They are presented as 8 groups.

Table 4a-iii. Lessons learned from 1990-1999 projects

Item No	Project name	Lessons
22	Community Natural Resources Management Project (1992-1995)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • All parties involved in the administration of natural resource management, especially community-based natural resources, must accept the premises upon which this approach is founded. If any parties (donor, host government, implementing ministry, project implementors or beneficiaries) do not embrace the general concepts of community-based natural resource management, there will be problems. • Organisational capacity to manage the resource base can be enhanced, but not created. Community natural resource management initiatives must start with a strong foundation of interest and commitment on the part of local residents. • The assumptions and issues which define the initial development setting, as provided in a project design, are subject to the evolving social, political and legal realities of a dynamic country. • A firm legal foundation and a clear national government policy mandate embracing the concept of community management of natural resources is essential. • Effective conflict resolution mechanisms for communal natural resource management issues must emerge from the local community. • The lack of a clear and concise RMA programme goal and strategy can result in piecemeal projects, within the programme, that are not complementary nor humanly and financially resourceful. A national programme vision for the RMA must be developed and promoted.

230 Land conservation and range development project, Lesotho technical proposal submitted to the United States Agency for International Development, in response to RFP no. 632-0215, April 1981. [<https://www.worldcat.org/title/land-conservation-and-range-development-project-lesotho-technical-proposal-submitted-to-the-united-states-agency-for-international-development-in-response-to-rfp-no-632-0215-april-1981/oclc/26219556>].

231 Strategies and Tenure in African Livestock Development by Brent M. Swallow (wisc-0008.pdf).

232 Marake, M. V. and Shone, G. 1998. The Production through Conservation (PTC) Programme 1981-1996.

233 T.F Shaxson & D M Sehloho 1993. Draft report of the informal evaluation mission, The PTC 11 Programme Mafeteng, Mohales Hoek, Quthing.

234 Mashinini, V. I. 2000. Sustainable Rural Development in Lesotho. PhD Thesis. Department of Geography, Faculty of Science, University of Orange Free State, South Africa

235 AMERICAN AG INTERNATIONAL: Consortium for International Development Fredrerisen, Kamine & Associates Lindsay/Dekalb International. 1992. Lesotho Agricultural Production and Institutional Support Project. LAPIS END-OF-REPORT. USAID Project No. 632-0221.

236 LAPIS 1991. LESSONS LEARNED FROM THE FORMATION OF GRAZING ASSOCIATIONS IN LESOTHO. Lesotho agricultural Production and Institutional Support. Ministry of Agriculture, Cooperatives and Marketing. Maseru, Lesotho [xdah027d.pdf] See also Appendix 5.

Recommendations	Remarks
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Develop, policy, and regulations supported by legally binding legislation. • Develop guidelines for engaging with the communities to enable formation and registration of grazing associations. • Legalise RMA as the official management model for proper range management. 	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Integrate other livelihoods in the programme. • Incentives should be aligned with the needs and capacities of the beneficiary and their willingness to participate. 	
<p>The programme is currently carried out as part of the range resource management main tool and shows successful upscaling. The organisation framework used in this programme, supported by the most up-to-date legal framework (policy, regulations and bills), is worth emulating by ReNOKA. Despite delays in decentralisation, this programme manages to reach local land users better than most.</p>	

Recommendations	Remarks
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • When designing and implementing a community-based natural resource management project, all parties must accept the approach and strategy. • A participatory process should be used between donor, client and beneficiary in the design and finance of natural resource management initiatives. • Project design and management must allow for latitude, flexibility and innovation in the eventual implementation of natural resource management initiatives. • Community-based natural resource management initiatives require that an enabling legal and policy foundation already exists or can be created as an initial project component. • Community natural resource management initiatives should encourage and support the development of conflict resolution mechanisms at the local level. • The RMA programme must have a concise goal, objectives and strategy; and then solicit resources to accomplish that goal. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The implication of the first lesson learned is that there has to be extensive education of all those that will be involved in the project. Yet projects are designed and appraised without some of those that will be involved in their implementation and their beneficiaries. • Local residents are not consulted during the design of the project. This means the project design assumes that residents will be committed to the project because it is in their interest. • In most cases it is assumed that the legal and policy framework can be developed or changed while the project is being implemented. In many cases these processes take long and fail to influence project outcomes.



Item No	Project name	Lessons
23	Production Through Conservation (1990-1996) ^{237 238}	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The chiefs perceived development differently from the target population. • Chieftainship institutions enjoy little support from the central government to improve their administrative capacity and leadership quality. • The village administration is, in most instances, run single-handedly by the chiefs without the requisite transparency and accountability. • The community members lack the forum to voice their development aspirations or to make demands on the authorities. • Villagers have lost interest and respect for their village institutions. • Projects and government service institutions are fragmented. • Departments fail to provide a wide range of options appropriate to the divergent aspirations of individuals with different social and economic backgrounds.
27	Conserving Mountain Biodiversity in Southern Lesotho, 1995 (CMBSL) LES/97/G31/B/1G/99 ²³⁹	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Biodiversity conservation projects need to be preceded by comprehensive situation analyses covering biodiversity, and social and economic conditions at the proposed sites. • Institutional capacity limitations are a common feature among most government entities in developing countries. • For a project to be successful, among other things, it must have a “champion” - somebody or some institution that is determined that it achieves its stated objectives. • There is a strong need in projects concerning biodiversity conservation to have regular technical input from conservation or biological scientists, particularly if such skills are not available on the project staff. As seen here, the initial conservation objective can be lost sight of, or poor technical decisions made regarding conservation interventions. This technical input is ideally in the form of a backstopping technical agency or could be in the form of regular advisory consultancies. It should also be consistent and not a “pick and choose” approach. Regular monitoring and supervision from GEF are also essential. • Modalities, and the relative strengths of implementing departments and agencies, need to be carefully appraised during project formulation. Changes to them (such as rearrangement of ministries and departments) should be addressed, if need be, by changes in project design, rather than by minor modifications. Many countries lack capacity in key areas which is part of the justification for donor support. These limitations in capacity should not be unduly strained by project demands such that they become the weak links and causes of project failure. Empowerment for sustainability should be the central aim. • Steering committees, however well-constituted, can lack the ability to have a significant influence or redirect a project. • Participatory management is a good idea, but if things go wrong, one needs clearly defined responsibilities if the problem is to be solved. • The sites at which a project will work need to be clearly articulated during the formulation stage. Likewise, the type of activities that will take place there, targets and expected achievements ought to be specified in the log frame. • Monitoring and evaluation modalities need to be thought through during the formulation stage and adhered to during implementation. • Regular external review missions are important.

237 Marake, M. V, with contributions from Shone, G. J. Carlsson. Y. Khatiwada and M. Segerros. 1998. The Production through Conservation (PTC) Programme. 1981-1996. A Historical Document.

238 Mashinini, V. I 2000 Sustainable Rural Development in Lesotho. PhD Thesis. Department of Geography, Faculty of Science at the University of Orange Free State, South Africa.

239 Oliver Chapeyama and Taelo Letšela. 2006. Conserving Mountain Biodiversity in Southern Lesotho (Cmbsl). Final Evaluation (Project Number LES/97/G31/B/1G/99).

Recommendations	Remarks
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • PTC was found to represent a significant breakthrough in approaches to achieving conservation-effective rural development in Lesotho. It was found to use the enthusiasm of the people as well as their skill and local knowledge. • The sustainability of the project approach depended on how the government would apply it country-wide. • The approach of PTC was lauded as having promise and had the potential to be used nationwide. This was because it had successfully changed the attitudes of planners, experts and development practitioners.
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Carry out baseline studies for biodiversity conservation projects. • Limitations can be addressed through the involvement of civil society entities working to compliment government efforts. • The engagement of people with appropriate technical skills to manage projects will ensure that appropriate action is taken to correct misdirected project initiatives. • Have a project champion that can be looked up to by those involved. • Steering committee members need to be well-informed, have continuity and commitment of membership, and be able to actively influence progress if required. • NES should re-engage with relevant government entities proposing biodiversity conservation projects involving community groups in the former project areas. They must ensure that the high levels of motivation that are evident among these communities for involvement in future conservation programmes are marshalled and put to effective use. • Some useful studies have been conducted on the biodiversity and tourism potential of the southern mountains of Lesotho as part of the CMBSL initiative. These need to be properly packaged for use by ongoing and future initiatives. These could also lay the foundation for a body of knowledge about this important eco-region in Lesotho. • The CMBSL experience with the approach of using the PIU model for project management should be documented and shared with other government entities so that the experience is used to inform choices of project management models in future. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Biodiversity conservation projects need to be preceded by comprehensive situation analyses covering biodiversity, and social and economic conditions at the proposed sites. • Institutional capacity limitations are a common feature among most government entities in developing countries. • For a project to be successful, among other things it must have a “champion” - somebody or some institution that is determined that it achieves its stated objectives. • There is a strong need in projects concerning biodiversity conservation to have regular technical input from conservation or biological scientists, particularly if such skills are not available on the project staff. As seen here, the initial conservation objective can be lost sight of, or poor technical decisions made regarding conservation interventions. • This technical input is ideally in the form of a backstopping technical agency or could be in the form of regular advisory consultancies. It should also be consistent and not a “pick and choose” approach. Regular monitoring and supervision from GEF are also essential. • Modalities, and the relative strengths of implementing departments and agencies, need to be carefully appraised during project formulation. Changes to them (such as rearrangement of ministries and departments) should be addressed, if need be, by changes in project design, rather than by minor modifications. Many countries lack capacity in key areas which is part of the justification for donor support. These limitations in capacity should not be unduly strained by project demands such that they become the weak links and causes of project failure. Empowerment for sustainability should be the central aim. • Steering committees, however well-constituted, can lack the ability to have a significant influence or redirect a project. • Participatory management is a good idea, but if things go wrong, one needs clearly defined responsibilities if the problem is to be solved. • The sites at which a project will work need to be clearly articulated during the formulation stage. Likewise, the type of activities that will take place there, targets and expected achievements ought to be specified in the log frame. • Monitoring and evaluation modalities need to be thought through during the formulation stage and adhered to during implementation. • Regular external review missions are important.

Table 4a-iv. Lessons learned from 2000-2009 projects

Item No	Project name	Lessons
32	LHDA Contract 1044 Integrated Catchment Management Project in Phase I Areas of the Lesotho Highlands Water Project (2004-2010) ²⁴⁰	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Ultimately, the success of the established catchment-level and community-level institutions will be determined by the success of decentralisation. • Achieving early and ongoing tangible results in the field is important for motivating and maintaining a positive and supportive work environment. • Alignment of project priorities and community priorities. The lesson learned was that "...the communities in the highlands do not all perceive problems related to resources management as their top concern for external assistance and that if they were given funding and asked to carry out whatever development activity they wanted, it is likely that activity would not involve improving resources management". • Hiring and using local community level coordinators facilitates easy organisation and mobilising of communities. • A key element of the ICM approach is wide participation of stakeholders, especially the communities. • Timely and proper counterpartying for capacity building of staff. • Farmers are reluctant to test practices on their best land (fields). • Weak enforcement of land use and grazing management plans by community structures. • Expectancy of handouts and/or payments to implement communal activities. • Full integration and harmonisation of plans among all stakeholder is a long-term goal. • Communities generally understood the need and benefits of soil conservation measures. However, community members were not willing to construct/install the measures on their communal land without payment for the labour. • Field owners are interested in protecting their marginal fields with buffer strips but are not willing to install them where they will reduce the productive area of the field. • Communities are interested in planting trees for fuelwood at their homes and communal areas without pay. • Keyholes gardens for vegetable production were popular and community members learned from each other. • Environmental education in schools was popular. • Community ICM meetings, pitsos and brochures help raise environmental awareness.

Recommendations	Remarks
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • That the counterparts should be retained to work on ICM after the end of the project to ensure that the achievements of the project are not lost. • For resources inventory, studies and/or reviews be conducted annually to update the inventory. • Integrated Catchment Management Plans (ICMPs) be reviewed and updated/ revised annually in consultation with communities, local leaders and relevant stakeholders. New ICMPs be developed for any new areas where ICM may be expanded/ extended. • LHDA, together with the relevant government ministries and catchment management institutions, continue working closely with pilot area communities and individuals to train and encourage adoption of the ICM-promoted activities. • The monitoring and evaluation of all ICM activities of the past and in the future should continue for many years after the activities are completed as impacts may be seen several years after activities are implemented. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Consultations with communities were made on programming and activities but not on decisions of resource allocations. Wrong assumptions were made about some aspects of the project such as that local communities would agree to carry out labour intensive soil conservation activities for no pay, but they refused to do so. But as it turned out, they were ready to undertake work on their fields and homesteads without being paid. • The project was feasible and well-conceived but potentially very complex. It needed a much longer period and an overlap between the pilot and the extension to new areas to maintain the learning momentum while at the same time embedding the approach through its application over a long period of time. • The context at the start was the GoL decentralisation and all efforts were made to align with an integrated implementation approach in a situation where ministries have always worked in silos. The project was, to a large extent, able to get the different entities to work together and was able to achieve a fair amount of success. The project was able to develop local capacity for the implementation. • The counterpart staff had only a maximum of two years before they were to take control of the project which was unrealistic. • Being a consultant developed and managed project, the development of the monitoring programme was detailed and well-defined. In addition, the monitoring programme was revised and revamped based on the experiences from project implementation. The end result was a robust plan that was not only able to track project implementation at the activity and outcomes level but laid a foundation for good post-project monitoring. It is therefore unfortunate that LHDA then showed reluctance to commit to a post-pilot project that would use the extensive monitoring programme. • Although LHDA did not continue with the project, communities continued to implement those aspects that were of direct benefit to them. This implies that there are aspects of the project that communities needed or wanted and which they perceived to be important to their daily lives. • Challenges to the project included issues brought about by the compensation programmes and the historic payments for conservation activities. A most startling challenge is LHDA's reluctance to fully commit long-term to the ICM program. • The project made a flawed assumption that communities would implement and monitor the plans on their own with their resources. When this did not happen they were said to be uncooperative.

Item No	Project name	Lessons
33	Sustainable Agriculture and Natural Resource Management Programme (2005-2011) ²⁴¹	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Successful implementation requires improved staff capacity. Involvement and good performance of the extension service was critical to the implementation of programme activities, but was below expectation. • A more integrated approach in smaller areas is preferable. An integrated watershed management approach would be more effective than isolated programme activities scattered over a large geographical area. The implementation of different conservation and production-related activities in a coordinated manner can demonstrate how these activities can relate to and reinforce each other. • Successful implementation requires ownership, proactive and committed management, and improved staff capacity at all levels. • Institutional framework should ensure ownership at all levels. The SANReMP was not well integrated in government operations due to ownership and poor coordination amongst the central and district-level institutions. Efforts made to integrate land and water activities with crop and livestock production had limited success due to poor coordination between the MAFS and the MFLR. • Cost-sharing and beneficiary contributions must be clearly defined, enforced and recorded. In order to ensure the sustainability of services following programme completion, it is advisable to institute cost-sharing principles and user fees from the outset of implementation to the extent feasible. • Future IFAD operations in Lesotho should support market linkages and a value chain approach. • Rural financial services. The lack of short- and medium-term finance was a serious constraint to the access of inputs on which increased productivity is largely dependent. • Effective M&E systems are a key success factor. An effective M&E system needs to feed continuously into programme management with operational, financial and other information on programme performance in order to take timely and appropriate management decisions. Developing efficient and effective monitoring systems should begin at programme start-up, with the help of external specialists. Baseline and impact studies must be conducted in a timely fashion and be clearly interlinked. District staff should be provided appropriate training, including record keeping and report writing, as well as on requirements regarding data collection, analysis and submission.
36	Lesotho Wetlands Restoration and Conservation Project (2008-2013) ²⁴²	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Ecologs, sack gabions and rock packs are effective in stopping small gully incisions. • Ecologs, sack gabions and rock packs are highly replicable due to their low cost and limited environmental footprint. • The sustainability of the structures is threatened by the action of the endemic ice rat within and around the structures. • A major limiting factor in the restoration was the limited effort in active re-vegetation of the bare soil areas and in encouraging and enforcing sustainable grazing practices in the pilot catchments. • Any roll-out of restoration measures in other catchments requires a clear framework for planning, design, implementing and monitoring of the structures. • Bio-physical monitoring has been very challenging in terms of loss/ failure of equipment. • Outreach activities were very effective as stakeholders in the project areas became generally well aware of wetland degradation and the consequences. • Stakeholders, even herders, appear willing to change grazing patterns. • Decisive leadership and enforcement measures are required to achieve sustainable grazing patterns. • Alternative livelihood activities have partly been effective due to a range of factors, including the failure to undertake a proper situation analysis at the start. The activities are unlikely to result in reduced grazing pressure on the wetlands or changed grazing patterns. • Several policies exist that relate directly or indirectly to wetlands. All are too broad and overly ambitious to be effective, while many policies do not find their way to implementable strategies. • Capacities at the national level to deal with wetlands are not just constrained by a wide distribution of roles and responsibilities, they are also very limited in terms of human and financial resources. • Capacities are even more modest and over-stretched at the sub-national level than at the national level.

²⁴¹ Evaluation Report No. 3379-LS 2014. By the Independent Office of Evaluation (IOE). 6-16 March 2013.

²⁴² Mott MacDonald in Association with Green's Integrated Services. 2013. Strategic Performance Assessment of the Lesotho Wetlands Restoration and Conservation Project. Final Report. Millennium Challenge Account Lesotho Contract No. WS-F-045-12.

Recommendations	Remarks
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Institutional framework should ensure ownership at all levels. Although programme implementation was carried out by established government institutions, ranging from the local chiefs and district administrators to the various ministries and agencies in Maseru, the SANReMP was not well integrated in government operations due to poor ownership and coordination amongst the central and district-level institutions. • Cost-sharing and beneficiary contributions must be clearly defined, enforced and recorded. In order to ensure the sustainability of services following programme completion, it is advisable to institute cost-sharing principles and user fees from the outset of implementation to the extent feasible. • Future IFAD operations in Lesotho should support market linkages and a value chain approach. Marketing under the SANReMP was touched upon very slightly, mostly in connection with the wool and mohair growers' associations. Future IFAD-funded projects need to provide institutional support for various marketing activities at several levels. This includes assistance to farmers, farmer groups and entrepreneurs for establishment of credit, initial operation of marketing associations of agricultural produce, purchase of inputs, private small- and medium-scale processing plants, and quality testing. • Rural financial services. The lack of short- and medium-term finance is a serious constraint to the access of inputs on which increased productivity is largely dependent. Landless and poor farmers need to rely on credit opportunities for on-farm investments and off-farm income generation. • IFAD visibility. SANReMP productive resources were spread too thinly so that programme visibility was poor. IFAD's activities in Lesotho are not well known to the programme beneficiaries and clients, let alone the general public. In future, IFAD's operations in Lesotho could benefit from a more proactive communications and dissemination activity and resources should be invested in a manner that would enhance the IFAD visibility in the country. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Although the SANReMP project was a successor to a number of other IFAD projects, it has suffered a fate similar to many others. The main reason for its sub-par performance is the poor support from GoL parent ministries and the operational level (district). The project was initiated as a response to the drought at the time and focused largely on improving food security, family nutrition and household incomes in Mafeteng, Mohale's Hoek and Quthing. Its design focused on creating a conducive environment to achieve this goal. • Typically, when addressing food security, the project focused more on access to food and not food security itself. Food security does not have to only address access to food that is produced but should embrace the fact that one should also be able to sell some of the produce and have access to resources to purchase food at a later stage. That being the case, the project, and others, should have addressed the marketing more vigorously and should have established a vibrant marketing system with correct linkages and points of aggregation and transport using local players.
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Have a Project Implementation Unit as the nucleus for any new, major efforts on wetlands. This can only be an efficient arrangement for short-lived tasks, primarily at national level. A PIU or PMU cannot effectively design, develop, organise and manage a complex, nation-wide programme that needs solid inputs from existing departments, local government and civil society. • Continuing the current fragmentation of roles is not an option. This will not be adequate in case more extensive, dynamic and coherent attention needs to be given to wetlands matters. • Selecting a lead agency from among the currently involved departments is not ideal. None of the currently involved departments fully qualifies for becoming the lead agency and it is likely that, whatever arrangements are made, inputs from all departments will continue to be required. It may, however, be considered to assign some lead roles to one of the key departments. • Not to invest substantially in developing or adjusting policies. • Serious attention is given to developing and agreeing on strategic plans for the work on wetlands by the various departments. • There is an urgent need and sound justification for a new, substantial programme on wetlands restoration, conservation and management. The most important justification for a new wetlands programme lies in the urgency and magnitude of the threats. • The focus of future work on wetlands should mostly be on addressing key implementation issues and on facilitating large-scale implementation. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • It was not a project designed with a predetermined endpoint but with an inherent flexibility to monitor progress, learn lessons and adjust the approach and implementation accordingly. Pilot projects are, by definition, projects whose main accomplishments are to provide indicators of what will and will not work. • Later socio-economic studies provide a more solid base, although it remains unclear to what extent the recommendations resulting from these studies were used by the project. • The project did not have resources to specifically work on institutional topics. Consequently, it was not able to influence national leadership regarding wetlands. There is no clear political support, linkages among stakeholders are limited, and there is no political linkage between wetland conservation and water production. In summary, lessons learned, and unresolved issues include: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Overlapping jurisdictions of institutions with control over the same natural resources. - Ineffective grazing control. - Non-sustainability of the existing rural economy. - Complexity of local government. - The lack of a strong political will for wetlands conservation and management. - Lack of financing of wetlands work. - The need for low-cost measures and structures to restore, conserve and manage wetlands and the unaffordability of several methods and approaches developed under the WRCP for replication on a large and wider scale. • The SPA team identified the 11 priority areas for strategic direction to achieve wetlands conservation at local, district and national levels:

Item No	Project name	Lessons
37	The Rural Finance Intermediation Programme (2008-2015) ²⁴³	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • There is weak internal budget control, and poor procurement planning and management, and record keeping. Neither of the two management committees meet to provide guidance. • Delays in contracting NGOs reduce the likelihood of reaching targets. • No exact data of the sustainability of the FCs and groups promoted by the DOC and MAFS is available.
39	Capacity Building and Knowledge Management for Sustainable Land Management (2009-2016) ²⁴⁴	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The basis for project design should be a theory of change so that a clear strategy for connecting and sequencing outputs to deliver the intended targets is developed. • Using existing information will help to design better projects and avoid redesign once implementation starts, which is costly in management time. • The IGAs seem to have been instrumental in promoting community cohesion and may therefore be considered as an integral part of a community-based range management strategy. • It is well understood that communities need to see benefits accruing to them from their investment of time in group range management schemes. • The management team was too thinly spread and this negatively affected project results. Getting an adequate management team in place to cover all bases may be seen as costly, but with the right people in place, it is an investment in project success. • Implementation would have worked better had it been based on a meaningful partnership model, delegating authority to competent agencies within and outside the private sector where the expertise and experience lies. • Work to implement the GA system should be carried out from the field in order to make the funds go further and crucially, to provide a better service to communities. • The land degradation issue in Lesotho needs a sustained, longer term effort that approaches the problem from an integrated systems perspective. This means that it requires the effective inputs from a multi-disciplinary team of implementing partners to use their respective expertise and ideas, calling for effective coordination. The disciplines that SLM needs to cover include agriculture, livestock management, veterinary services, energy, water, marketing, economics, institutional development, training, and transport. This implies the need for larger programmatic projects. Small budgets will still be useful but should be focused on delivering results in niche areas with working connections to the bigger whole.

243 IFAD President's Report. Proposed loan and grant to the Kingdom of Lesotho for the Rural Financial Intermediation Programme. Approval. 2007.

244 Troni, J and Matsumunyane. M. 2015. Terminal Evaluation of the 'Capacity Building and Knowledge Management for Sustainable Land Management in Lesotho project. UNDP/GEF.

245 These recommendations have been edited for brevity (Troni & Molupe 2015. pp 93-98).

Recommendations	Remarks
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Board of LPB to decide on appropriate strategy for the banks. If done, MoU between RUFIP and LPB to be signed on future cooperation. • PCU, with the support of the Ministry of Finance, needs to improve coordination of programme activities and build on synergies with other programmes. • Contracts with CARE and CRS on VSLA promotion to be signed for two years. • M&E capacity needs to be raised in RUFIP, particularly as project completion approaches. 	<p>A key learning aspect was the vulnerability of state-owned banks such as LPB to changes in their top management, particularly if this is combined with weak control by the board. After the board approved a new strategy for the bank, which was clearly against the LPB mandate and RUFIP objectives, the benefits from earlier RUFIP investments in the bank became doubtful, resulting correctly in the suspension of disbursements to this component.</p>
<p>Promoting better coordination and collaboration between ministries</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Constitute a Strategic Investment Programme Board. Better ways must be found to engage other ministries for cross-government learning and strengthened policy making. • Establish a programmatic approach to dual-focused project steering committee meetings. • Incentivising ministry staff to work with the project through non-monetary means. This strategy should be considered a sustainability strategy as institutional support makes or breaks a project. • Improving the performance of ministry staff. • Consider how ministry staff time is used. A greater de-concentration of ministry staff would deliver better support services to communities and help to support continuation of these GAs. <p>Develop training standards for communities.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Use the CSIF as a platform to mainstream SLM in the next iteration of the National Strategic Development Plan. • Management policy. • Policy needs should frame the efforts on knowledge management and project data monitoring. <p>Developing the range management governance model</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Develop evaluative case studies on the different models under operation and success factors. This can inform policy decisions on implementation strategies regarding range management. • Support the continuation of the district-level project implementation forums which have received good feedback in bringing all relevant parties together. • Develop an engagement strategy with the chiefs - since they are a critical part of the range management system - while the new system of democratic governance phases in, which could be a 10-year medium-term process. • Community empowerment is part of the solution. Farmer-to-farmer learning blended with more conventional training should be continued as should support of CSOs and NGOs in areas where they are already working. <p>Improving management efficiency</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Develop cost-output benchmarks that can be used for budget planning and control. • Training workstreams should be subcontracted to professional training organisations, working to develop the materials and training plan, possibly in partnership with the Lesotho civil service training institute.²⁴⁵ 	<p>The terminal evaluation notes as follows: “The findings indicate that sustainability is possible but that it needs continued support. Institutional sustainability is possible though not yet achieved. The exit plan recommended that MFLR continue to support the communities and scale up its support to operationalising and maintaining community group structures and range management plans”. This a common finding for most natural resource management projects. The time span of projects is usually short and GoL is unable to implement the exit plans which usually require activities to be continued.</p>

Table 4a-v. Lessons learned from 2010-2020 projects

Item No	Project name	Lessons
41	Lesotho Adaptation of Small-Scale Agricultural Production (LASAP) (2011-2015) ²⁴⁶	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Close connection and articulation between the GEF project and its baseline “parent” project is essential to achieving multiplied results for both projects. • The role of extension workers and their ownership of resilience issues is key to achieving long-term transformation of the agricultural sector. • Because so many countries face constraints in ensuring the operations of their extension service, the project not only benefits from the strength of the Lesotho extension service, but also will provide additional capacity building, tools and methods that can be owned and deployed by the government on a larger scale in the future.
45	Smallholder Agriculture Development Project I and II (2011 –2020) ²⁴⁷	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • When a project aims to promote commercial agriculture, a mix of activities including investments and institutional support is critical. • Assessing critical conditions during project preparation is important for ensuring the achievement of intended outcomes. • This project was able to change the mind-sets of smallholder agricultural producers, but the ICR did not provide any evidence to back up those claims. • The provision of financial capital needs to be combined with building resilience of agribusinesses to climate shocks.

246 Project Document 12-26-2013_ID4453_Projdoc.pdf.

247 World Bank. Appraisal Report for Smallholder Agricultural Development Project. 2011. Report No: 64990-LS.

Recommendations	Remarks
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Close integration will be achieved by embedding LASAP project staff into the SADP existing PMU and project structure. • Strengthen extension services and provide additional capacity building, tools and methods that can be owned and deployed by the government. • Promote an increased awareness among smallholders of the economic benefits they can accrue and maintain in the long term by adopting adaptive approaches. 	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The provision of financial capital needs to be combined with building resilience of agribusinesses to climate shocks. • The importance of farmers having incentives to work together in groups should be sufficiently identified during project preparation to ensure that sub-projects are sustainable and performed efficiently. 	<p>It is noteworthy that the original and revised objectives of the project were not sufficiently specific. The original and revised objectives did not clearly state what outcomes were to be achieved through increasing marketed output among project beneficiaries in Lesotho's smallholder agriculture sector. Therefore, the theory of change and how key activities and outputs were to result in the intended outcomes was not clear.</p> <p>It must be noted that the project went ahead despite the risk of weak implementation capacity and several other substantial risks. Mitigation measures identified did not work.</p> <p>While this project did not address harsh weather and climatic events in its project design, it was sufficiently flexible to introduce climate-smart agriculture practices and activities during project implementation resulting in long-term climate resilience by project beneficiaries.</p>



Item No	Project name	Lessons
46	Khubelu “SPONGES” Pilot Project (2013-2015) ^{248 249 250 251 252}	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Visits to illustrated success story sites sped up understanding of holistic grazing and its potential for environmental protection, rehabilitation and economic development, to livestock farmers in the area. • Rural communities, especially farmers, are trainable and capable of leading developments that affect their lives and livelihoods. • The concept of holistic management became well understood and the majority of participants would like to implement the concept. • Farmers who practice holistic grazing already reported a general health status improvement of their livestock. • Ice rat infestation is an indicator of degradation of the wetlands, not a cause. Ice rats require non-waterlogged soils for their burrows; therefore, healthy peat forming hydric soils do not contain ice rat burrows. Therefore, maintaining a high-water table on the total habitat area can reduce, but not totally eliminate, ice rat infestation. • Poorly defined roles among institutions involved in grazing management creates a challenge in the implementation of holistic management in the biological rehabilitation intervention. This is because both high-density grazing and mobile kraaling require mixing of livestock which currently is of very different conditions. • Herders are a critical component in successful livestock agriculture, but currently their labour rights are not adequately addressed. • It has been identified that land degradation results from overgrazing and over-resting of plants. This happens when livestock are given the opportunity to graze selectively. This occurs where herders operate in a harsh environment and are not adequately protected against the elements. They therefore seek refuge away from the animals and leave them to graze selectively. • Knowledge management and documentation of the interventions is not systematised. The lessons contained in these documents should; be compiled into a single document and distributed widely especially among the stakeholders that have participated in enabling their discovery.

248 Orange-Senqu River Basin/ORASECOM Transboundary Diagnostic Analysis.

249 TCC, DHI and PEM Consult. 2008. Feasibility Study of the Protection of Orange-Senqu River Water Sources ('Sponges' Project): Final Report. Report Number ORASECOM 004/2008.

250 Sefali. N. 2014. Khubelu Sponges Midterm Report. Trans-boundary Water Management in SADC Programme Protection of the Orange-Senqu Water Sources (Sponge)- Project Lesotho.

251 Schusser. C. 2015. Lessons Learnt Report. Transboundary Water Management in SADC Programme Protection of the Orange-Senqu Water Sources (Sponge)- Project Lesotho.

252 Chakela. Q and Green. T. 2017. End-of-Pilot Project Report. Transboundary Water Management In SADC Programme Protection of the Orange-Senqu Water Sources (Sponge Project).

Recommendations	Remarks
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • To monitor livestock movement, have a number of animals that have electronic tags that can be tracked by satellite or through the GSM infrastructure. • The use of concrete physical structures in wetland rehabilitation is discouraged. Their installation is very expensive. The time needed to build them is long and the summer window period when the work can be done is short. They are an eyesore. They have an extensive and long-lasting footprint from vehicles that bring materials to site. They create areas of desiccation where ice rats seem to thrive. Due to their logistical requirements, it will not be possible to use them in some of the very remote sites when activities are scaled up. One alternative is the use of sharpened wooden staves that are then impact-driven into the soil. These would then be packed on the upper end with shrubs (e.g. sehalahala) that are removed from the surrounding area. • There is a need to increase the number of local community groups in the activities to enhance the potential for successful interventions in the interest of all residents of the project area. The project should work on empowering local groups to act as watchdogs of the work of those directly involved. • The involvement of traditional herbal practitioners is essential and critical in removing shrubs. This should not only be done in consideration of grazing potential but to protect medicinal plants and utility grasses (hat, rope, and mat-making plants) etc. • Use of drones with video cameras that are programmed to fly over designated areas to monitor both illegal grazing and the use of high density grazing and kraaling. • Hiring rangers who are equipped with cameras - preferably video cameras - to take footage of animals that are grazing illegally on the rangelands and whose herders are not complying with stipulated grazing patterns. • For the capacity building efforts to be sustained, the Department of Range Resource Management, through its field officers, should develop an effective strategy to monitor the work of GAs and intervene where necessary. • It is therefore recommended that a system of certification for both farmers and herders be developed, similar to a trading license, which can be revoked if the farmer/or herder contravenes the principles of good land husbandry. 	<p>The pilot project's objective to rehabilitate the wetland and the related interventions are relevant to the efforts to protect and conserve this natural resource of great importance to local communities, Lesotho nationals and the SADCC region.</p> <p>The pilot project was effective in demonstrating that wetland degradation can be ameliorated by applying physical measures. Removal of shrubs as part of biological measures works while intensive grazing improves pasture quality.</p> <p>The use of concrete structures was not efficient and had negative impacts on the wetlands. Biological measures should be used.</p> <p>The impacts of most measures were immediate but would not be maintained in the long run. Uncontrolled grazing will negate positive impacts of intensive grazing and concrete structures will need expensive maintenance and the coordination work of local institutional structures will not survive post the project.</p> <p>The use of physical structures is not sustainable because they would be too expensive to scale for the large areas that require attention. GoL does not have resources to continue maintenance and monitoring activities to sustain the work started by the project.</p>

Item No	Project name	Lessons
48	Wool and Mohair Promotion Project (WAMPP) (2014-to date) ^{253 254}	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Project Field Office should be better integrated in the programme, provided with adequate operational resources, and encouraged to bring lessons from the ground to feed into planning of operational activities at national level. • Development of AWPB should start from district level to ensure it is “fit for purpose”. • Joint planning of activities. Activities in the three technical components should be planned jointly, involving all technical staff and PFOs, in order to improve component synergies and interlinkages at operational level. • To enhance PCU staff retention, decisions to remove staff members should only be performance-based. Justified staff changes should be assessed and endorsed by PSC, with proper overlap plans to allow business continuity. • The Participatory Integrated Climate Services for Agriculture Approach (PICSA) is an approach that seeks to build resilience at the farm level by supporting decision-making through the integration of information on location-specific climate, crops, livestock, and livelihoods. It emphasises practical hands-on methods that can easily be used and understood by farmers by integrating livelihood alternatives to those on-farm. Extension service workers are trained on PICSA and they train farmers. • It was good to see the strong link between M&E and climate adaptation activities. Solid evidence on PICSA would be very helpful as this seems a promising innovation. • Disbursement pressure overtook project committee engagement. The WAMPP project had a slow start-up and lagged disbursement, especially on time bound OFID funds. IFAD escalated this situation to the PS MAFS in Nov 2017 and March 2018, which led to increased attention to the project at PS level. Consequently, the project did speed up implementation and disbursement. Yet, consultation through planned committee work at national and district level became more erratic, leading to lack of ownership and awareness by certain key stakeholders (especially at district level).
50	Strengthening Capacity for Climate Change Adaptation through Support to Integrated Watershed Management Programme in Lesotho (2015-2019) ²⁵⁵	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Livelihoods and other pressing needs (water, food security) must be at the heart of sustainable development initiatives for them to gain traction. • Decentralised elements of the project team were successful. • The Project Steering Committee must be composed of members with some programmatic clout who can influence work in their own divisions/departments to complement the project. • Although climate data is available, it still does not meet the needs or expectations of users at the local level. • Having an NPC working in the government offices is beneficial for project ownership, alignment of the project with national programmes, capacity building, and the retention of skills in the government. • Project Steering Committee budget costs should include modest costs related to Project Steering Committee site visits, which can be paid for by co-financing. • The lack of a dedicated M&E staff member was perceived as a weakness in monitoring project progress and measuring results. • For any physical work, additional FAO oversight should be ensured beyond the government processes. • Training on FAO procurement policies must be carried out as soon as staff are retained for future projects. Lessons learned from procurement challenges should be documented by the project.

253 IFAD. 2014. Wool and Mohair Promotion Project (WAMPP) Final project design report. Main report and appendices. Report No. 3549-LS. Project NO. 1673.

254 IFAD. 2020. Wool and Mohair Promotion Project (WAMPP) Mid-term Review. Main report and appendices. Report No. 5318-LS. Project NO. 2000000053.

255 FAO. 2021. Terminal evaluation of the project “Strengthening capacity for climate change adaptation through support to integrated watershed management in Lesotho” Project symbol: GCP/LES/049/LDF GEF ID: 5124.

Recommendations	Remarks
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Partial restructuring of component A2 affecting the budget allocation and implementation arrangements by adding a third-party for fast-tracking the planned activities implementation of planned activities. • Reallocation of OFID funds from A to B and C, and revision of current AWBP and PP in line with updated costs and timelines as discussed with the mission. • Strong attention to post-project sustainability for set of activities under component B in the form of strengthening the growers association to take over full responsibility as the project approaches closing date. • Increased attention to project-related inter-ministerial communication and coordination at national and district level to ensure this multi-sectoral value chain project can achieve its objective. 	<p>The project was affected by sub-par management and coordination between the various ministries and other stakeholders. There was poor financial management and accountability. Poor M&E also meant poor impact and progress assessment.</p> <p>Of direct relevance to ICM is the range management component of the project. Despite extensive experience with GAs in Lesotho, from as far back as the US funded project in Sehlabathebe and Ramatseliso is Qacha's Nek, the current project does not seem to have taken into consideration lessons learned. Therefore, it did not implement the component directed at achieving the objective to "establish a sustainable system of communal grazing and rangeland management with the objective of improving livestock nutrition and maximizing production and returns for smallholder wool and mohair producers". The activities that have to be undertaken to achieve this will require extensive consultations with members of GAs and communities. Central to discussions will be rights and responsibilities and to define the range land resources which community members have the right to use. The design document shows that "WAMPP will take a community-based approach to delineating grazing areas, establishing stocking rates and developing grazing plans, following a participatory rangeland management methodology". The project is unlikely to be able to fully achieve its objectives since at the time of the MTR not much had been done and a six-month recovery plan was only then being developed.</p> <p>Our view is that ICM-related projects have prioritised activities aimed at engaging with communities on natural resource management. These should start early in the life of the project and give consistent attention to communication with communities.</p> <p>We regard the involvement of the LNWMGA as a positive and necessary aspect in NRM as NGOs have a greater interest and potential accountability than GoL institutions. NGOs such as the LNWMGA have a narrow and commercial focus and are likely to ensure sustainability of initiatives.</p>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Ensure that project indicators mainstream gender issues. • Develop case studies to showcase how women's circumstances were improved through the project, examining their livelihoods, and economic, social and environmental factors. • Showcase local conflict management strategies and attempts to share natural resource management information so that they may be replicated and upscaled. This should take place in Sesotho and include the role that traditional leadership played to capture and understand the nuances of this process. It would be useful to showcase some of the downscaled examples of conflict resolution that could be replicated elsewhere to improve community resource management. • For future projects, FAO/GEF should consider providing funds to conduct a socio-economic survey in a timely manner, involving the project participants in tracking changes. • Alternative livelihood activities promoted by the project should be followed up by the relevant project partners to ensure their sustainability and verify whether they require any additional inputs. 	<p>The project was successful in achieving all but one of its outcomes satisfactorily. It provided wide-ranging, capacity-building initiatives to the government and local beneficiaries to enhance their skills and abilities in carrying out SLM/W activities, resulting in global environmental benefits such as restored landscapes, landscapes under improved practices, and strengthened biodiversity.</p> <p>The conservation of rehabilitated wetlands, the establishment of orchards, and improved management of water resources had visible effects on local communities. In particular, the project piloted a number of SLM/W practices to address the shortages of water experienced by many, thereby improving the quality of life and security of community members.</p> <p>The project was implemented over the course of three political administrations. While these changes added burdens on project staff, the project was structured so that its outputs can be used by different governments, demonstrating political sustainability. This shows that the project design was robust.</p> <p>The project was perceived by stakeholders as bringing diverse stakeholders together (e.g. government agencies, NGOs such as the CRS, and local communities) and allowing them to engage.</p>

Item No	Project name	Lessons
51	Reducing vulnerability from climate change in the Foothills, Lowlands and the Lower Senqu River Basin (2015-2020)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Livelihoods and other pressing needs (water, food security) must be at the heart of sustainable development initiatives for them to gain traction. • The project was able to manage this by creating an ongoing presence at the local level, leaning on social structures (chiefs, grazing associations, lending groups, and nutrition groups) and including people in a learning-by-doing approach. However, the question of incentives in how to motivate people to work on communal projects without financial gain will be an ongoing challenge for other projects. • Decentralised elements of the project team were successful. Having people residing in the districts where activities are underway creates stronger linkages, and better opportunities for feedback and adaptive management. It also fosters a culture of trust among stakeholders. • The Project Steering Committee must be composed of members with some programmatic clout who can influence work in their own divisions/departments to complement the project. This would ensure greater ownership of project activities, synergies and buy-in from the national government. Project Steering Committees often play a rubber-stamping role, however, inviting members for field visits and oversight missions can be extremely beneficial. • Although climate data is available, it still does not meet the needs or expectations of users at the local level. These needs must be clarified since there is a gap in communications and expectations. • Having an NPC working in the government offices is beneficial for project ownership, alignment of the project with national programmes, capacity building, and the retention of skills in the government. However, the salary of this position should be commensurate with expectations of a United Nations project for purposes of equity with the rest of the project team financed by the project. • Project Steering Committee should take steps to facilitate their access to the project sites. The Project Steering Committee participation was seen as a strength of this project, which was partially due to the site visits they made. To avoid financing issues, this should be added to the co-financing budget.

Recommendations	Remarks
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The challenge is to maintain interest in communal sustainable development initiatives that do not directly yield income. • Gender-disaggregated indicators, baselines and targets should be developed. • The results framework should be significantly adjusted. • The project should accelerate delivery on outcome 3 and 7 outputs. • Project government structures at sub-national level (DPCC and DPIC) should be adjusted to increase the visibility of community councils, contributing to decentralisation and not only to de-concentration. This could entail involving more representatives from community councils. A conversation on this should be held with the local governments. Coordination with district officers should be strengthened, including visits to project sites. • MU should strengthen its work in documenting lessons. This should be informed by the national and on-the-ground M&E systems. PMU should start by documenting all the lessons that can be already drawn and are not necessarily indicated in quarterly or annual reports, collating them in one document. • At both the national and sub-national levels the project should provide more capacity building support, including training, study tours and equipment for some aspects, such as GIS. At the sub-national level, the project should further support existing institutional structures similar to project structures, namely the Forum of Heads of Department and the Local Planning Unit. • The project should try to help local governments use the guidelines developed by the project when preparing the new local development plans. • The project should help establish grazing associations for all rehabilitated land, ensuring adequate rules, monitoring and enforcement systems are put in place. • FFS should further be promoted as a way of demonstrating benefits and building local experts that can train others when the project phases out. The project should also provide more training, including on food production and conservation, trimming of fruit trees, beekeeping, poultry management and improvement of local cows. Herd boys should be included in training on rangeland management. • The project should promote existing associations or cooperatives as well as the creation of new ones to boost IGAs, as these structures facilitate access to inputs, technical advice and markets, including financial services. They could contribute to minimising encroachment, although the project may consider providing some fences to protect gardens and orchards in the short term. 	<p>At midterm evaluation the project had to have major restructuring at most levels as can be seen from the recommendations. It is clear that the project was poorly designed.</p>

Appendix 5: Lessons learned from the formation of Grazing Associations in Lesotho

LESSONS LEARNED FROM THE FORMATION OF GRAZING ASSOCIATIONS IN LESOTHO

EXTRACTS FROM

**Lesotho Agricultural Production and Institution Support Project (LAPIS)
Ministry of Agriculture, Cooperatives and Marketing**

End of Project Report

Maseru, Lesotho

September 1991



2.0 LEGAL SETTING

2.1 National laws and regulations

1. Enforcement of grazing regulations is difficult given the apathy and disinterest of traditional local institutions. Hence, enforcement devolves to the GA and its elected riders. The best foundations for successful enforcement are GA policies which have been developed with a broad base of member participation. Members who are caught for non-compliance can be held accountable by the very plans for which they have provided public input or support.
2. Enforcement actions are also necessary against non-members of the GA who will constantly test the integrity of the RMA boundary. Many of these individuals will be highly resentful of having been dispossessed of their grazing right within the RMA. They can be quite bellicose, and it is the riders who must bear the brunt of their animosity. The diligence of the riders must be maintained by providing them with meaningful remuneration and active leadership.

2.2 Chieftainship

1. Initiatives for organising GAs and establishing RMAs should only be undertaken in wards where these processes have the unequivocal support of principal chiefs. Though attempts have been made to implement this procedure, the Mokhotlong situation has emerged. To reduce the chance of a similar occurrence, closer pre-development liaison and efforts to increase the exposure of principal chiefs to the RMA/GA concept must be undertaken.
2. The principal chief must verbally (traditionally at pitsos (village gatherings)) and in writing declare the establishment of the RMA and the authority of its GA. Without these pronouncements, the RMA and association will receive neither popular recognition nor legal registration by the law office.
3. The participation of local chiefs must be provided for in the management structure of associations. Area chiefs and village headmen are automatically members of the four GAs established to date.
4. Even with the inclusion of the area chiefs/village headmen as per no.3 above, an RMA advisor should be prepared for low levels of participation on the part of local chiefs. In these cases, organisational and extension efforts must operate on several fronts. Frequent, informal meetings must be held with the chiefs to build the highest level of trust and acceptance between the association's management committee, the chiefs, and the advisor. Simultaneously, the committee and advisor must build a positive relationship with the principal chief, for they will very likely need to appeal to him to motivate his subordinate chiefs.

3.0 ESTABLISHMENT OF THE RMA

3.1 Selecting and defining the RMA

3.1.1 Ranking and recommendation versus expansion of RMAs

1. Within MoA, it is important to establish linkages with the DAO and his staff in livestock production, range management, and extension. On the RMA side, discussions should be held with the DS and his subordinate staff in planning and rural development. The time taken to build strong personal relationships with the district staff will have been well spent as one moves further afield and attempts to organise, strengthen, and advise the groups which are responsible for implementing national policy within the RMA, the VDC, an MOL construction and the GA, a section of MoA.
2. After MoA and MOL, the third important player in the district administration is the principal chief. Protocol dictates that he be consulted through the highest levels - the DAO and DS. His support is necessary as advisors begin consultations with the area chiefs in the potential RMA.
3. Visitations and consultations with MOA and MOL staff residing within the proposed RMA (livestock attendants, grazing control supervisors, woolshed supervisors) are integral to establishing the RMA. These government employees are the source of valuable insights concerning local politics, the strengths and weaknesses of local leadership, and some of the more subtle and hidden relationships among the farmers. Local staff are also of assistance in making contacts with the chiefs, VDCs, and Land Allocation Committees within the proposed RMA.
4. Once ties have been established with local leadership, the area chiefs should call a series of pitsos where advisors can spread public awareness, explain the benefits and costs of development, acquire an understanding of the farmers' goals, objectives, and priorities, and canvass public opinion whether development of the RMA should proceed.
5. Concurrent with these early extension efforts, a rapid assessment of the physical and cultural resources of the proposed area should be made. Jurisdictional boundaries of chiefs and courts, the density of basic infrastructure (roads, schools, post offices, police, woolsheds, livestock improvement centres), and boundaries of cattle post and village grazing areas should be discussed and mapped. An inventory of forage density and potential production, water distribution, watershed stability, grazing patterns, and livestock productivity should be made as well.

3.2 RMA resource inventories

3.2.1 Cattle post inventory

1. Cattle post ownership patterns and user relationships must be documented and mapped, for they feature significantly in establishing the RMA boundary and in defining the population within which the association will be organised.
2. Where inventories have been completed it will be necessary to superimpose the proposed RMA boundary over the surveyed area to define the population of cattle post users. Analysis of user patterns within the newly defined area may then commence. Once a clear picture has emerged from the analysis, the RMA advisor should go to the cattle posts accompanied by local government staff to ground truth the data, to introduce themselves to herders, and to familiarise themselves more fully with local issues. A broad base of trust and acceptance must be built with the herders as their cooperation is vital for successful grazing management. This foundation can only be laid through the advisor's exposure in the cattle posts.
3. Where surveys have not been completed it will be necessary for the advisor to initiate the process himself. Contact should be made with RMD's inventory section for assistance. However, the section's work plan may prevent its participation, and the advisor should be prepared to organise the survey. In either event, the advisor must lead the effort and make their presence well known in the cattle posts.
4. The advisor must expect the population of cattle posts users and their areas of operation to be too large for either the practical operation of a GA or the effective management of an RMA.

3.2.2. Socio-economic survey

1. Socio-economic studies provide important details about the local environment in which RMA residents live and offer insights to their priorities and thoughts. This information is useful for setting goals and objectives, for identifying potential constraints to the implementation of GA activities, and for monitoring the effectiveness of the association's management.
2. Establishing the RMA boundary will require thoughtful reflection on the results of both the cattle post and socio-economic surveys, and will invariably require trials and adjustments.

3.3. RMA's physical boundaries

1. Failure to adhere to the above guidelines may hamper the viability of the GA. Guidelines D and E have proven to be especially meaningful.
2. Local livestock producers (potential grazing association members) and local chiefs must actively participate in determining the RMA boundaries. Their involvement will reduce future conflicts with neighbouring communities and provide them with a sense of ownership of the effort.

4.0 ORGANISING GRAZING ASSOCIATION

4.1. Facilitations vs administration – A contrast in roles

4.2 The cooperative as an institution

1. People participate in cooperative efforts in the belief that they will receive certain benefits through collective action which would not accrue to them as individuals. Within a community there is a wide range of individual ability to derive benefit from the surrounding natural resources and an equally broad range of opinion as to how involved one should become in cooperative action. Advisors should not assume that the "benefits", which have in general been conceived by government and presented to the people as propositions, are readily apparent to the farmer.
2. The extent of control and force necessary to sustain an activity or programme is a measure of its relevancy to the members.

4.3 The process of organisation

4.3.1 The constitution

1. Procedures utilised to assist community members to develop the association's constitution must be continually reviewed and modified. with the intent of increasing participation and enhancing broad-based support.
2. The process of drafting and approving the constitution within the association must proceed slowly. Although the topics which must be included in the document are straightforward and a checklist is available from the law office, numerous pitsos at each village are necessary to determine the specifics. It is during this process that the abilities and levels of commitment of the representatives and of the GA advisor are on display. The village representatives, guided by the advisor and the executive committee, must obtain a consensus among their constituencies with respect to the various articles of the constitution (e.g., goals and overall mission of the association, membership criteria and fees, benefits of membership, terms of

office, and the duties, election and recall procedures of officers). In addition, it is necessary to explain the various national laws and regulations which will be enforced, such as the grazing regulations, once the association is registered and management begins. A period of 3 years from the initial meetings to explain the RMA/GA concept to the final approval of the constitution should be expected.

3. When developing a constitution to establish a new GA, participants should not be able to refer to the constitutions of existing associations. Instead, participants should be encouraged to determine their own needs, goals, and management objectives. This is an important learning process, which contributes strongly to programme ownership and the level of commitment.

4.3.2. The management committee

1. Management committees require training in the procedures and processes of conducting formal meetings, group decision making, record keeping, the roles and duties of executive officers. This training must be initiated prior to developing the constitution.
2. A wide range of talent and capability will be exhibited by the members of the management committee. Matching these with the skills required for specific officer positions will facilitate the development of the constitution and improve the management of the GA. Therefore, the process of electing the executive should not be rushed. Instead, ample time must be provided to allow committee members to familiarise themselves with one another's abilities and depths of commitment.

5.0 GRAZING ASSOCIATION ADMINISTRATION

1. Committee members, especially officers, are busy and have limited amounts of time for GA administrative affairs. Means of securing greater commitment to duties must be pursued.
2. Training of GA management committees must be continual and must build upon the contents of previous training sessions.
3. The short tenure of committee members and the absence of staggered terms of office reduces the administrative effectiveness of the GA. Modifications to this situation are necessary.
4. Committee members must be reminded to keep their constituencies informed of the GA's activities and efforts must be made to improve communication between the management committee and GA members.
5. Currently, the definition of goals and objectives is a one-time event. Consequently, a loss of focus occurs when management committee members change. This approach should be modified so that goals/objectives are continually clarified and updated.
6. Results from monitoring ecological, animal productivity, and economic parameters should be routinely reported to the association so members can appreciate subtle progress in less tangible areas (e.g., range condition, wool/mohair weights and proportional changes in classes, stock liveweights at sales, weaning percentages). Events such as feasts, annual general meetings, and "intra-mural" stock shows should be organised to evaluate progress, promote spirit, and exchange ideas.
7. The authority of a newly established GA to enforce regulations and policies must be tied to the traditional power of the chieftainship. Hence, it is essential to involve local chiefs in the committee's administrative duties.
8. Administration is enhanced if the advisor and the association establish links with other producer groups and institutions in the RMA. These include WMGAs, VDCs, the police, and the local courts. The GA repeatedly requires the assistance of these other institutions. Therefore, an effort must be made to include them, when appropriate, in the association's plans, training sessions, and activities.
9. The management committee must be financially accountable to the membership.
10. Women in rural Lesotho tend to be better educated than men. Furthermore, they do not generally move from the RMA in pursuit of work. The presence of women on the management committee enhances its stability and administrative capability.

6.0 TECHNOLOGY

6.1 Livestock breeding

1. New technologies often require time to be accepted. Judgements should not be made about their effectiveness until a trial period has elapsed.
2. User fees must be assessed for certain activities such as breeding or livestock health and must be set high enough to allow for replacement.
3. Farmers support programmes and activities to the extent their goals are met and tangible benefits are returned.
4. Association members are unwilling to incur high costs and/or risks, hence new practices must have a relatively immediate payoff.

6.2 Grazing management plan

1. Farmers should be encouraged to develop their own grazing plan, using traditional cattle post and village grazing areas as management units. The advisor's role should be to provide insights on technical matters (i.e. carrying capacity, plant recovery periods, timing of livestock movement related to the plan).
2. Issues of equity should be considered in the design of grazing plans. The increased costs of removing animals to distant grazing areas may be too high for individuals to bear. They may have to negotiate unfavourable herding arrangements or reduce their herds. These points are discussed in detail by Artz (1990, 1991).
3. Grazing plans introduce new practices and costs that require repeated explanations and patience before the community at large can absorb them. The effectiveness of a plan cannot be judged for several years after its introduction. Effective plans will receive increased support with the passage of each year. Ineffective plans will require continual enforcement, with participation declining over time.
4. The design of a grazing management plan is not a one-time event. The plan must be monitored closely and the need for annual adjustments should be expected. Plans must be operationally flexible.
5. Grazing plans which are followed can result in desirable successional change (Weaver and Sekoto, 1991) and the need for a good ecological baseline is paramount.

6.3 Infrastructure developments

1. Keep structures simple and use durable materials. Use low-maintenance materials. Housing should be as energy efficient as possible with attention paid to siting for passive solar capture and insulation.
2. If appropriate, expand on or upgrade existing infrastructure. Avoid overlap and duplication of function.
3. DLS has very little money for site maintenance and inputs. To be truly sustainable, all activities that the association does finance must be liquidated or a way found to make them self-supporting.

6.4 Training programme

1. Training farmers must be an ongoing process which continually builds on previous training exercises.
2. Current training efforts must be expanded to reach a wider audience. This will require recurrent village-by-village campaigns.
3. Funds expended in support of farmer training are well spent. However, training would be even more meaningful if the GAs and/or individual farmers were required to pay for a percentage of the training costs.
4. Training should continue to be one of the primary activities focused on GA members.

7.0 MOA INSTITUTIONAL SETTING

7.1 Headquarters level

1. The Range Management Division has met resistance from within the DLS in the implementation of the RMA programme. Weak coordination within the MoA and an overlap of activities are some of the reasons. These must be overcome with improved planning and greater involvement in the RMA/GA programme by all of the DLS.
2. The inclusion of RMA operation and maintenance costs within the general RMD budget allocation has contributed to a shortage of RMA support funds. The RMA budget should be separated from the general RMD budget.

7.2 District level

1. MoA district staff have few resources to participate in the RMA/GA development and support effort. Hence, the RMA advisor and other MoA staff, resident in the RMA, will remain the primary extension agents. However, the development effort should be closely coordinated with district staff, and the DAO must be kept regularly informed of GA activities. Failure in this regard will result in a lack of his support during critical development stages.
2. Given the shortage of MoA resources and manpower, GA development should emphasise self-help and seek to keep the GA as independent from government assistance as possible.

8.0 ROLE OF ADVISOR

1. RMA advisors require specialised formal training. It should be broad and cover the fields of biology, botany, ecology, rural sociology and development, extension methods, animal science, and business management. Field training should include an "apprenticeship" under experienced and competent staff, and the most able advisors should be sent to new locations. In-service training and professional development are critical and should include in-country as well as international tours, conferences, workshops, and seminars. Advisors should be encouraged to report upon their work and unique situations.

2. Many of the processes discussed in the preceding pages hinge on the advisor. They must be a generalist who, like the conductor of a symphony, hears and sees the entire score of people and land. The ability to conceptualise and operate within the “wholes” which comprise rural ecosystems (people and their land) can be learned. This, then, is a major component of sustainability sensitive, competent, and visionary advisors.

9.0 CONCLUSION

The RMA programme began in 1982 and has undergone nine years of growth and development. This has been a dynamic process involving institutions in the Ministry of Agriculture, Cooperatives and Marketing and the Ministry of Interior, Rural Development and Chieftainship Affairs. More specifically, it has centred around the cooperative efforts of the DLS Range Management Division staff, expatriate advisors from the USAID-funded LCRD and LAPIS projects, innovative members of the Chieftainship, and stockowners of the remote mountain areas of Lesotho.

So far, the GAs established under the programme have taken the first steps to organise local stockowners. Through collaborative action these farmers will manage the natural resources of their surroundings and will improve their standards of living. Much of this success can be credited to the ability and willingness of the programme to study itself and improve upon its methods of operation.

Yet, even after nine years of development, this programme is still in its infancy. Weaknesses will emerge but they will be overcome if the programme remains dynamic, continues to adapt, and incorporates new approaches and techniques which further the sustainability of rural communities and enhance the biodiversity upon which their survival depends.

Appendix 6: Template: Method used in this study

Methods used in this study

Measure of Success: In this study success is defined as, a measure of the extent to which the project achieved its objectives. This is abstracted from the evaluation reports (mid-term, terminal evaluation and post review) supplemented by materials from other sources. This will be facilitated by the project having clearly defined objectives and the existence of set criteria for measuring the achievement of the objective.

Information about the project

Table 1: Project meta-data

Our project number	
Sponsor	
Title	
Sponsor's project number	
Local agencies	
Approval date	
Signing date	
Entry into force date	
Duration (dates)	
Delays or extensions:	
Total costs donor US\$.....	
Local M	
Loan/financing terms:	
Type of project (Tick)	Area-based: <input type="checkbox"/> National <input type="checkbox"/>
	Location: <input type="checkbox"/>
Documents used for review 1	
Documents used for review 2	
Documents used for review 3	
Documents used for review 4	

Stages in the life of the project.

Table 2: Summary of the "BEFORE THE PROJECT" information

1. Who initiated?

	Yes	No	Do not know
Sponsor			
Host			
Neither			
Other			

2. Planning sequence

	Do we have it?		
	Yes	No	Not clear
Was there a document for proposal or identification?			
Preparation or evaluation?			
Appraisal?			
Agreement/document?			

3. Were there discussions?

Item/response/rating	Yes	No	I don't know	-2	-1	0	+1	+2
At political level (Govt.)?								
At managerial level (Depts)?								
With other aid agencies?								
With farmers?								

Item/rating	1	2	3	4	5
Was there a national agricultural development plan?	1	2	3	4	5
If so, was the project integrated into it?					
How well could the local institutions cope?					
In terms of staff?					
Material support (e.g. transport)?					
Local costs?					

4. Objectives/targets

Item/rating	1	2	3	4	5
Was there an element of institution building?					
Were the objectives well defined?					
Were the objectives realistic?					
Was the time span realistic?					

5. Plans for evaluation

Item/rating	1	2	3	4	5
How good was the definition of targets?					
How good was the definition or indicators/verifiers?					
Were there specified assessment/evaluation dates?					
Did evaluations take place as planned?					

6. Was the climate favourable? e.g. social environment

Item/rating	0	1	2	3	4	5
Was there existing S. Cons. Programme?						
Was there interest in S.C. among farmers?						

7. General planning. Was the project:

Item/rating	1	2	3	4	5
Feasible?					
Well conceived?					
Compatible with local systems, institutions?					
Competing with other projects?					
Competing with other departments?					

Item/rating	1	2	3	4	5
Was there flexibility to change during the project?					
Was there an annual workplan?					

8. Community involvement at planning

	Yes	No	Don't know	Not needed
Was the budget/resources discussed with community authorities?				
Was the budget/resources discussed with farmers?				
Was the role of the community discussed with community authorities?				
Was the role of the community/farmers discussed with farmers?				

Table 3: What Happened DURING IMPLEMENTATION?**Donor Factors**

Management (Tick)

PMU	Steering Committee	Through Department
-----	--------------------	--------------------

Provided by Project (tick)

Building-house	Offices	Transport	Plant	Technical equipment	Other:
----------------	---------	-----------	-------	---------------------	--------

Staff- expat T/O's No. of man month

Item/rating	-2	-1	0	+1	+2
Personality of leader					
Effectiveness of team approach					
- within international					
- within local staff					

Policies

Item/rating	1	2	3	4	5
Was there flexibility within project?					
How effective was donor back-up?					
Were there plans for regular monitoring?					
Did the monitoring happen as planned?					

Local Factors

Strength of moral or practical support

Item/rating	1	2	3	4	5
At Central, political level					
At department, managerial level					
At district, project, field level					
In farming community					

Resources

Item/rating	Yes	No	Not clear
Were financial resources adequate?			

Completion of planned project activities

Item/rating	Yes	No	Not clear
Were all planned project activities started?			
Were all planned project activities fully implemented?			

Activities not started	Reasons for not starting

Activities not started but not completed	Reasons for not completing

In retrospect:

Item/rating	Yes	No	Don't know	-2	-1	0	+1	+2
Did the farmers need/want it?								
Did the farmers profit from it?								
Are there the resources to service it?								

Define major bottlenecks, constraints...

Item/rating	Poor	Satisfactory	Good
Clarity of objective			
Project design			
Borrower support and involvement			

Achievement of objectives

Item/rating	Poor	Satisfactory	Good
Output			
Transfer of skills			
Follow-up prospects			

List project impacts

List recommendations



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